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This dissertation questions the politics of contemporary cultural development known
as "multiculturalism" and "particularism" which permeate the realm of theology, particularly
in relation with non-Western theologies. It begins by examining the mechanism of
representing "different others" within the modern subjectivity and its universal validity
claim, in order to reveal the modernist's essentialism and reductionistic, totalising tendency.
By arguing that reality is non-formalistic, ambiguous and contingent, and decentring of the
subject, the study articulates the social source of rationality that exists in "in-between"
people (subjects) against the philosophical metanarrative. From this standpoint, the focus
shifts from the subject's ontological/epistemological emphasis to a dialogical event or
relation with the other.
Therefore, this study explores human desire on the relation of "I and the Other,"
with particular attention paid to Emmanuel Levinas' idea on the 'ethical responsibility for
the Other' as the first philosophy. This argues that Levinas disrupts the philosophy of
ontology by inserting a God who is infinite into the finite, and suggests a new modality (me-
ontological) of ethical responsibility for the Other/other. It argues that Levinas' idea is
concretised in Mikhail Bakhtin's dialogism that perceives human consciousness not as a
unified whole but one that always exists in a tensile, conflict-ridden relationship with other
consciousness. It also argues that dialogism is not simply a textual or even an inter-textual
phenomenon, but reaches beyond the text to the social world as a whole. It suggests that
ethics exists in an open and ongoing obligation to respond and answer to the other, rather
than as a consensus or philosophical end or rule. Ethics, as a reminder of the surplus in
human dialogue, argues for the structural necessity of otherness in my solidarity with the
other.
This thesis, then, explores the event of kenotic Christ as a fertile prototype for the
leitmotif of 'the Word made flesh,' and the I/Other dichotomy, and as the consciousness of
human development and dialogical orientation. It stresses a theological and religious affinity
of creating an ethical space to experience the meaning of the future that interrogates the
temporal reality and 'givenness,' a space which brings people into "radical communality and
human solidarity" of the great time, the eschatological plenitude. From this perspective, I
suggest theology as a critical engaging discourse and a cultural criticism within the public
sphere, in creating a new world of human relation.
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In our contemporary discussions, whether about politics, social sciences, or
the humanities, the most pressing feature is the issue of ethnic or cultural identity.
With the rise of nationalism and cultural and ethnic nationalism in the non-Westem
world, the dominant Western ideology and its principles have been put into question
and furthermore, challenged and deconstructed by voices from other traditions of the
non-West or even from the marginalised traditions within the West. As a result, a
rhetoric of equal rights and a politics of difference have emerged which emphasise
the uniqueness of particular identities, and in many cases, reject other groups and
their rights. The aim of this thesis is the search for a meaningful relation between
these particularities and an ethically responsible action that will bring us to focus on
humanity.
In this sense, the question of identity is the kind of question we ask about
ourselves and others, in the context of so-called post-modern multicultural society.
Searching for one's own identity has been the Enlightenment project of discovering
and understanding of the /, Descartes', Cogito ergo sum. The central assumption of
intellectual tradition, especially in the West, has been that knowing and discovering
are intrinsically related. When this searching for an identity becomes an obsession
for ourselves only, where there is an insistence that one's own identity is a universal
one without respecting and accepting the other, - when others are described in terms
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of what is intelligible within my culture - a problem occurs. We are faced with the
question: "what is the purpose of searching for my identity?"
The contemporary politics of multiculturalism attempt to recognise the
marginalised groups including both minority ethnic culture within the Western
country and non-Western cultures globally. But, in an actual socio-political/cultural
representation within the dominant tradition (of the West), the entire multiculturalist
model is flawed by "its tendency to essentialize those cultures, attributing to them far
more unity, regularity, and stability than they actually have."1 Although
multiculturalism seems to promote comparison, there is a danger or tendency to
isolate one from another, and to stress differences to the degree that meaningful
relation between cultures may be deemed impossible.
As a Korean-American, I have constantly questioned my identity and that of
others to try to articulate my relationship with those different others. For me, it is not
a combination of two identities, but a question of living in the hyphen between
Korean and American. This living on the border is a continuing reminder that I have
to live in a diaspora, and as a minority. For it provides a mode of breaking with the
past, transforming the present, learning new things; and moreover, desiring a better
country for all. For many, this project involves searching for authenticity and
uniqueness, and emphasising the differences. But, the heart of this project lies in
my relating to others. However, this does not mean that I disregard authenticity and
difference. I choose to express it in terms ofmutual existence and solidarity for all.
1 Charles Bernheimer, "The Anxieties of Comparison," in Comparative Literature in the Age of
Multiculturalism, ed by Charles Bernheimer (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p.8.
2
Introduction
So, the question is 'How do I relate myself to the other', and 'What is the space that
promotes such relations in which no one is excluded but all participate.' The idea of
authenticity or uniqueness does not mean 'wholeness,' but a 'meaningful
particularity' in itself. What is being attempted here is a definition of the limitedness
of a particularity, because on a fundamental level it is the limit that divides,
separates, and creates boundaries, in every culture. In other words, the subject under
discussion is the human predicament of being limited - the mutual acknowledgement
of one's ability and inability to see.
Having recognised limitedness, it is crucial to relate ourselves to the Other,
in searching and articulating for a better future for all, since the Other is a necessary
condition of our existence, not an option or addition. But, our past shows that the
Other has been defined in reference to me and for me, and this trend has been
intensified through the imperialist and colonialist periods, especially in the West.
Consequently, Eurocentrism defined colonialism and described the process of
European powers into much of the world. J.M Blaut called this "the coloniser's
model of the world."2 Eurocentrism as a discourse divided the world into the "West
and the Rest,"3 and attributed to the West an inherent process of democratic tradition,
progress, and humanism, while patronising and demonising the non-West. What I
am addressing is not the European as individual, but rather the historically dominant
and oppressive European relation to the Other, externally and even internally,
rejecting Europe as the unique source of meaning. My question is not how far
2 J.M. Blaut, Colonizer's Model of the World: Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentic History
(New York: Guilford Press, 1993), p. 10.
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Europeans have been guilty and Third World inhabitants innocent. But, rather, how
far the criteria by which guilt and innocence are determined have been historically
constituted; how the Other has been represented in the West; and how this history has
been written about it. This study endeavours to show the mechanism of
representation - marginalising, manipulating, and oppressing the different others in
favour of us, through the reflection on contemporary cultural studies and post-
colonial discourse. It is an attempt to reveal and overturn this structural domination
upon which Western thought traditionally has rested, as Thomas Altizer says,
[T]rue revolution is not simply an opening to the future but also a
closing of the past. Yet the past which is negated by a
revolutionary future cannot simply be negated or forgotten. It
must be transcended by way of a reversal of the past, a reversal
bringing a totally new light and meaning to everything which is
manifest as the past, and therefore a reversal fully transforming
the whole horizon of the present.4
Post-colonial discourse exposes this inner mechanism, and indicates the
constructive-deconstruction of the dominant ideology by its ethical questioning. The
aim is not just to relativise Eurocentrism and related discourses, but to go beyond and
make connections between different others in an effort to overcome and place
ghettoised histories and discourses in productive relations. It also rejects
essentialising tendencies (such as militant particularism) of the non-Westem




discourse in articulating its own difference and uniqueness only. It searches for the
ontological past and its re-discovery against all that is western and its implications.
The crucial issue lies in their inter-connectedness, rather than speaking of cultural
groups in isolation. What emerges from the "in-relation" or "in-between" is a
dialogue and communication that is a process of doubling, never happening in
isolation. Communication is a dialogic encounter of subjects creating together, not
just a transference of knowledge. This means that people live in two different worlds
at the same time; or if they live in one world, the oneness will be achieved at the
expense of the other.
This discourse is an attempt to articulate the space of "in-between" borders
and to experience the limitedness of the self and the acknowledgement of co-
participating existence in the making of a fuller humanity. It challenges each of these
borders and breaks one's own totalising system. Thus, the implication of the dialogic
process suggests a mode of questioning and interrogating the self and exposes the
limit of a particular culture or view in the process of dialogical becoming. To be
engaged in dialogue means to articulate the present as ambivalent and provisional,
necessarily open to future evaluation. The purpose of the dialogical project is not to
pursue order and certainty and thus destroy ambivalence, but to live with
ambivalence and ambiguity. In other words, what emerges from dialogue is to be
suspicious of and to question the present, as reflected in Derrida's critique on
modernism: full clarity means the end of history. This deconstructive criticism calls
into question the structural relationship of Western tradition and dislocates its
4 Thomas J.J. Altizer, The Descent into Hell: A Study of the Reversal of the Christian Consciousness
(New York: Seabury, 1979), p. 53.
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network.5 Its criticism not only creates a sense of 'in-between' that resists the
traditional systematic form of Western theology, but also a new opening for
religious imaginations.
The task of (post)modern theology is then to articulate the dialogical reality
of human life that is constituted by its many dialogue partners. This includes
contemporary cultural discourse, thoughts and belief foreign to the Western tradition
itself, and the new emerging voices from feminist, Third World and other theological
perspectives.6 In a way, the contemporary theological task is "to discover plurality"
and "to rediscover the contingency and ambiguity of history and society."7 As Rowan
Williams says "it is more importantly exercised in the discernment of what
contemporary conflicts are actually about and in the effort both to clarify this and to
decide where Christian should find his or her identity in a conflict."8 Since theology
is constructed within socially and morally formative discourse, it should be a public
discourse judging and contributing to public and individual spheres in what Williams
calls "a real or possible community of speaking and responding persons, and a
history of concrete decisions and acts."9 The task is only possible through dialogical
engagement in solidarity, a willingness to listen and to respond to the different
5 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. By A Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1978,), p. 20.
6 See David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination (pp. 99-167); Plurality and Ambiguity (pp.42-82).
7 David Tracy, Plurality andAmbiguity, p. 65.
8 Rowan D. Williams, "Postmodern Theology and the Judgement of the World," in Postmodern
Theology: Christian Faith in a Pluralistic World, ed by Frederic B. Burnham (HarperSanFrancisco,
1989), p. 98.
9 Ibid., p. 99.
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others. In other words, the task of theology is to serve humanity and the world
around us, as Gordon Kaufman says,
Theology also serves human purposes and needs and should be
judged in terms of the adequacy with which it is fulfilling the
objective we humans have set for it. "The sabbath was made for
man," Jesus said, "not man for the sabbath" (Mark 2:27). This
is, all religious institutions, practices and ideas - including the
idea of God - were made to serve human needs and to further our
humanization.10
Christian theology is not the science of religion that articulates ontological
statements about the empirical existence of human being, cultures and religions, but a
philosophy of religion that suggests the possibility and meaning of human endeavour
in struggling for truth, justice and freedom. Hence, Christian theology as a
transcultural or metalinguistic ethics, should reveal the violence and oppression
committed in the name of the sacred and of culture and tradition. What emerges here
is neither an epistemological understanding nor ontological discovery of being, but
an ethical relation that comes out from the inter-subjective dialogic process of
intimacy, vulnerability and mutual exchange; it is an attitude and a sense of faith that
comes by participating in human life. In responding to the Other, as Levinas shows,
it is an ethic that is rooted in human existence. He calls this "First Philosophy"-
conditioning moral obligation and existential condition in human solidarity. This is,
as Schussler Fiorenza emphasises, to change the definition of theology from an
"interpretive conversation" that ignores implicit structures of power and privilege, to
10 Gordon Kaufman, The Theological Imagination: Constructing the Concept of God (Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1981), p. 264.
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a different theological discourse.11 For her, theology is about waging a critical
discourse against the patterns of power and privilege, through the solidarity with
marginalised voices that are traditionally excluded from theological conversation.
What is needed is an ongoing theological struggle against oppression and violence,
as she says,
The 'inclusion of the previously excluded as theological subjects,
I argue, entails a paradigm shift from scientific to a rhetorical
genre, from a hermeneutical model of conversation to a practical
model of collaboration. Since rhetorical practices display not
only a referential moment about something and a moment of
self-implicature by a speaker or actor, but also display a
persuasive moment of directness to involve the other, they elicit
responses, emotions, interests, judgement, and commitments
directed toward a common vision.12
In this process, the significance of religion makes us realise that the task of theology
is never completed. It must reject perfection - the theological temptation of self
glorification and narcissism.
What is being attempted is a recovery of the voice of theology, a theology
that has lost the confidence of contemporary audiences by reminding it of the fact
that if there is truth in particular traditions or cultures, freedom, justice, and human
solidarity dwell with that truth. The theological task here is to assess traditions and
cultures in line with the commitment to freedom, justice and human solidarity, by
engaging in the dialogical relation. This is not just a matter of tolerating the other,
11 Elizabeth Schtissler Fiorenza, "Commitment and Critical Inquiry," Harvard Theological Review,
no. 82, 1989, p. 8.
12 Ibid., p. 9.
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but of accepting justice and human solidarity as a shared goal and task for all. This
theological human solidarity is anticipatory and prophetic as regards the future, and
despite circumstances to the contrary, it generates hope.
Thus, the task of this study is to create a space that generates hope and resists
the totalising and de-humanising violence within the society. Because of the nature
of its study, this argument operates in and around the dominant discourse of the West
and other peripheries, as I am placed in this space of 'in-between.' It is possible only
through a genuine dialogical process with the Other, in resisting those totalising
powers. It reveals the mechanism of Western totalising power of fixing,
controlling and inflicting violence on the Other. It challenges this listening to the
discourse of the victim through the post-colonial discourse and its socio-political
implications. This creates a feeling of ambivalence and uncertainty within Western
discourse, and leads us to a radical questioning of the foundation ofWestern thought.
This questioning displaces the West from its isolated privileged position and places
it within a relationship with the Other.
What is required in this relationship exceeds mere understanding and requires
a sense of ethical responsibility that comes from justice. Justice remains justice only
where it is linked in a complex manner of relationships, a community of others. What
becomes clear is that, while the history of humankind is a history of conflicts
between people and their ideologies, justice does not arise from ego, or self-
development, but from our moral responsibilities for the Other and solidarity with
9
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the Other. In applying this 'new modality' into ordinary discourse, this study will
seek to extend this Levinasian insight into Bakhtinian thought.
This me-ontological praxis of ethics as opposed to the hegemony of
representation, is concretised in Bakhtin's understanding of dialogical relationship
between discourses of real life and literature. In revealing what Bakhtin calls a
'mutual answerability' among human sciences and ordinary life with each other, this
mode of interhuman relationship and interaction becomes a key to our task that ends
comprehension, but opens ethics in our articulations. And, this Bakhtinian dialogical
relationship, especially of ethical commitment (operating in Bakhtin's commitment
to Russian Orthodox Christianity and the kenotic tradition) provides a way to attend,
to re-orient, and to concretise our theological discourses in our sociality. Theology
should be a reflection on kenosis that opens new possibilities in our theological
discourse, in understanding God, self and world, and in developing self-critical
thought in relation with the Other within a vision of human solidarity
This study is divided into five chapters. The first chapter deals with the
mechanism of representation that violates and victimises the Other in the name of
rationalism and modernity of the past, and the multi-culturalism of the present. This
discussion includes a review ofEdward Said and Rene Girard.
The second chapter deals with post-colonial discourse as the mirror image of
the Western intellectual tradition, as well as that of the non-Western tradition. The
colonised nations and their efforts to find cultural identity reveal a similar trend
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within theology. This discussion involves the idea of doubling and hybridity that
rejects the discourse which insists on the purity and origin of 'being,' but articulates
'becoming' in conflicts and struggles in tension. This idea of 'becoming' rejects the
dominant reading practice but promotes a reading from the victim's perspective in
order to reveal the limitedness and power structure of the dominant group. This is
investigated through the thoughts of Franz Fanon, Edward Said, Stuart Hall, Homi
Bhabha, Michael Foucault and the theologians Nairn Ateek and R.S. Sugirtharajah.
The third chapter is devoted to Emmanuel Levinas, especially his particular
account of ethics as a new modality at the end of philosophy which rejects Western
consciousness as being dominated by 'ontological comprehension.' He rejects
rational-enlightenment philosophy and theology on the ground of their historic
vassalage to such philosophy, by rethinking both philosophy and theology in the
light of ethics as 'first philosophy.' The new modality is a me-ontological form of
relating, which should be related to the concerns of philosophy and theology; it
emphasises the dynamics of a me-ontological responsive praxis that comes from
responsibility and moral consciousness on behalf of the Other. It deals with the
necessity of the Other and the Other's ethical and religious significance in this
rethinking process ofmoral consciousness.
The fourth chapter deals with Mikhail Bakhtin, who, as Todorov remarks, is
"the most important Soviet thinker in the human sciences and the greatest
theoretician of literature in the twentieth century."13 This section argues for a
13 Tzvetan Todorov, Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle, trans, by Wlad Godzich
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1984), p. ix.
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communicative and dialogical event in human consciousness, by extending Levinas'
perspective on the otherness and the me-ontological ethics of responsibility, into the
fundamental question of self/other relations of Bakhtin. It attempts to find an
alternative path to me-ontological praxis, by investigating Bakhtin's architectonic
relationships (of constructive, compositional, or creative relationships) between
discourses in life and literature. Bakhtin re-interprets relationships among genres,
forms and discourses in a way that engages in an open-ended dialogical process.
Here, Bakhtinian re-interpretation is applied in the sphere of the cultural domains of
the human sciences, religion and life in general, as an attempt to find, what he calls
"mutual answerability." This section explores the concept of 'novelness,'
'heteroglossia' and 'carnival' in order to emphasise the dialogical process and to find
the answerable event. It finds significant theological echoes in Bakhtin, especially in
his conception of Christ in the kenotic tradition of the Eastern church. The event of
Christ is not only important for the cosmic history of human salvation, but also for
the development of human consciousness of the self s relation to the other. Hence,
this study reiterates the event of incarnation in John 1:1-14, as the signifying
importance of dialogical interaction among people and of dialogical inter-orientation
with each other.
Finally, the fifth chapter suggests that the ethics of dialogism should lie at the
heart of our contemporary theologising process. It seeks to shift the task of theology
from the investigation of essence or being and of self-development, to the ethical
event of human solidarity that articulates how to live in communion with the other,
and ultimately with God. This study suggests that theological education should be
12
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an experience of the event of kenosis of de-centring the subject and of placing it into
relations of ethical responsibility of togetherness. This kenotic event indicates the
process of secularising 'official or elitist theological discourse' and weakens its
strong ontological structure and human epistemology. Within the spirit of 'kenotic
event,' theological interaction and encounter with others (or other values) should
lead us to create an event that returns us constantly to a 'critical space' or 'border' in
which Christianity is enacted differently in a heterogeneous plurality in the present.
The important task of our theologising process is the ethically responsible action and
living on the border, in creating a new order of human relations. As Bakhtin says of
the borderline event,
the demand is: live in such a way that every given moment of
your life would be both the consummating, final moment and, at
the same time, the initial moment of a new life.14
The hope for a new order provides a sense of distance to keep ourselves from the
present order and reality, and a desire to create a community that is without violence
and in defense of all victims and the oppressed. This is only possible through the
'taking of responsibility rather than scapegoating others,' in order to create such a
community of faith, hope, and love. It emerges from a sense of faith and an attitude
of hope for a new humanity, believing in God's transformative presence among us
for all.
14 Mikhail Bakhtin, Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays, ed. by Michael Holquist and
Vadim Liapunov, trans, by Vadim Liapunov (Austin: University of Texas, 1990), p. 122.
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Chapter 1. Profile ofthe Other
"When we discover that there are several cultures instead of just
one and consequently at the time when we acknowledge the end of
a sort of cultural monopoly, be it illusory or real, we are
threatened with the destruction of our own discovery. Suddenly it
becomes possible that there are just others, that we ourselves are
an 'other' among others. All meaning and every goal having
disappeared, it becomes possible to wander through civilization as
if through vestiges and ruins. The whole of mankind becomes an
imaginary museum: where shall we go this weekend - visit the
Angkor ruins or take a stroll in Tivoli of Copenhagen?"
Paul Ricoeur, "Universal Civilizations
and National Culture," in History and
Truth, p.278.
Los Angeles, like all cities, is unique, but in one way it may
typify the world city of the future: there are only minorities. No
single ethnic group, nor way of life, nor industrial sector
dominates that scene. Pluralism has gone further here than in any
other city in the world and for this reason it may well characterize
the global megalopolis of the future.1
Nowhere are the issues dividing America more pronounced:
the imperative of the nation as a whole culture set against the
desire for subcultures to flourish. E pluribus unum (out of many,
one) is a formulation no longer adequate to that duality which
many want: a dialogue between the one and the many, the center
and the peripheries, with both sides equally acknowledged and
allowed to talk.2
Today, in the West, multiculturalism is the most popularly used word in
society, stemming from a desire to respect other cultures and to deny racial
1 Charles Jencks, Heteropolis: Los Angeles, the Riot and the Strange Beauty ofHetero-Architecture
(London: Academy Group and Ernst John & Son, 1993), p.7.
2 Charles Jencks, Heteropolis, p.8.
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hierarchy. It depends on the idea that every culture is equally valuable and that the
protection and promotion of cultural diversity is an essential aspect of a democratic
society. This idea of 'multiculturalism' rejects an apartheid policy, like that of
former South Africa, and promotes the maintenance of cultural diversity. In modem
Western society, this idea is applied and permeates every aspect of societal life
including academic disciplines and religious practices. But the most worrying aspect
is that this idea, while promoting and encouraging the maintenance of cultures and
their uniqueness, also implies an underlying idea of cultural separation.
The most significant area affected by this prevailing idea is educational policy
- multicultural education in western society, especially that of the North Atlantic
states. Although multicultural education has been described as a means to accept
cultural diversity, it seems, in fact, to present these differences as a static,
unchangeable, and predetermined natural phenomenon. It is like a human museum
or zoo where differences are displayed, emphasising the vertical orientation of
culture. As the anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss stated as an anthropologist, "the
ultimate goal is not to know what the societies under study 'are'... but to discover
how they differ from one another."3 Levi-Strauss likened societies to trains moving
each on its own track, at its own speed, in its own direction.4 This emphasises the
3 Claude Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, vol. 2 (London: Allen Lane, 1968) p. 63.
4 Claude Levi-Strauss, The View From Afar, trans Joachim Neugroschel and Phoebe Hoss
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987) pp. 10-11.
"The trains rolling alongside ours are permanently present for us; through the windows of
our compartments, we can observe at our leisure the various kinds of cars, the faces and
gestures of the passengers. But if, on an oblique or a parallel track, a train passes in the other
direction, we perceive only a vague, fleeting, barely identifiable image, usually just a
momentary blur in our visual field, supplying no information about the event itself and
merely irritating us because it interrupts our placid contemplation of the landscape which
serves as the backdrop to our daydreaming.
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differences that make us separated from the others, even to the point where cultural
difference is deemed to be the same as biological difference. He says,
In order to develop differences, so that the boundaries enabling
us to distinguish one culture from its neighbours may become
sufficiently clear-cut, the conditions are roughly the same as
those promoting biological differentiation between human
groups.... Cultural barriers are almost of the same nature as
biological barriers; the cultural barriers prefigure the biological
barriers all the more as all cultures leave their mark on the
human body.5
This suggests a denial of the possibility of interaction between different cultures. In
other words, while emphasising differences and certain ways of life, multiculturalism
can be used to place others in a realm of indifference. Levi-Strauss encourages the
creation of barriers between different groups to minimise interaction because such
contact between different cultures weakens their differences. He argues that the ideal
situation is where "communication had become adequate for mutual stimulation by
remote partners, yet was not so frequent or so rapid as to endanger the indispensable
obstacles between individuals and groups or to reduce them to the point where overly
facile exchanges might equalise and nullify their diversity."6 For Levi-Strauss,
communication is proper, as long as there is no danger of contaminating each other.
Every member of a culture is as tightly bound up with it as this ideal traveller with his own
train. From birth and, as I have said, probably even before, the things and beings in our
environment establish in each one of us an array of complex references forming a system -
conduct, motivations, implicit judgements - which education then confirms by means of its
reflexive view of the historical development of our civilization. We literally move along
with this reference system, and the cultural system established outside it are perceptible to us
only through the distortions imprinted upon them by our system. Indeed it may even make
us incapable of seeing those systems."
5 Claude Levi-Strauss, The View From Afar, p. 17.
6 Claude Levi-Strauss, The View From Afar, p. 24.
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What is implied is that cultures should remain where they belong as distinctive
cultural identities.
The principle ofmulticulturalism applied to education, politics, religious
practices, etc., especially in Levi-Strauss' terms, sounds reasonable enough in
creating a society where individuals and groups are recognised in their differences,
so that they are not manipulated by others. In this post-colonial and global society,
this understanding ofmulticulturalism and its political implications still operates
with hegemonic power..
A city like Los Angeles is a city of the future; not because of its geographical
size or number of its population, but rather because of its multicultural, global, post¬
modern characteristics. It symbolises the central theme of post-modern urban
imagery in the theme of difference. It rejects the old liberal ideal of universal and
meta-narrative homogeneity. It also distinguishes itself from so-called 'cultural
diversity,' which is an epistemological project in which "cultural difference is the
process of enunciation of culture as 'knowledgeable,' authoritative, adequate to the
construction of systems of cultural identification."7 'Cultural diversity' is the
'recognition of pre-given cultural contents' which is only possible within a certain
system of articulation; it gives rise to the liberal notion of multiculturalism and
cultural exchange, which is probably possible only in a Utopian situation.
The Los Angeles riots in 1989, however, raised a fundamental question. This
7 Homi K. Bhabha, "Cultural Diversty and Cultural Difference," in the Postcolonial Studies Readers,
ed. by Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin (London: Routledge, 1995), p.206.
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was more than just an urban riot in a city that is made up entirely of cultural
minorities. The problem is not a problem of disorder, chaos or even violence. It is
'the dilemma of multiculturalism at its most acute' that is posed by the riots in Los
Angeles - i.e. the need for all voices to be heard, for all identities to be affirmed.8
What is now needed is a politics of difference that is not a politics informed by an
abstract notion of justice, but a genuinely multicultural politics within which
alternative notions of justice can be brought into play.9 It should be a politics of
difference which empowers the voices of all.
This politics of difference, however, should not be viewed as simply the
reflection of pre-given ethnic and cultural traits set in the fixed tablet of tradition, as
in multiculturalism. It is more a "social articulation of difference," from a minority
perspective. It "is a complex, on-going negotiation that seeks to authorise cultural
hybridities that emerges in moments of historical transformation,"10 as we live on the
borderlines of the present. Renee Green, the Afro-American artist, said,
Multiculturalism doesn't reflect the complexity of the situation
as I face it daily... It requires one to step outside of him/herself to
actually see what he/she is doing. I don't want to condemn well-
meaning people and say (like those T-shirts you can buy on the
street) 'It's a black thing, you wouldn't understand.' To me
that's essentializing blackness.11
8 Joel S. Kahn, Culture, Multiculture, Postculture (London: Sage Publications, 1995), p. 105.
9 See Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics ofDifference (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1990)
10 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location ofCulture (London:Routledge, 1994), p. 2.
11 Rene Green, interview conducted by Miwon Kwon for the exhibition 'Emerging New York Artists.'
quoted from Homi Bhabha, The Location ofCulture, p.3.
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Going beyond the border of self identity means to encounter something new which is
not part of the continuum of the past and the present. The borderline is not the final
boundary, but the beginning of something new and a place where a different reality
is encountered. Franz Fanon once said, "I should constantly remind myself that the
real leap consists in introducing invention into existence,"12 and "In the world in
which I travel, I am endlessly creating myself. And it is by going beyond the
historical, instrumental hypothesis that I will initiate my cycle of freedom."13
The journey of self-identity is well described in Eva Hoffmann's biography
Lost in Translation. In three parts: Paradise, Exile, and The New World, she
beautifully expresses in a moving and thought-provoking manner the problems which
emigrants have to face: the problem of language , nostalgia, loss, and the search for
identity. In the second part of the book, Hoffmann focuses on her alienation and her
problem with the English language. The problem is that the signifier has become
severed from the signified. The words / leam now don't stand for things in the same
unquestioned way they did in my native tongue. Her native language (Polish)
becomes a dead language. She finds that Polish words don't apply to her new
experience. This part contains a thoughtful discussion about life in a new language
and her anxiety about identity:
'This is a society [an American says] in which you are who you
think you are. Nobody gives you your identity here, you have to
reinvent your self every day.' He is right I suspect, but I can't
figure out how this is done. But how do I choose from identity
12 Franz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (London: Pluto, 1986), p.229.
13 Franz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, pp. 231.
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options available all around me?14
In part three, Hoffmann gives an account of how she gradually begins to feel at home
in the New World. She shares an acute sense of dislocation and the strong challenge
ofhaving to invent a place and an identity for herselfwithout the traditional supports.
Feelings of anomie, loneliness and emotional depression force her into therapy. She
is asked: why do so many Americans go to psychiatrists all the time? She replies:
It's a problem of identity. Many of my American friends feel
they don't have enough of it. They often feel worthless, or they
don't know how they feel maybe it's because everyone is
always on the move and undergoing enormous changes, so they
lose track of who they've been and have to keep tabs on who
they're becoming all the time.15
At the end of the book, Hoffman acknowledges that she is being remade, fragment by
fragment, like a patchwork quilt, and that she is becoming a hybrid creature, a sort of
resident alien. The book makes it clear that identity is changed by the journey; that
subjectivity is recomposed. Exile and migration can be deadening, but it can be very
creative, and a place for transfiguration. Therefore, identity is to be found in the
process of becoming through the Other, because identity is always related to what
one is not, and only conceivable in and through difference.
But such realities also pose a challenge to the traditional mechanism that
limits and channels people and ideas, both at the individual and the larger-group
levels. It changes people and their mentalities. New experiences result from the
14 Eva Hoffman, Lost in Translation: Life in a New Language (London: Minerva, 1991), p. 160.
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coming together of multiple influences and peoples, and these new experiences lead
to altered or evolving representations of experience and self-identity. This complex
act of relating to a number of identities, in terms of linguistic, religious, economic,
social, political, ethnic and cultural identities, calls 'us' into question, and challenges
'our' previous self-perceptions and images. It posits a change of attitude towards the
past and the present, and hence to the future as well. Moreover, it creates feelings of
uncertainty: the ambivalence that comes via the Other.
1. Desire for the Other.
The appearance of the Other is not a sudden phenomenon within Western
intellectual history. It has been latently present, but suppressed by the dominant
ideologies, cultures and their practice. In ancient times, the Greeks drew a sharp
distinction between themselves (i.e. self) and the Barbarians (i.e. the Other):
Greekness was the polar opposite of barbarism. This Panhellenism was a popular
device of uniting the feuding city-states in an aggressive campaign against the same
barbarian enemy. This becomes the Neo-Hellenism of the West which has assumed
the guardianship of ancient Hellas and its legacy. Although the problem of the Other
is as ancient as the metaphysics in Greek philosophy, the Other has been devalued or
ignored by onto-epistemologically oriented Western philosophy and theology.
Moreover, since the modern era, ushered in by Descartes and the Enlightenment, this
15 Eva Hoffman, Lost in Translation, p. 263.
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process of manipulation of the Other has been intensified and rationalised with the
result that the Other is considered as 'that which lacks what we have.' Thus, the
Other has a negative image, pushed to the peripheral and the margin, or otherwise
dismissed from cognition.
This negative understanding of the Other has religious connotations, based on
a mechanism that produces a scapegoat. As we see in Edward Said's Orientalism,
the Other - in this case Islam - is always produced for the sake of us, the dominant
tradition and structure, in order to preserve the status quo and its purity from
contamination. Thus, Rene Girard particularly articulates a theory of the Sacred that
explains the role of religious institutions and cultural formations and at the same
time, provides a hermeneutical theory to interpret them.16 Girard indicates that
society results from the collective murder of an arbitrary victim, in order to re¬
establish peace through finding and killing a single and common enemy to whom all
attribute their misfortune.17 He argues that the nature of overarching authority is
violence as the energy of the social system that includes primordial religious
institutions and the relationship between individual and institutions.18 This event of
killing of one by all, in Girard, founds society, religion, and other social institutions,
and this process is both historical and mechanical in the sense that it happened (and
16 See Andrew J. McKenna "Introduction," Semeia no. 33, 1985, pp. 1-11. Semeia 33 is solely
contributed to Rene Girard and Biblical Studies. He articulates the dialectics of mimetic desire
forming human relations, in Deceit, Desire and the Novel (1965); the fundamental motivations of
ritual sacrifice (the role of sacrifice and the surrogate victim)in Violence and Sacred (1972);
anthropological theory and hypothesis of human culture in Things Hidden from the Foundation of the
World (1978).
17 Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred , trans, by Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1977), pp. 204-205.
18 Robert Hamerton-Kelly, Sacred Violence (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), p. 17-18.
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happens) and operates at a non-conscious social level, unrecognised at the level of
religious interpretation.
Girard begins with the nature of desire, a desire for the Other viewed in terms
ofmimesis, rivalry, and collective violence. He uses this as a hermeneutical tool for
understanding the development of human culture. Hamerton-Kelly articulates the
Girardian model of culture as a 'likely story,':
Once upon a time there was a group of hominids that found itself
unable to do anything in concert because of rivalry among them.
Each one [was] inwardly compelled to imitate some other. As
the imitation became more successful he found himself a rival of
his model, and the more like the model he became the more
violent became the rivalry. Co-operation was impossible until
one day, [the momentous day human culture began,] two of them
discovered that is was possible to agree on one thing, to agree to
kill someone else. This was such a compelling possibility that
the whole group imitated them, and so the first moment of
human solidarity happened as the fellowship of the lynch mob.19
The mimetic desire that operates by copying the other's desire for an object brings an
ultimate logical consequence - conflict.20 What is being proposed in order to deflect
violence away from the human community is the selection of a single victim or
group of victims. What is achieved through this process of victimisation is peace in
the community; in other words, through the violent act done to the 'scapegoat' the
19 Robert Hamerton-Kelly, "Sacrificial Violent and the Messiah: A Hermeneutical Mediation on the
Marcan Passion Narrative," unpublished paper presented to the Bible, Narrative, and American
Culture Seminar and the Jesus Seminar, October 15-18, 1987, pp. 6-7. quoted from James G.
Williams, The Bible, Violence, and the Sacred (New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991), p. 7.
20 Andrew J. McKenna "Introduction," Semeia no. 33, 1985, p. 3.
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community is able to alienate its own destructive violence. The victim is hallowed
and sanctified for being a redeemer of the community and consequently the violence
itself become sanctified as well.21 Accordingly, what is demonstrated here is that the
foundation and preservation of culture is based on a sacred violence that repeats,
following the original substitution, endlessly justifying itself. Hamerton-Kelly, in
summarising Girard's idea, argues that "the energy is violence, the mechanism is the
Sacred, and society is a system of sacred violence."22
Girard's idea of the Sacred is directly opposite to that of Mircea Eliade who
considers religion as a response to the Sacred and ritual and myth as a human
response to the manifestation of the Sacred. For Girard, the Sacred is itself a product
of community.23 Therefore, the Sacred gains the dominance over man. In society,
"violence is the heart and secret soul of the sacred,"24for its ability to divert the
intense mimetic desire of destruction into a way that unifies community by
transferring not only our mimetic desire but also the deflecting mechanism of our
surrogate victimage, to the victim. Theologically we make the victim bear both our
sins and the sin ofmaking the victim bear our sins. This double transference is "the
foundational lie of culture and the original act of bad faith."25 As Girard states in
Things Hidden from the Foundation of the World the original sign of emerging
humanity (or human relation) is the victim;
21 Andrew J. McKenna "Introduction," Semeia no. 33, 1985, pp. 3-4.
22 Robert Hamerton-Kelly, Sacred Violence, p. 18
23 Robert Hamerton-Kelly, Sacred Violence, p. 28.
24 Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 31.
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The signifier is victim. The signified constitutes all actual and
potential meaning the community confers on to the victim and,
through its intermediacy, on to all things. The sign is the
reconciliatory victim. Since we understand that human beings
wish to remain reconciled after the conclusion of the crisis, we
can also understand their penchant for reproducing the language
of the sacred substituting, in ritual, new victims for the original
victim, in order to assure the maintenance of the miraculous
peace.26
The important point is that this victimisation mechanism is a reflection of the human
condition, and this scapegoating is more deeply rooted in the human condition than
we are willing to admit.27
The significant element about scapegoating is that the myth and ritual of
surrogate victimage becomes a pattern of modern socio-political and psychological
practice. Others are blamed for mistakes in the society.. And responsibility for
society's own violence is transferred to others, as in the Gulf War, the Bosnian-
Serbian conflict and its racial genocide, the Nazis, the South African Apartheid
policy, anti-Islamic movements, racism, nationalism, imperialism, colonialism, and
anti-Semitism, etc. This has to do with accusation and collective violence in human
relations. The prevailing practice of human society is to identify a victim so that the
group or community may exist in harmony. In other words, the sacred violence of
scapegoating is a religious and cultural form that is capable of channelling and
25 Robert Hamerton-Kelly, Sacred Violence, p. 27.
26 Rene Girard, Things Hidden since the Foundation of the Earth, trans by S.Bann and M. Metteer
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), p.103
27 Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 96.
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deflecting rivalry and preventing conflicts from erupting.28 In a way, it is a
consensus, a common ground on which parties in rivalry can agree, which becomes
violent and victimises the surrogate victim.
The victim, as the source of the sudden unity and order [i.e., "the
first moment of human solidarity as the fellowship of the lynch
mob"], was regarded as a saviour; and [he or she] was blamed
for causing the previous disorder. Thus [he or she] acquired the
double valency of the sacred: attraction and revulsion. From the
victim came the building blocks of social order: prohibition to
control the course of rivalry; ritual sacrifice to reenact and so
represent to the group the unifying energy of the founding
moment; myth to explain and obscure the violence by covering it
up with transformations. The victim became the god, at the stage
of the emergence of the gods. Thus society formed in the
crucible of religion. Religious feeling [is individual and group
awareness of the community, whose power of mimetic violence
is represented in the form of gods and the sacred. Therefore,
religion is essentially sacrifice- sacrificare, "making or rendering
sacred."]29
The victim is a necessary condition of social order in differentiating the other from
the all by establishing prohibition and re-enacting myth and ritual. The victim is the
different other (a foreigner, a witch, a purveyor of new ideas, a prophet and etc.)
considered as the cause of disorder and at the same time the cause of order or peace.
Moreover, all prohibition, myth, and ritual maintain the economy of the 'victimising
sacred violence.' In this social system, what is important is not what really
happened, but "the interpretation of what happened, - what the community transfers
28 Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 14.
29 Robert Hamerton-Kelly, "Sacrificial Violent and the Messiah: A Hermeneutical Mediation on the
Marcan Passion Narrative," pp.6-7. quoted from James G. Williams, The Bible, Violence, and the
Sacred, p. 10..
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to the victim and what the victim in turn represents to them."30 As a consequence,
interpretation or hermeneutics is at the origin of culture, since as mentioned above,
the matter is the (mis)interpretation of what happened.31 This (mis)interpretation of
what happened is re-enacted or retold in the form of myth and ritual, in order to
rationalise the founding mechanism of sacred violence, and to constitute or
reconstitute the cultural order. Girard indicates that,
Monstrosities recur throughout mythology. From this we can
only conclude that myths makes constant reference to the
sacrificial crisis, but do so only in order to disguise the issue.
Myths are the retrospective transfiguration of sacrificial crises,
the reinterpretation of these crises in the light of cultural order
that has arisen from them.32
Such mythology is elaborated as "an unconscious process based on the surrogate
victim and nourished by the presence of violence. This presence is not 'repressed,'
not cast off on the unconscious; rather, it is detached from man and made
divine"33and ontological in its nature. Not only can the violence be survived, but "it
has also provided the impetus for the development of religious ritual and myth, and,
through their generative influence, legislation and human culture."34
Girard's demythologising of the myth of sacred violence is a retelling of the
story from the victim's perspective. In so doing he exposes the lie and reveals the
30 Robert Hamerton-Kelly, Sacred Violence, pp. 27-28.
31 Robert Hamerton-Kelly, Sacred Violence, p. 28.
32 Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 64.
33 Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 136.
34 Walter Wink, Engaging the Powers: Discernment and Resistance in a world of Domination
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), p. 146.
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founding mechanism of sacred violence. In the nature of this inquiry, the method
employed is a deconstructive hermeneutics of suspicion which reveals the underlying
mechanisms. It reveals the founding (ontological)mechanism of representation or
(mis)interpretation of the Other for us. Therefore, a 'looking' or 'reading' from the
victim's perspective, is not just a different reading, it is a memory trace of how the
mechanism of sacred violence has been carried out in the cultural-political system
and its practice. What is important is that we must refuse the illusion that there can
be a legitimate safe violence, the violence of just retribution. Girard says that the
Gospel tells a radically different story as "Jesus invites all men to devote themselves
to the project of getting rid of violence, a project conceived with reference to the true
nature of violence, taking into account the illusion it fosters, the method by which it
gains ground, and all the laws that we have verified."35 It is looking at reality from
the victim's perspective and refusing to reciprocate in kind to legitimate violences.
Rene Girard attempts to see natural religion as founded on a victim-based
conception of the sacred which then permeated the socio-political-cultural
mechanism. Natural religion is organised violence in the service of social stability.
So Girard interprets the scapegoating (sacrifice) as ritually concealed expulsion.36
Therefore, although it had "a positive function insofar as it contributed to the
pacification ofhuman society," in fact, these sacrifices were "rooted nevertheless in a
collective self-deception."37 Girard's theory of sacred violence reveals the victim (the
35 Rene Girard, Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World, p. 197.
36 Raymond Schwager, S.J., "Christ, Death and the Prophetic Critique of Sacrifice," in Semiea 33,
1985, p. 109.
37 Raymond Schwager, S.J., "Christ, Death and the Prophetic Critique of Sacrifice," in Semiea 33,
1985, p. 109.
28
Chapter 1. Profile ofthe Other
Other), whose traces have been covered up by the (mis)representation of culture,
social hierarchies, and power relations. In doing so, Girard particularly considers the
text of the Scripture as a means of exposing the falsehood of the sacred in its
victimisation of the different other (scapegoat). He articulates his theory in the story
of Cain - "one of the two brothers kills the other, and the Cainite community is
founded."38 Although the story of Cain is similar to other stories of social origins in
which culture and tradition begin with a murder, Girard also sees a difference. For
example, in the Roman myth, the murdering of Remus was an action that was
perhaps to be regretted, but was justified by the victim's transgression. In order for
the city to exist, no one could be allowed to flout with impunity the rules it
prescribed. So Romulus is justified. By contrast, the story of Cain tells us about a
murderer, not camouflaged in myth and ritual from the standpoint of the mythic
community. What is most significant here is the moral judgement the Scripture
prescribes in this matter.39 In this regard, Girard sees Max Weber as the one who
understood the fact that the biblical writers have an undeniable tendency to take the
side of the victim on moral grounds and to spring to the victim's defence.40 What the
Scriptures constitute from the story of Cain and Abel, of Jacob, of Joseph and his
brothers, through the Law and the Prophets, is a theory of human violence. The
history of Israel is a history of disclosure of God's intention to reveal the hidden
mechanism of victimising the Other.41 Thus, we must reject the illusion that there
can be a legitimate violence.
38 Rene Girard, Things Hidden since the Foundation ofthe Earth, p. 146
39 Rene Girard, Things Hidden since the Foundation of the Earth, p. 146-147.
40 Max Weber, Ancient Judaism, trans by H.H. Garth and M. Martindale (Glencoe, IL,: Free Press,
1952), pp. 19-22; 429-495. quoted from Things Hidden since the Foundation ofthe Earth, p. 147.
41 See Things Hidden since the Foundation ofthe Earth, pp. 144-158.
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From the perspective of the present situation, this mechanism is still active in
relation to the Other in Western culture; in fact, the significance of this mechanism
lies in the fact that it is very much a theologically oriented one. This fact brings
modern Western society and its working into a fundamental questioning and, reveals
"the infinite potential" of violence toward the Other.42 The dominant intellectual
tradition of the West has been a history ofmimetic desire in rivalry, in casting out the
old (sacred) at the price of the new (sacred). This leads inevitably to conflict and
rivalry. In order to resolve or overcome the event of crisis, a victim is chosen in
order to regain the stable order of differences. The theory of sacred violence reveals
the violent origin of sacrifice and the victimisation that makes the society exist in
harmony. The important task we have however, is to seek a totally different point of
view that undoes the mechanism. This is, according to Girard, the voice or
perspective of the victim. As long as we try to situate sacrifice within a system, we
tend to remain within the system. We discover what generates it. Accordingly,
without an exploration of the victim's perspective, we have little choice but to repeat
and justify the system of violence,43 operating at a non-conscious social level and at
the level of religious interpretation. Therefore, it is important to uncover the horror
of violence permeated into our modern social mechanism and consciousness, and
reveal its inability to procure true peace with the others, from the victim's point of
view.
42 Rene Girard, Things Hidden since the Foundation ofthe Earth, p. 137.
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2. The Desire ofModernity
Anthony Giddens, in The Consequences ofModernity, states that "modernity
refers to the modes of social life or organization which emerged in Europe from
about the seventeenth century onward and which subsequently became more or less
worldwide in their influence."44 In other words, the modern agenda and its ideology
have cut across the world - across geographical boundaries, ethnicity, nationality,
ideology, religion and class, as the West intensified its control over others, in the
name of 'progress' and of 'development,' promising to liberate humankind from
'ignorance' and 'irrationality'.
The significant matter is that modernity is more or less shaped by the
western society - society shaped by an exclusive set of cultural values, and a western
intellectual tradition which has been preoccupied with the pursuit of truth received as
definable, locatable, something all reasonable people may finally agree upon (here,
'reasonable people' are mostly white, male and upper class). Moreover, the
underlying principle of modernity is dominated by "the idea that the history of
thought is a progressive 'enlightenment' which develops through an even more
complete appreciation and reappreciations of its own 'foundations'". These
foundations are often understood to be 'origins', so that the theoretical and practical
revolutions of Western history are presented and legitimated for the most part as
'recoveries', rebirths, or returns, and "the new is identified with value through the
43 James G. Williams, The Bible, Violence, and the Sacred, pp. 19-20.
44 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991) , p.l.
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mediation of recovery and appropriation of the foundation-origin"45. Therefore, it is
clear that in this foundationalism the question it raised is contained within itself.46
But, as society becomes multi-cultural and pluralistic, we also become aware
of the realities of religious and cultural plurality in the study of Christianity. David
Tracy in The Analogical Imagination shows that the "modern conflict of
interpretations of religion has made it clear that it is not really possible to provide
one definition for the essence of religion."47 He therefore questions the traditional
assumptions ofWestern theology that it was possible to define in general terms about
religion and religions. In effect he shows that this involved a process of
familiarisation in which the other culture was dehumanised to the level of an abstract
structure, exemplified in the notorious but well-known saying that 'only a dead
Indian is a good Indian' - that is to say, good only as an object to be classified in
publications and museums.48 The Other was understood only when translated into
more familiar categories. Even in what has been called 'cultural encounter,' the
Other is deconstructed in the favour of a monopoly ofWestern culture. But, in this
process of translation, what is lost is the irreducible strangeness of the other
45 Gianni Vatimo, The End ofModernity (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), p.2.
46 cf. Aristotle argued in book Gamma of the Metaphysie that the observance of the law of logic is
only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for rationality, whether theoretical or practical. See
Alisdair Maclntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., 1988),
p.4.
47 David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture ofPluralism (New
York: Crossroad Publishing Co., 1981), p.157.
48 Thomas Mooren, On the Border - The Otherness of God and the Multiplicity of the Religions
(Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1994), p.37.
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Western Christians are now coming to a realisation of the Eurocentricism of
Christian history, culture, and biblical interpretation. Until recently, it has been
normal practice to define religion within Western presuppositions which are then
applied to non-Western cultural phenomena. Contemporary scholars are now being
forced to confront matters of definition and category in relation to other religions and
cultures in a serious way.
On the other hand, in the West, although some of the key premises of
Western ideology have been recognised, and some postcolonial argument has been
accepted, there are attempts to maintain 'western value' against those whose cultures
are perceived as different. In Europe, there is a growing feeling that a postcolonial
language of culture and difference has been re-appropriated by the Right in a
renewed racism. It has been pointed out that,
[the] colonial logic of universalism and assimilation has given
way to the postcolonial logic of pluralism and difference. In this
pluralistic context 'culture' has become the major site of struggle
for new racist and anti-racist formations. It can be mobilized
both to reinforce and to challenge exclusion and racism. This
has clearly been a problem for anti-racism, whose language of
'difference' has been appropriated by the new racism and turned
back on the anti-racist movement itself. Anti-racism has
therefore been faced with the problem of how to challenge the
essentialist concept of difference used by the New Right without
reinforcing an essentialism of its own or slipping back into a
universalism which it was at pains to challenge in the first
place.49
49 Maxim Silverman, "Introduction," in Race, Discourse and Power in France, ed by M. Silverman
(Aldershot: Avebury, 1991), p.2.
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This cultural Right is trying to distance itself from the traditionally known 'racism,'
by claiming left-wing theoretical roots and emphasising the cultural over the political
struggle. Its self proclaimed logic is the right of difference, of culture and of roots.
The right to be different was inherited from left-wing discourse and, for the last few
decades, it was used for the anti-racist movements. But this new approach of the
Right (the so-called New Right) which appropriated the crucial term 'difference,' has
used the idea of difference as the backbone for a so-called 'cultural' rather than racial
argument. In other words, the use of the term 'race,' is being replaced by 'culture,'50
and 'the difference of culture,' as was particularly evident in the Apartheid policy of
South Africa in the last several decades.
These are real problems that we, the post-modem society, are facing today.
Having witnessed and experienced the implications of this, these human
predicaments require theological reflection and a new mode of hermeneutics. This is
not to suggest a better definition of the Other but rather a change of attitude toward
the Other; not an attempt to analyse the Other but to respond to the Other. Therefore,
it is imperative that the Other "should be understood not as something at which our
saying and doing aims but something from which it starts."51 This study is an
attempt to create a 'space,' in which a rediscovering and encountering of the Other
that is normally beyond the boundary of our identity, becomes possible. What is
50 Clotte Guillaumin, "Race and Discourse," in Race, Discourse and Power in France, ed by M.
Silverman (Aldershot: Avebury, 1991), p. 9.
51 Bernhard Waldenfels, "Response to the Other" in Encountering the Other(s): Studies in Literature,
History, and Culture, ed by Gisela Brinker-Gabler (Albany: State University of New York, 1995),
p.89
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important here is, that when we come to a boundary, we realise that on 'the other
side' lies that which is not our own. Yet these realities meet at boundaries at which
we sense not only difference but connectedness as well.52
This 'rapprochement' of different cultures, especially in relation to theology
explores an attitude that promotes the interaction in such a way that no one is
excluded and appropriated but instead appreciated. In this inter-cultural encounter,
the Other not only calls for respect, but also demands an ethical relationship. Ethics
as a mode of critique puts Western epistemology and its system into question, and
places them in relation with others. It is a critical question of looking on 'ourselves'
as others see us; it is to place 'ourselves' before the judgement of the others.53
The question of the Other inevitably implies the duty of deconstruction, and
demands an ethical response; it should be understood as an ethical demand, the
demand that puts "into question my spontaneity by the presence of the Other"54 It is a
critical question to the idea of liberty and the cognition of the ego that seeks to
reduce all otherness to itself. The domain of the Same, as Levinas says, that
"maintains a relation with otherness, but it is a relation in which the 'I', ego, or
Dasein reduces the distance between the Same and the Other, in which their
opposition fades."55 Moreover, as for Derrida, one's thought itself is "a form of
hegemony, totalization in its claims to understand, to comprehend, to force otherness
52 Paul R. Sponheim, Faith and the Other: A Relational Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993),
pp.2-3.
53 Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge (London: Fontana Press, 1993), p. 16
54 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p.43
55 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 126
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and Absence in terms ofpresence and understanding."56
In this self closure, the limits of tradition and the possibility of transgressing
those limits, are denied. Therefore, the deconstructive mode operates as the
disruption and interruption of the limit that divides the inside from the outside of
tradition. Deconstruction demonstrates that tradition, or text, or institution are
dependent upon the presuppositions of a metaphysics of presence, and questions the
metaphysics it presupposes. But, as Derrida indicates, deconstruction is not
something negative; it is neither a process of demolition, nor an act produced and
controlled by a subject, rather it is to locate a point of otherness and to open it up
from the position of the Other;
We want to attain the point of a certain exteriority with respect to
the totality of the logocentric epoch. From this point of
exteriority a certain deconstruction of this totality ... could be
broached.57
It is a movement of traversing the text, that enables this reading to obtain a position
of alterity or exteriority from which the text can be deconstructed. In other words, it
is opening up this textual space to show that there are many genres operating within
the text. The significant form is a kind of double-reading that comes from
deconstructive reading, which searches for the other. In this way, reading opens a
discourse on the other to philosophy, about otherness that has been dissimulated or
56 Raymond Corbey and Joep Leerssen, "Studying Alterity: Background and Perspectives," in
Alterity, Identity, Image: Selves and Others in Society and Scholarship, ed. R. Corbey and J.T.
Leerssen (Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi, 1991), xii.
57 Jacque Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. By G.C. Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press,
1976), p.14
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appropriated by the logocentric tradition, and articulates the ethical condition to
interrupt the ontological or logocentric closure.58 Therefore, in extending this
deconstructive reading to the question of ethics, cultural reading is history read from
the perspective of the victims of that history. Then, what emerges from here, is an
ethical history.
In relation to the study of culture, colonialism is crucial for an understanding
of the history and of interaction between cultures. The anthropological concept of
'culture' would not have been invented without a colonial expansion that encouraged
and facilitated the new claims of Europe and its Other through its histories of
conquests and rule. But although colonial conquest was predicated on the power of
superior arms, military, political power, and economic wealth, it was also based on a
complexly related variety of cultural technologies. Consequently, in both Western
centres and colonial peripheries, the anthropological givens of culture have been
transformed over and over again by colonial encounters. However, if colonialism is
seen as a cultural formulation, culture can be seen as a colonial formulation. To the
degree that culture was implicated both in the means and the ends of colonial
conquest, culture was invented. Western histories, in fact, were both sustained and
influenced by colonial events, which became fundamental moments in the unfolding
narrative of the modern West.
Colonialism can be seen as an historical moment in relation to European
political and economic projects in the modern era, as well as a trope for domination
58 Mark C. Taylor, Erring: A Postmodern A/theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984),
pp 9-13
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and violation. Culture can be seen both as a historically constituted domain of
significant concepts and practices, and a regime in which power achieves its ultimate
apotheosis. But, colonialism was neither monolithic nor unchanging throughout its
history, and colonial power was never so omniscient as to imagine itself as total.
While colonial rulers were always not certain that their power was dependent on
knowledge, they were similarly aware of all the ways in which knowledge was
power. Colonialism remade the world. Neither European nor the Third World,
neither colonisers nor colonised, would have come into being without the history of
colonialism; and the cultural predicates and categories of our world have been shaped
through colonial encounters. Our post-colonial world is one in which we live after
colonialism, but never without it. Colonialism continues to live in ways that we have
only begun to recognise, despite decolonization; certain destinies and identities seem
fixed, while others seem chaotic, disorderly, unfixed. Colonialism is coming back to
haunt 'new nations and people,' and debates over nationality and multiculturalism
mask increasing anxiety over the categories and identities of race, language, culture,
and morality.
Therefore, by evaluating the encounter between the West and the non-West
and its cultures, it might be possible to locate our identities and subjectivities. This
project is neither concentrated on an intrinsic value of self-identity or the absolute
relativising of all value, but is governed by the irreducible necessity of engaging with
other voices. It is " the double perception that ours is but one voice among many and
that, as it is the only one we have, we must need speak with it."59 Here, ethical force
59 Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge, p.234.
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is inseparable from an acknowledgement of one's own position and cultural identity;
a means of immunising the self against any form of violent decentring of the Other,
or as Levinas indicates 'the ethical commitment of self to the Other.'
Thus, this study is an attempt to bring the ethics into the discourses of
hermeneutics, ethnography, epistemology, and postcoloniality, in terms of
responsibility for the Other for ethics presumes a physical setting and relation with
the others and commands to act accordingly. It is clear that any examination of the
question of the Other leads to the radical questioning of the foundations ofWestern
thought and tradition; its questioning is related to critiques of the subject, the West,
and to the challenges to Western thought and its practices by diverse groups of others
in terms of race, ethnicity, religion, gender, or sexual orientation.
3. Myth ofModernity
The situation of 'Post-modernity' or 'Post-Christendom' is posing a
challenge to the way we understand the past, which indicates the history and our
sense ofwhat experience and knowledge are. This challenge is directly related to the
structure of knowledge in academic institutions, since universities, colleges,
seminaries, and other higher educational institutions have "a crucial relationship to
the forms of knowledge developed within those institutions, and in their relationships
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with other forms of knowledge and representation."60 What is important, today, is to
see the knowledge produced in academic institutions in terms of the power-interests
and relationships that sustain them, as Michel Foucault indicates,
No body of knowledge can be formed without a system of
communications, records, accumulation and displacement which
is in itself a form of power and which is linked, in its existence
and functioning, to the other forms of power. Conversely, no
power can be exercised without the extraction, appropriation,
distribution or retention of knowledge. On this level, there is not
knowledge on the one side and society on the other, or science
and the state, but only the fundamental forms of
knowledge/power.61
Today, Western Christian theology and its culture are facing and hearing powerful
voices from the 'two-thirds' worlds of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Oceania, as
well as from Eastern and Central European countries. Western theology, however,
tends to understand these voices not in the context of cultural difference, but of
cultural diversity. As a result, Western understanding of the non-Western becomes
an epistemological project in which cultural diversity is a category of comparative
study. The recognition ofpre-given cultural contents and customs, held in a frame of
relativism, means the West can claim the Other's time, control the Other's space and
the Other's bodies, impose limitations on M'hat can be said and done, and decide the
Other's being62 Materials and thoughts from non-Western countries, are collected,
analysed, compared, competed and classified in such a way that the Western subject
60 Steven Connor, Postmodernist Culture: An Introduction to Theories of Contemporary (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 6.
61 Alan Sheridan, Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth (London: Tavistock, 1980), p. 131.
62 Richard Ashley, and R.B.J. Walker, "Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissident Thought in
International Studies," in International Studies Quarterly 34 (3), 1990, p.261.
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can occupy the central role in representing their theologies in term of the
power/knowledge relation. The same is true in relation to non-Western theologies;
the Western academic institutions tend to represent them in the self-reflective and
self-validating way of modem epistemology in which the Other is merely reflected
and represented in otherness and difference, in a controlled space and time, like a
museum display.
3.1. Familiarisation and Order
Zygmunt Bauman stated that the typical modem project was the struggle for
order; he says, "it is not a fight of one definition against another, of one way of
articulating reality against a competitive proposal. It is a fight of determination
against ambiguity, of semantic precision against ambivalence, of transparency
against obscurity, clarity against fuzziness."63 In other words, modem consciousness
attempted to create a society that is "sustained by design, manipulation, management,
engineering,"64by extemiinating ambivalence. In fact, in this social engineering, the
quest for order and an ambivalence-free homogeneity was enforced by an
Enlightenment rationality in which everything including nature is subordinated to the
human will and reason.
Modernity is dominated by "the idea that the history of thought is a
63 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp.6-7.
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progressive 'enlightenment' which develops through an ever more complete
appreciation and reappreciations of its own 'foundation'".65 These foundations are
also understood to be 'origins,' so that the theoretical and practical revolutions of
Western history are presented and legitimated for the most part as 'recoveries',
rebirths, or returns. The idea of 'overcoming', which is so important in all modern
philosophy, understands the course of thought as being a progressive development in
which the new is identified with value through the mediation of the recovery and
appreciation of the foundation-origin.66
As Plato maintained, the soul finds it true Being in returning whence it came.
Its coming into the world in the first place was a fall, and so the essential thing is to
undo the fall as quickly as possible, to redress the wrong which has confined the soul
in the realm of change. Therefore, for him, the essential destiny of the soul is to
recover its origins in the sphere ofprimordial Being and pure presence.67 Knowledge
is not a discovery but a recovery, a recollection; learning means to re-establish
contact with a cognition that we already possess. In Plato, therefore, everything
moves backward: from the fallen to the primordial, from copy to the original, from
loss to recovery, from forgetfulness to recollection.68 It is clear that this
64 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence p.7.
"Gianni Vatimo, The End ofModernity (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), p.2.
"Gianni Vatimo, The End ofModernity, p.2
67 John D. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutical Project
(Bloomington: Indian University Press, 1987), p.13.
68 John D. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, pp. 13-14. Kierkegaard said that recollection begins at the
end instead of at the beginning, with the 'loss; instead of the task, from S. Kierkegaard, Fear and
Trembling and Repetition, ed. and trans. Howard Hong and Edna Hong (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1983), p. 136; see also p. 131 on his criticism against the Greek recollection.
Johannes Climacus calls Platonic recollection a 'temptation' to recollect oneself out of existence, and
he says that the greatness of Socrates was to have resisted this temptation, Concluding Unscientific
Postcript to the Philosophical Fragments, trans. David Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton:
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foundationalism, and the questions it raises, is contained within itself. Searching for
the meaning has been the agenda of a Western intellectual tradition preoccupied with
the pursuit of truth as though it were somehow definable and locatable in a
meaningful way. This meaningful representation has been central to the study of
theology, as seen in church history and systematic theology. In a time of
globalisation, however, like today, the story of Western theology, which once was
the central experience of the church, is now complicated by the addition of theologies
from non-Western traditions or from minority cultures in a particular society,
especially evident in the United States.
In fact, the notion of the description of a culture, in this situation, cannot
appear as a neutral or trans-cultural , for it is linked to the epistemology of the
Western tradition. Richard Rorty in Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature, indicates
that hermeneutics is defined in opposition to an epistemology which is founded on
the presupposition that all discourses are commensurate with and translatable among
each other:
Hermeneutics sees the relations between various discourses as
those of strands in a possible conversation, a conversation which
presupposes no disciplinary matrix which unites the speakers,
but where the hope of agreement is never lost so long as the
conversation lasts Epistemology sees the hope of agreement
as a token of the existence of common ground which, perhaps
unbeknown to the speakers, unites them in a common
rationality.69
Princeton University Press, 1941), pp. 184-185.
69 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979),
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Here, for epistemology, conversation is an inquiry which views the participants as
united in what Oakeshott called a universitas - "a group united by mutual interests in
achieving a common end," as opposed to hermeneutics, in which inquiry is a
conversation that views them as united in what he calls a societas - "persons whose
paths through life have fallen together, united by civility rather than by a common
goal, much less by a common ground."70 Therefore, in epistemology, when
encountering other culture, alterity becomes to some degree regulated through the
metaphysically inspired appeal to a common humanity. When representing the other,
"the notion of knowledge as accurate representation lends itself naturally to the
notion that certain sorts of representation, certain expressions, certain processes are
'basic,' 'privileged,' and 'foundational.'"71 For Rorty, hermeneutics aware that there
is no such single unifying language, tries to appropriate the language of the other
rather than translate it into its own language. Hermeneutics is a bit like getting to
know a stranger, rather than the development of logically constructed
demonstration;72in relation to other culture.
The notion of culture as a conversation rather than as a structure
erected upon foundations fits well with this hermeneutical notion
of knowledge, since getting into a conversation with stranger is,
like acquiring a new virtue or skill by imitating models, a matter
of /po vrjcris rather than brnor/pr/P
p.318.
70 Cf. "On the character of a Modem European State" in Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975). Quoted from Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of
Nature, p.318, no.2.
71 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and theMirror ofNature p.318-319.
72, Richard Rorty, Philosophy and theMirror ofNature p. 319. He said "coming to understand is more
like getting acquainted with a person than like following a demonstration."
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Rorty writes, "we will be epistemological, when we understand perfectly well what is
happening but want to codify it in order to extend, or strengthen, or teach, or
'ground' it. We must use hermeneutics where we do not understand what is
happening but are honest enough to admit it..."74 In other words, it is "discourse
about as-yet-incommensurable discourses."75
What is clear is that the ideology and practice of "representation" cannot be
an objective representation of reality, but the representation of a particular value
system (it is the West's in this case). It is the activity of self-representation of the
West as the subject, that "constitutes a process of self-appropriation through which
the subject comes into possession of itself."76 Therefore, by relating itself to itself,
the subject realises itself as self-present subjectivity, and the realisation of the self s
full presence to itself necessarily involves a process of re-membering or re-collection.
It is evident that 'to know' itself is to re-collect, even in the thought of a theologian
like Augustine, since he recognised "the close connection between cogo (to drive
together to one point, collect, assemble, gather together) and cogito" from his
Platonic and Neoplatonic heritage.77
In this act of knowing, the subject re-members and recollects what previously
had been dismembered or dispersed. Recollection makes connections between what
73 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature, p. 319.
74 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and theMirror ofNature, p. 321.
75 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and theMirror ofNature, p.343.
76 Mark C. Taylor. Erring: A Postmodern A/theology, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1984) p.43.
77 Mark C. Taylor. Erring: A Postmodern A/theology, p.44.
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is disjoined and fragmented and enables the self to become present to itself by
comprehending, gathering together, and unifying. This interplay of self-appropriation
and recollection points to the importance of autobiography for self-realisation. The
subject attempts to weave together the various strands of experience and to construct
them into a unified whole, since a meaningful totality is not given.78 It becomes
evident, therefore, that the story of others is a story of the self; and what is
represented is what the self constructs for narrating its own story. It is representing
or exhibiting ourselves to ourselves, and telling the stories of our lives in ways which
would be impossible otherwise.
3.2. Museum Practice as the Cultural Expression of the
Modern West
One of the most distinctive characteristics of modernity is promoted and
practised institutionally in the museum, in terms of telling and exhibiting ourselves to
ourselves. In Western culture, there has been a gradual expansion of interest in
human history and human activities, moving on from the ancient epics and writings
to the ecclesiastical collections, and etc., to the creation of the museum as an
institution, starting in the eighteenth century in Western Europe. From the end of the
eighteenth century to the end of the nineteenth century, there was an enormous
78 Mark C. Taylor. Erring: A Postmodern A/theology, pp.43-44.
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growth of interest in the housing of collections.79 Museums are a characteristic part
of the cultural pattern of modern Europe, and of the European-influenced world, and
undoubtedly most European museums are, among other things, memorials to the rise
of nationalism and imperialism. Every capital must have its own museum devoted in
part to exhibiting the greatness of its past, and, to exhibiting the loot gathered by its
monarchs in conquest of other nations.
More importantly, by nature, the museum is an institution which holds the
material evidence, objects and specimens, of the human and natural history of our
planet. What is important is to notice that all of the museum holdings were
assembled, with some degree of conscious intention, by collectors whose collections
found their ways into a holding museum, where they are cared for and interpreted by
museum staff. In modern Europe, the museum became a modern institution around
the middle of the fifteenth-century in the Renaissance cities and courts of Italy and
has continued in a linear development in Europe since that time, spreading to the rest
of the world along with all the other characteristically European institutions.80 It
was clear that museums became a typical characteristic ofmodernity and its cultural
expression in the West.
Modernity was concerned with the scientific knowledge and understanding
gained through the activity of reason upon natural phenomena, and for which
79 Hubert G. Alexander. "Why Preservation," in The Idea ofMuseum: Philosophical, Artistic and
Political Questions, ed. by Lars Aagaard-Mogensin (Lampeter: the Edwin Mellen Press, 1988), pp.7-
15.
80 Susan M. Pearce, Museums, Objects and Collections: A Cultural Study (Leicester: Leicester
University Press, 1992), pp. 1-2.
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museums were perceived as the primary repositories of primary evidence.
Philosophically, modernity promoted the meta-narratives, overarching discourses
through which objective realities and eternal truths could be defined and expressed.
In fact, civic pride was not the reason for having museums on a large scale, but rather
the unique characteristic ofmuseums to hold the real objects, the actual evidence, the
true data, upon which in the last analysis the materialistic meta-narrative depended
for its verification. It is the purpose of a museum to display, to demonstrate, to show
the nature of the world and of man within it by arranging the collected material in
particular patterns that reflect, confirm and project the contemporary world view.81
In fact, the whole of cultural expression, one way or another, falls within the
realm of material culture. It is also true that the material culture held today by many
museums falls within this frame, like the areas of an industrial landscape. It is
significant that cultural value is given by this material culture and its idea of
selection; the act of selection turns a part of the natural world into an object and a
museum piece, as demonstrated by the sample ofmoon rock which went on display
in the Milestones of Flight hall at the National Air and Space Museum, Washington,
DC:
The moon rock is an actual piece of the moon retrieved by the
Apollo 17 mission. There is nothing particularly appealing about
the rock; it is a rather standard piece of volcanic basalt some 4
million years old. Yet, unlike many other old rocks, this one
comes displayed in an altar-like structure, set in glass, and is
complete with full-time guard and ultrasensitive monitoring
device... There is a sign above it which reads, 'You may touch it
81 Susan M. Pearce, Museums, Objects and Collections: A Cultural Study, pp. 2-6.
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with care.' Everyone touches it*2
Through its selection and display, even the natural world (here, rock) has turned into
material culture, and became a part of the world of human values. It is important to
note the contemporary principles that are involved in selection, detaching objects
from the natural context, and organising them into some kind of relationship with
other material.
Museums hold the stored material culture of the past. The material has not
arrived in museums in a steady, single-state flow, one piece at a time, but rather it
comes in groups which have been gathered together by a single individual, or
sometimes a closely associated pair or group of individuals. It is interesting to see
how the notion of group identity and personal association is deeply embedded in the
material itself. The making of a collection is one way in which we organise our
relationship with the external physical world of which collections are a part. It is a
part of a relationship between the subject (conceived as each individual human
being), and the object (conceived as the whole world) which lies outside of him or
her. Collections are a significant element in our attempt to construct the world, and
so the effort to understand them is one way of exploring our relationship with the
world.83
The selection process is the crucial act of the collector when he decides how
his selection will work, what he will choose and what he will reject. What he chooses
82 D.J. Meltzer, "Ideology and Material Culture" in Modern Material Culture: the Archaeology of Us,
edbyR.A. Gould and M.B. Schiffer (New York: Academic Press, 1981), p.121.
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bears "an intrinsic, direct and organic relationship, that is a metonymic relationship,
to the body ofmaterial from which it was selected because it is an integral part of it.
But the very act of selection adds to its nature." The selected collection bears
"representative or metaphorical relationship" to its whole. It becomes an image of
what the whole is believed to be, and although it remains an intrinsic part of the
whole, it is no longer merely a detached fragment because it has become imbued with
meaning of its own.84 It means that collected objects are both the signifier (that is the
medium that carries the message) and the signified, the message itself. Here, it is
imperative to realise the dual nature of the collection. The metaphor (the signified or
message) has been added to the original material (the signifier or medium) by
perceiving humans, from whose human experience come the perceptions and
understanding which are imposed upon the world at any given moment.85 Therefore,
the attitude to the object would be either through contemplating its separateness, or
through attempting to merge with and absorb what is before it. As Adrian Stokes
expresses it,
Our relationship to all objects seem to be describable in terms of
two extreme forms, the one a very strong identification with
object, whether projective or introjective, whereby a barrier
between self and non-self is undone, the other a commerce with
a self-sufficient and independent object at arm's length.... the
work of art is par excellence a self-sufficient object as well as a
configuration that we absorb or to which we lend ourselves as
manipulators.86
83 Susan M. Pearce, Museums, Objects and Collections: A Cultural Study, pp.36-37.
84 Susan M. Pearce, Museums, Objects and Collections: A Cultural Study p.38.
85 Susan M. Pearce, Museums, Objects and Collections: A Cultural Study p.41.
86 Adrian Stokes, The Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes Vol. Ill (London: Thames and Hudson,
1978), pp.151-152.
50
Chapter 1. Profile of the Other
What is important about this experience is "the capacity to play with illusion, to use
imagination working on an external object to create something for which a need is
felt."87 Collecting has the character of ritual activity which is carried out for its own
sake with all the social and emotional quality which this implies. It is quite right that
collections are objects of love, but they are also objects of dominance and control.
What is clear is that the struggle is not only over what is to be presented, but
over who will control the means of representing. What is evident in this struggle, is
"the articulation of identity." When cultural 'others' are implicated, "exhibitions tell
us who we are, perhaps most significant, who we are not. Exhibitions are privileged
arenas for representing images of self and 'other.'"88 Regarding the museum as a
Western cultural institution, it is possible to argue that the museum is a unique
institution where the story of Western imperialism and colonial appropriation is
being told, and the exotic objects displayed in the museum indicate their status as
trophies of imperial conquest, in relation to the other cultures.89 Moreover, this
museum practice turns cultural material into some kind of art object. The products of
other cultures are made into something that people look at.
In the practice of exhibition, people and their knowledge are limited to the
objects displayed in a museum which are removed from their original setting and
lost their meaning for existence - their function. The smells, sounds and emotions
87 Susan M. Pearce, Museums, Objects and Collections: A Cultural Study, p. 46.
88 Ivan Karp, "Culture and Representation," in Exhibiting cultures, (Washington: Smithsonian
Institute, 1991 ),p. 15.
51
Chapter 1. Profile ofthe Other
associated with the objects, especially if from other cultures, are prohibited in the
exhibits. Things taken out of everyday life are regrouped and renamed. The objects
are transformed, removed from the continuity of everyday uses in time and space,
and put exquisitely on display, stabilised and conserved for the different meanings
that the makers of exhibitions and collections may be said to carry.90
The object begins to reveal a somewhat different meaning when it is drawn
out of its original context and put into a setting that evokes the totality of cultural
relations and makes that totality part of its defining frame.91 This was well
exemplified in the French Revolution, when the Louvre Palace was designated as a
national museum. The transformation of the old royal palace into the Museum of the
French Republic was high on the agenda of the French Revolutionary government.
And, public art museums were regarded as evidence of political virtue indicating that
government provided the best for its people.92 In this process of change, the function
of collection changes considerably as well, when it is no longer the private cache of a
prince, but rather the content of a gallery visited by a cross section of visitors. Even
the function of a painting changes when it becomes part of a collection; museums
become places where works of art no longer have any function other than being
works of art.93 Therefore, as we have noted, "the effect of the museum was to
89 Ivan Karp, "Culture and Representation,"p. 16.
90 Spencer R. Crew and James E. Sims, "Locating Authenticity: Fragments of a Dialogue," in
Exhibiting Cultures, p. 159.
91 Masao Yamaguchi, "The Poetics ofExhibition in Japanese Culture", in Exhibiting Cultures, p.62.
92 Carol Duncan, "Art Museum and the Ritual ofCitizenship," in Exhibiting Cultures, p.89.
93 Andre Malraux, The Voice ofSilence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), p.15.
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suppress the model in almost every portrait (even that of a dream-figure) and to
divest works of art of their functions. It did away with the significance ofPalladium,
of Saint and Savior; ruled out association of sanctity, qualities of adornment and
possession, of likeness and imagination. Each exhibit is a representation of
something, differing from the thing itself, this specific difference being its raison
d'etre."94
Museum and Myth
The traditional role of a museum has been described as that of a temple; the
museum displays a "timeless and universal function, the use of a structured sample
of reality, not just as a reference but as an objective model against which to compare
individual perceptions."95 On the other hand, it preserves a newer role as a forum;
the museum is a place for "confrontation, experimentation, and debate."96 Since the
messages communicated through the museum and its practice do not have a
predetermined content, museums and their exhibitions can claim to be morally
neutral in principle. But, inevitably, all exhibitions are organised on the bias of
assumption about "the intentions of the object's producers, the cultural skill and
qualifications of the audiences, the claims to authoritativeness made by the
exhibition, and the judgements of the aesthetic merit or authenticity of the exhibiting
process."97 The alleged innate neutrality of museums and exhibitions, however, is
94 Andre Malraux, The Voice ofSilence, p. 14.
95 Duncan Cameron, "The Museum: A Temple or the Forum," in Journal of World History 14, no.l
(1972), p.201.
96Duncan Cameron, "The Museum: A Temple or the Forum," p.197.
97 Ivan Karp, "Culture and Representation," pp.11-12.
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the very quality that enables them to become instruments of power, continually
making moral statements in practice. A museum is not the neutral and transparent
sheltering space that it is often claimed to be.
In addition to this myth of 'neutrality,' museums function like ritual sites;
museums do not simply resemble temples architecturally, but they work like temples.
Many, since the Enlightenment, think of religious truth as addressed to particular
groups of voluntary believers, while secular truth has the status of objective or
universal knowledge and functions in our society as higher, authoritative truth. In
this sense, the museum goers today, like visitors to these ritual sites, bring with them
"the willingness and ability to shift into a certain state of receptivity. And like
traditional ritual sites, museum space is carefully marked off and culturally
designated as special, reserved for a particular kind of contemplation and learning
experience and demanding a special quality of attention."98
It is also very important to realise that "objects have not a single past but an
unbroken sequence of past times leading backward from the present moment.
Moreover, there is no ideal spot on the temporal continuum that inherently deserves
emphasis In elevating or admiring one piece of the past, we tend to ignore and
devalue others. One reality lives at the expense of countless others."99 This
systematic collection depends upon "principles of organization, which are perceived
to have an external reality beyond the specific material under consideration, and are
98 Carol Duncan, "Art Museum and the Ritual ofCitizenship," in Exhibiting Culture, pp.90; 91.
99 Spencer R. Crew and James E. Sims, "Locating Authenticity: Fragments of a Dialogue," in
Exhibiting Cultures, p. 160.
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held to derive from general principles deduced from the board mass of kindred
material through the operation of observation and reason; these general principles
form part of our idea about the nature of the physical world and the nature of
ourselves."100 Even in science, systematic collecting has been an intrinsic part of its
development. The relationship of the scientist to the natural world is not a simple
one. Specimens are selected for collections on the strength of their supposed
'typicality' or their 'departure of norm' so that they may act as referents, a process
which is clearly circular and self-supporting. Again, collected specimens have
become artefacts in that the act of selection turns them into man-made products, and
when they have entered our world, they become part of the relationships which we
construct for them. In fact, there is a distinct human tendency "to imagine
classification systems in terms of human relationships, and a glance at any text book
will show how the (European) human family paradigm underlies our ideas about the
relationship of animal groups or, say, known languages."101
Creating a voice for exhibitions, however, is not a straightforward task; it
involves 'authenticity.' Authenticity is not about factuality or reality; "authenticity -
authority- enforces the social contract between the audience and the museum, a social
agreed-upon reality that exists only as long as confidence in the voice of the
exhibition holds."102 It is about authority; objects do not have authority, but people
do. It is people who must make a judgement about how to tell the past from the
multiple potential voices within the objects. It is the work of university-based
100 Susan M. Pearce, Museums, Objects and Collections: A Cultural Study, p. 87.
101 Susan M. Pearce, Museums, Objects and Collections: A Cultural Study, p. 85.
102 Spencer R. Crew and James E. Sims, "Locating Authenticity: Fragments of a Dialogue," p. 163.
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scholars, by whom these voices in exhibitions are influenced, and on whom
exhibitions frequently rely. In doing so, museums put works up against each other,
literally as well as metaphorically, and this confrontation, this inescapable
competition, alters the nature of the work in real ways. Ostensibly for contemplation,
museums have become battlegrounds.103
It is very important to recognise that exhibitions represent the nature of the
produced meaning and knowledge in very specific ways. Therefore, by asking
simple questions like, 'what presumptions are made about why this display is worth
looking at?' and 'what kind of understanding is this display offering?' we unravel the
nature of exhibition. Because the exhibition has been described as 'a typical
traditional ethnological exhibition in which a museum of the dominant culture
attempts to represent the heritage of a minority culture, largely in its absence.'104 In
other words, exhibitions make meaning through the conventions proper to the
dominant cultural group, and the kind ofmeaning generated from the exhibit is a part
of the overarching meta-narrative of knowledge and understanding of the particular
culture. Exhibitions are really works of imagination operating within an understood
tradition of knowledge and interpretation, and contributing their share towards both
the maintenance and the development of this tradition.105
103 John Fisher, "mUSEums," in The Idea ofMuseum, p.49.
104 P. McManus, "Making Sense of Exhibits" in Museum Language: Objects and Texts, ed by G.
Kavanagh (Lecister: Lecister University Press, 1991), p.203.
56
Chapter 1. Profile ofthe Other
3.3. Fixing the Text
All human experience is mediated through social contacts and the acquisition
of language. Language and memory are intrinsically connected, both on the level of
individual recall and that of the institutionalisation of collective experience.106 The
spoken word is "a medium, a trace, whose evanescence in time and space is
compatible with the preservation ofmeaning across time-space distances because of
human mastery of language's structural characteristics."107 As Levi Strauss says,
language is a time machine, which permits the re-enactment of social practices across
the generations, while also making possible the differentiation of past, present, and
future.108
Among many factors that shaped modern culture, one of the most influential
factors was the impact of writing, that was later intensified by the print; it
restructured human consciousness. Printing is the heir and successor of writing, and
its advent has intensified the effects and magnified the importance of the written
word. The print revolution in the modern West, and in modern high-literacy culture
in general, has turned the book into one of the most common furnishings of our
physical and mental world.109 It is clear that "the custodians of knowledge have
always been especially prone to exalt the written over the spoken word as the main
105 Susan M. Pearce, Museums, Objects and Collections: A Cultural Study, p. 141
i°6 pauj connerton, How Societies Remember (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989)
107 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p.23.
108 See Claude Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology (London: Allen Lane, 1968).
109 Walter J. Ong, "Ramist Method and the Commercial Mind." in Studies in the Renaissance 8,
(1961), p.176.
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bulwark of learning and progress."110 Modern scholarship and its inquiry are
suspicious of subjective emotions and personal engagement in favour of objectivity
and visual verification - observation and analysis of the data of sense perception
rather than immersion in them; and objectivity has been especially important in
modern Western thought since the scientific revolution and Enlightenment era. This
process has been hastened on by the printed word of the modern book."1
Because of this new mode of function of printing, words and books lost their
dynamism and personal quality, and became themselves things: mass-produced,
impersonal objects. Printed words are particularly well suited to their roles as
neutral bearers of objective content accessible to any literate person who can
understand that content.112 It is quite important to realise the fact that "when words
are written , they became static things and lose, as such, the dynamism which is so
characteristic of the auditory word in general, and of the spoken word in
particular."113 The modern encyclopaedia is characteristic in its provision of a
conspectus and its systematic arrangement ofhuman knowledge. Graham said that
it offers a general literate public not only a comprehensive
reference work, but functions also as a symbolic token of
modem progress: It expands our knowledge of the world and
makes access to it available to everyone a significant part of
its appeal and its success is due to the pervasive illusion in our
generally literate culture that books are the ultimate sources of
110 William A. Graham, Beyond the Written Word: Oral aspects ofscripture in the history of religion
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 21.
William A. Graham, Beyond the Written Word, pp.21-22.
1,2William A. Graham, Beyond the Written Word., pp.22-23.
113 J.C. Carothers, "Culture, Psychiatry and the WrittenWord." in Psychiatry 22 (1959), p.311.
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wisdom, proof, and authority.114
Since the Enlightenment, knowledge has come to be conceived of less and less either
as wisdom and learning acquired from special persons or as the legacy of a cultural
and historical tradition, and more and more as the accumulation and mastery of
objective data and 'scientific' methodologies acquired through diverse means. The
modern encyclopaedia changed attitudes toward not only words and discourse, but
also towards knowledge itself.115
In contrast to written culture and its consciousness, oral culture does not have
dictionaries. The meaning of each word is controlled by what Goody and Watt call
'direct semantic ratification,'116that is, by the real-life situations in which the word is
used here and now. Ong indicates in Orality and Literacy.
words acquire their meanings only from their always insistent
actual habitat, which is not, as in a dictionary, simply other
words, but includes also gestures, vocal inflections, facial
expression, and the entire human, existential setting in which the
real, spoken word always occurs. Word menages come
continuously out of the present, though past meanings of course
have shaped the present meaning in many and varied ways, no
longer recognized.117
Writing/printing is a technology, an artificiality that externalises thought and
114 William A. Graham, Beyond the Written Word, p. 27
115 William A. Graham, Beyond the Written Word, pp 27-28.
116 Jack Goody and Ian Watt, "The consequences of literacy," in Literacy in Traditional Societies, ed
by Jack Goody (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p.29.
117 Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: the Technologizing of the Word (London: Routledge, 1982),
p.47.
59
Chapter 1. Profile ofthe Other
alienates the self from nature and even from other selves. And it intensifies the
development of the extemalisation of knowledge - facts and science.118 In any
culture, storage and retrieval of knowledge are very important; primary oral culture
relies on the living human memory to store knowledge. Literary culture, by contrast,
relies on writing, and later printed books. What is clear is that in a writing culture,
knowledge has been stored in retrievable form, as in the eighteenth century
encyclopaedia. Printing culture encouraged the collection of knowledges in a way
which fosters closure and greater control. In fact, print replaced the lingering
hearing dominance in the world of thought and expression with sight-dominance.
And print "situates words in space more relentlessly than writing ever did. Writing
moves words from the sound world to a world of visual space, but print locks words
into position in this space. Control of position is everything in print."119 In fact, it
changed traditional concepts and their practice: print produced exhaustive
dictionaries and fostered the desire to legislate for 'correctness' in language, a desire
which grew out of a sense of language based on the study of Learned Latin. Learned
tongues textualise the idea of language, making it seem at root something written.
Print reinforces the sense of language as essentially textual. Therefore, the printed
text, not the written text, became the text in its fullest, paradigmatic form.120
It is clearly acknowledged that written documents count for more with us than
118 Bruce E. Gronbeck, "The Rhetorical Studies Tradition and Walter J. Ong: Oral-Literary Theories
of Mediation, Culture and Consciousness," in Media, Consciousness, and Culture, ed., Bruce E.
Gronbeck, Thomas J, Farrell, and Paul A. Soukup (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1991), p. 17.
See Ch.4 of W. Ong, Orality and Literacy, and Interfaces of the word: Studies in the evolution of
consciousness and culture (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 17-49.
119 Water J. Ong, Orality and Literacy, p.121
12°. Water J. Ong, Orality and Literacy, p.130.
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does speech, whether we are dealing with business contracts or academic
publications. In particular, our understanding of ancient worlds and other parts of
world, is overwhelmingly dependent on written texts, and our use of the texts
depends on the assumptions we make about how they were originally produced, read
and understood. A connection seems unavoidable between the authority of texts and
the expert readers' authority which enforce each other in sustaining power.121 In
other words, "power exercised over texts allows power to be exercised through
texts."122 The development of literacy, bureaucracy and documentation reinforces the
autonomy of the institution in which it exists; for example: the Roman army was
notorious for its tendency to record its operations and administration in a mass
paperwork.123 And this institutional literacy "enabled a broader spread and gave to
the lives of individuals a social, economic and psychological coherence within the
framework of Latin culture. This is an important clue to the reasons for the rapidity
and success with which the army archived the acculturation of peripheral
communities and used them in turn as instruments of furthering those processes."124
Lane Fox shows that a similar phenomenon existed in the history of early
Christianity by noting that the authority of texts derived originally from their sacred
origin and from their value as guides to the proper way to live, but their use in
contests for power, whether between Byzantine scholars or early Christian bishops,
must have reinforced their status still further. Their interpretation of holy writ was so
121 Alan K. Bowman and Greg Woolf, "Literacy and Power in the Ancient World," in Literacy and
Power in the Ancient World, ed. by Alan K. Bowman & Greg Woolf (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994), p. 13.
122.Alan K. Bowman and Greg Woolf, "Literacy and Power in the Ancient World,", p.8.
123 Jack Goody, The Logic of Writing and the Organization of Society (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986), p.90.
124 Alan K. Bowman, "Letters and literacy on Rome's another frontiers," in Literacy and Power in
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important to the whole community that rabbis, priests won authority as expert readers
and interpreters. Christians made use of the convenience of literacy as a means of
exerting power or maintaining solidarity.125
The printed text is supposed to represent the words of an author in definitive
or 'final' form, because print is comfortable only with finality. What is clear, in
terms of psycho-dynamics, is that once the word is printed, the text does not readily
accommodate change. This printed culture has, Ong says, "a different mind-set,"
which works within its own closed system. Ong continues, "print culture gave birth
to the romantic notions of 'originality' and 'creativity,' which set apart an individual
work from other works even more, seeing its origins and meaning as independent of
outside influence, at least ideally." 126 Because of this, when talking about the
written text, we speak from within a thought world that is cut off in a variety of
different ways from others. Writing necessitates distancing of the writer from his or
her reader, unlike speaking that involves interaction with an audience.
As Paul Ricoeur says, the written text is utterly independent of its author, and
is a logical expression of the autonomy of the written text. It is a different way of
thinking; writing changes not only the amounts and kinds of information and ideas a
culture collects and generates, but its fundamental mode of assimilating and using
them as well. Writing tends to fix events temporarily and heighten the sense of the
the Ancient World, p. 123.
125 Robin Lane Fox, "Literacy and power in early Christianity," in Literacy and Power in Ancient
World, pp.126-148. See A. Harnack, Bible Reading in the Early Church (1912), and W.V. Harris,
Ancient Literacy (1989).
126 Walter Ong, Orality and Literacy, p. 133.
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distinctiveness as well as their 'pastness', or separation from the past and the
individual person. In other words, written or print culture changes the relationship
between a society and its tradition, as well as that between individuals and their past,
because it fixes those traditions and that past in a way that distances both from the
present. In fact, it has been said that "the more 'literate' people become, the more
they tend to become detached from the world in which they live."127
In oral societies the cultural tradition is transmitted almost
entirely by face-to-face communication; and changes in its
content are accompanied by the homeostatic process of
forgetting or transforming those parts of the tradition that cease
to be either necessary or relevant. Literate societies, on the other
hand, cannot discard, absorb, or transmute the past in the same.
Instead, their members are faced with permanently recorded
versions of the past and its beliefs.128
Therefore, in terms of relationship between the author and the reader being mediated
through the text, readers are supposed to listen to a text as it speaks to them; thus, in
fact, it is not communication, since there is no one-way human communication.
3.4. Controlling Time and Space
This world-view ofmodernity constructed a model in which every distinction
between aspects and differences was translated into a certain spatial concept,
127 Graham cited from Ashley Montagu, Man: His First Million Years (New York: New American
Library, Menotr Books, 1958), p.150. Cf. Eric A Hovelock, The Literate Revolution in Greece and
Its Cultural Consequences, p.289: "Language uttered and remembered has no corporeal existence....
Language written and read becomes an object, a thing, separated form the consciousness that creates
it, and immobilized in a condition of physical survival."
128 J. Goody and I. Watt, Literacy in Traditional Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1968), p. 67.
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especially the concept of time and space. Time is a fundamental dimension of human
life represented in space; in other words, space and time are intrinsic categories of
human existence. Modernity thematises in specific ways the dialectics between time
and space, process and structure, change and continuity, and traces an underlying
developmental logic (historical process) toward its epoch. In fact, in relation to a
certain mode of experience of space and time, modernity has brought a new concept
of space and motion, and the organisation of space has "become the primary
aesthetic problem of mid-twentieth century culture as the problem of time (in
Bergson, Proust, and Joyce) was the primary aesthetic problem of the first decades of
this century."129 Throughout history, the historical and anthropological record is full
of examples of how varied the concept of space can be, as we find similar diversity
within outwardly homogeneous populations. But, since the eighteenth century, the
pervasive idea was that we must acknowledge an over-arching and objective meaning
of space; the Renaissance promoted "a radical reconstruction of views of space and
time in the Western world."130 The traditional conception of infinite space becomes
geographical knowledge that can be grasped and represented, as the discovery of
other territories produced new knowledge about a wider world. It was a revolution
in the concepts of space and time.
Since space is a 'fact' of nature, this meant that the conquest and
rational ordering of space became an integral past of the
modernizing project. The difference this time was that space and
time had to be organized not to reflect the glory of God, but to
celebrate and facilitate the liberation of 'Man' as a free and
129 Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions ofCapitalism (London: Heinemann, 1978), pp.107-111.
130 David Harvey, The Condition ofPostmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change
(Oxford: Blackwell. 1989), p.242.
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active individual, endowed with consciousness and will. It was
in this image that a new landscape was to emerge.131
This was the Enlightenment vision of how the world should be organised: the map,
but maps had become abstract and strictly functional systems. In a way, it is
'positioning,' that is in relation to the others across time-space; the position of an 'I'
is founded on a narcissistic tendency that sees the individual as the ultimate source
and container of social power.
It is important to challenge the idea of a single and objective sense of time
and space (time-space fixity), and against which we can measure the diversity of
human conceptions and perceptions. Moreover, it is imperative that we recognise the
multiplicity of the objective qualities which space and time can express, and the role
of human practices in their construction.132 Therefore, the perception of time-space
will, in fact, be a crucial factor in breaking and reconstructing human epistemology.
Anthony Giddens argues that all pre-modern culture's modes of calculating time is
always linked with place and the basis of everyday life - and is usually imprecise and
variable. For example, hunting and gathering communities (and few nomadic
cultural societies) were the societies whose overall time-space organisation implies
regular movement of the whole group through time-space.133 It was impossible for
them to tell the time of day without reference to other socio-spatial makers: 'when'
was almost universally connected with 'where.'134
131 David Harvey, The Condition ofPostmodernity p.249.
132 David Harvey, The Condition ofPostmodernity, p. 203.
133 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution ofSociety (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984), p. 260.
134 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences ofModernity, p.17.
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But, since the invention of the mechanical clock, time and space have been
separated; the clock expressed a uniform dimension of 'empty' time, quantified in
such a way as to permit the precise designation of 'zones' of the day. It is evident
that the 'emptying of time' is the precondition for the 'emptying space' and thus has
casual priority over it, and therefore, co-ordination across time is the basis of the
control of space.135 In pre-modem societies, space and place largely coincide, since
the spatial dimensions of social life are dominated by 'presence,' but, with the advent
of modernity, it became clear that space was torn away from place by fostering
relations between 'absent' others, locationally distant from any given situation of
face-to-face interaction,136 that Anthony Giddens calls "the separation of time and
space."137 In other word, locales are thoroughly penetrated by and shaped in terms of
social influences quite distant from them.
This development of 'empty space' allows for the representation of space
without reference to a privileged locale which forms a distinct vantage point, and
makes the substitutability of different spatial units possible. It is well exemplified in
the 'discovery' of 'remote' regions of the world by the Western travellers and
explorers, as well as in creating universal maps presenting geographical position and
form in terms of establishment of space as independent of any particular place or
region.138 In this Enlightenment project, the conquest and control of space requires
135Anthony Giddens, The Consequences ofModernity, pp. 17-18
136Anthony Giddens, The Consequences ofModernity, p. 18
137 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p.17.
138 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences ofModernity, p. 19.
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that it be conceived of as something inept, and therefore capable of domination
through human action. Enlightenment thinkers sought a better society. In this
totalising vision of the globe, a conception of otherness might be admitted, and even
flourish, but in such a way that the diversity of people could be appreciated and
analysed in the secure knowledge that their place in the spatial order was
unambiguously known.139 For this progressive idea, they had to pay attention to the
rational ordering of space and time as prerequisites in the construction of a society
that would guarantee individual freedom and welfare. By treating certain idealised
conceptions of space and time as real, Enlightenment thinkers ran the danger of
confining the free flow of human experience and practice to rationalised
configurations, and as a result of that, Enlightenment practice moved toward
surveillance and control. This indicates the 'totalizing qualities' of Enlightenment
thought,140 regarding the Others.
4. Representation of the Other
Driven by the Enlightenment ideal, Western academic institutions formally
recognised the Other as an area of study, and generalised the construction of 'man
and his others' as objects of knowledge, from the late eighteenth/early nineteenth
139 David Harvey, The Condition ofPostmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p.250.
l40David Harvey, The Condition ofPostmodernity, pp.253-259.
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century in Europe, onwards. This ideological consistency extends into modernity. In
terms of the mutual implication of power and knowledge, "the Western power,
especially the power to enter or examine other countries at will, enables the
production of a range of knowledges about other cultures. Such knowledge in turn
enables (legitimates, underwrites) the development of Western power in those other
countries.141 Although colonial expansion was predicated on the power of superior
arms, military and political power, and economic wealth, it was also based on a
complex network of cultural technologies. In other word, colonialism was itself a
cultural project of control, since for colonial rulers, the culture and nature of
colonised were one and the same.
Now, after the decolonisation, colonialism was contextualised within a
historical category, linked to the present term as neo or post. It seems that
colonialism has become a subject of scholarship that calls for the study of the
aesthetics of colonialism. This way we might end up ignoring the extent of it.
However, it is imperative to see colonialism as an historic moment and as a trope for
domination and violation. In the same way, culture should be seen as a historically
constituted domain of significant concepts and practices, and as a regime in which
power achieves its ultimate apotheosis. Any attempt to make a systematic statement
about the colonial project runs the risks of denying the fundamental historicity of
colonialism, as well as of conflating cause with effect.
141 Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman, "Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: An
Introduction." in Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader (London: Harvester &
Wheatsheaf, 1994), pp.6-8. On the knowledge and power relations, see Michel Foucault,
Power/knowledge (New York: Panthenon, 1980).
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It is a fact that colonial rulers were always aware that their power was
dependent on their knowledge, but they were never aware that knowledge was power
in any strategic sense. Therefore, the hegemonic and sinuous character of
colonialism should be considered. Colonialism lives on in post-colonial society and
psyches. It is very difficult to engage in the study of the colonial world without the
basic categories and assumption that have been shaped by colonial rule, but Edward
Said has made the case that the Orient was constituted as an effect of the
collaboration of power and knowledge in the West. These power/knowledge
relations are well exemplified in the study of Orientalism. The nineteenth century
image of the Orient was constructed not just in Oriental studies, romantic novels, and
colonial administrations, but in all the new procedures with which Europeans began
to organise the representation of the world, from museums and world exhibitions to
architecture, schooling, tourism, the fashion industry, and the commodation of
everyday life. Edward Said's analysis argued that Western artistic and scholarly
portrayal of the non-West was not merely an ideological distortion convenient to an
emergent global political order but a densely imbricated arrangement of imagery and
expertise that organised and produced the Orient as a political reality.142 The new
apparatus of representation gave a central place to the representation of the non-
Western world, and several studies have pointed out the importance of this
construction of othernesss to the manufacture of national identity and imperial
purpose. The imagery of Orientalism was a new machinery for rendering up and
laying out the meaning of the world.143
142 Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978).
143 Timothy Mitchell, "Orientalism and the Exhibitionary Order," in Colonialism and Culture, ed.
Nicholas B. Dirks (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1992), p.289-290. See Tony
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4.1 Orientalism
The Orient and the Occident are not just words, but names used to construct
identities which become territories, and in fact, the name, 'the Orient,' becomes the
dividing line between the two. The Orient and the Occident are facts produced by
human beings, and as such must be studied as integral components of the social, and
not the divine or natural, world.144 As a result of this division, the Orient only exists
from the Western vantage point; the Orient becomes the Other for the West. The
representation of the Orient as a nineteenth century phenomenon is well described in
the Orientalist painting. The main initiator of Orientalism in France is the painter
Gros, who was commissioned to glorify the Egyptian expedition of Bonaparte and
created the prototypes of Oriental landscapes, costumes and faces without having set
foot in Egypt; although he used props and artefacts brought back from the East to his
studies, he was nevertheless convinced that he painted from direct observation.145
Representation of the Orient may be said to be mythical, not just because they
are delusions or false representation, but because they provide an explanation that
Bennett, "The Exhibitionary Complex," New Formations 4 (Spring 1988), p.96; in 1889, 32 million
people visited the Exposition Universelle in Paris, to commemorate the centenary of the Revolution
and to demonstrate French commercial and imperial power. See also Robert W. Rydell, All the
World's Fair: Visions of Empire at American International Expositions, 1876-1916 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1984).
144 Edward Said, "Orientalism Reconsidered" in Europe and its others, vol. 1 (Colchester: University
of Essex, 1985), p.15.
145 Oliver Richon, "Representation, the Despot and the Harem: Some Questions around an Academic
Orientalist Painting by Lecomte-Du-Nouy (1885), in Europe and its others, vol. 1 (Colchester:
University of Essex, 1985), pp.1-2.
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rationalises a present state of affairs to the West. For the nineteenth-century
academic painting and literature, Egypt was used as a reservoir of archaeological
information, providing the necessary factual details for a mise-en-scene of an 'Orient'
- factual details (costumes, architectures, and design) were necessary in order to
legitimise the fantasy of a Western Orient.146
Edward Said was concerned about the representation of other cultures and
societies and the relationship between knowledge and power. He raises the question
as to "how the production of knowledge serves communal, as opposed to factual,
ends, how knowledge that is non-dominative and non-coercive can be produced in a
setting that is deeply inscribed with the politics, the considerations, the positions, and
the strategies of power."147 Such ideology and practice are well articulated in
Edward Said's Orientalism, indicating Europe's relationship with, and discursive
construction of, 'the Orient,' as paradigm of colonial and imperial structure. Here,
"the Orient is not only adjacent to Europe, it is also the place of Europe's greatest
and richest and oldest colonies, the source of its civilisations and languages, its
cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other."148
Said uses Vico's observation that men make their own history, that what they can
know is what they have made, and extends it to geography. Both geographical and
cultural entities - to say nothing of historical entities - such localities, regions,
geographical sectors such as 'Orient' and 'Occident' are man-made. It reminds us of
the fact that "as much as the West itself, the Orient is an idea that has a history and a
14601iver Richon, "Representation, the Despot and the Harem: Some Questions around an Academic
Orientalist Painting by Lecomte-Du-Nouy (1885)," p.10.
147 Edward Said, "Orientalism Reconsidered," p. 15.
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tradition of thought, imagery and vocabulary that have given it reality and presence
in and for the West."149 And, moreover "the Orient was almost a European invention,
and had been since antiquity a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories
and landscapes, remarkable experiences."150 Since the Orient is an integral part of
Europe,
The Orientalism expresses and represents that part culturally and
even ideologically as a mode of discourse with supporting
institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even
colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles.151
Orientalism was an academic tradition, whose fortunes, transmigrations,
specifications, and transmissions were in part the subject of this study; it was a
scientific movement whose analogue was the Orient's colonial accumulation and
acquisition by Europe.152 Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological
and epistemological distinction made between the 'the Orient' and 'the Occident.'
On this basic distinction between the East and the West, a very large mass of
research, writing, idea and theory concerning the Orient, its people's customs, mind,
and so on, was produced. In the late eighteenth century, Orientalism was discussed
and analysed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient - dealing with it
by making statements about it, authorising views of it, describing it, by teaching it,
settling it, ruling it. By doing so, the West established a Western style of
148 Edward Said, Orientalism , p.l.
149 Edward Said, "From Orientalism" in Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader
(London: Harvester & Wheatsheaf, 1994), pp. 132-133.
150 Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), p.l.
151 Edward Said, Orientalism, p.2.
152 Edward Said, "Orientalism Reconsidered,"p.l7.
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dominating, restructuring and assuming authority over the Orient, and was able to
manage the Orient politically, sociologically, ideologically and imaginatively during
the post-enlightenment period. Therefore, the Orient was Orientalized not only
because it was discovered to be 'oriental,' but also because it could be made Oriental.
In other words, because of the Orientalism of the West, the Orient was not (is not) a
free subject of thought or action of its own.153
Having recognised the process, Orientalism is "a created body of theory and
practice in which, for many generations, there has been a considerable material
investment. Continued investment made Orientalism, as a system of knowledge
about the Orient, an accepted grid for filtering through the Orient into Western
consciousness."154 In the post-Enlightenment period, Orientalism is not merely
academic subject matter of culture and its representation, but rather is,
a distribution of geographical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly,
economic, sociological, historical and philosophical texts; it is an
elaboration not only of a basic geographical distinction, but also
of a whole series of 'interests' which, by such means as
scholarly discovery, philosophical reconstruction, psychological
analysis, landscape and sociological description, it not only
creates but also maintains155
Since it has created itself upon this assumption, Orientalism can be regarded as a
manner of regularised writing, vision, and study; the Orient is taught, researched,
administrated, and pronounced upon in certain ways. Within this imagery,
153 Edward Said, "Orientalism Reconsidered,"pp.2-5.
154 Edward Said, "From Orientalism" in Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory, p. 133.
155 Edward Said, "From Orientalism," p. 138 (my italic).
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assumptions and intentions, the Orient that appears in Orientalism is a system of
representation framed by a whole set of forces that brought the Orient into the
Western learning, Western consciousness, and later, Western empire. It is quite true
that all cultures tend to make representations of other cultures the better to master or
in some way control them, yet not all cultures make representation of foreign cultures
and master or control them in such a way as the European manipulated the other
cultures. It is the distinction of modern European culture that the non-European
world is to be studied for both the representations and the political power they
express.156 For example,
the history of India became one of the means of propagating
those interests. Traditional Indian historical writing, with its
emphasis on historical biographies and chronicles, was largely
ignored. European writing on Indian history was an attempt to
create a fresh historical tradition. The histographical pattern of
the India past which took shape during the colonial period in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was probably similar to the
patterns which emerged in the histories of other colonial
societies.157
Orientalism is a school of interpretation whose material happens to be the
Orient, its civilisation and people, and its objective discoveries in this school, are and
always have been conditioned by the fact that its truths, like any truths delivered by
language, are embodied in language, as Nietzsche said:
156 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (London: Vintage, 1993), p. 120.
157 Thapar Romila, "Ideology and the Interpretation of Early Indian History," Review 5, No.3 (Winter
1982), p.390. Quoted from Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 121.
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a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms
- in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced,
transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and
which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a
people: truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that
this is what they are.158
Although it might look too nihilistic it nevertheless draws attention to the fact that
this truth existed in the West's consciousness and awareness. Orientalism was
perceived as such a system of truths, truths in Nietzsche's sense. Therefore, on this
view, every European might consequently be described as a racist, an imperialist,
and almost totally ethnocentric, since they spoke within their own system of truth.159
Take, for example, the study of Islam. The perception of Islam in the West has been
shaped by those people who tried to understand it in an analogical way to
Christianity; since Christ is the basis of Christian faith, it assumed that Mohammed
was to Islam as Christ to Christianity. "The Christian concept of Islam was integral
and self-sufficient." Islam became a representative image for Christianity in the
medieval period. As Norman Daniel points out "the inevitable tendency to neglect
what the Qur'an meant, or what Muslims thought it meant, or what Muslims thought
or did in any given circumstances, necessarily implies that Qur'anic and other
Islamic doctrine was presented in a form that would convince Christians."160 This
episode has been a sophisticated attempt to put a representative Orient in front of
Europe, and to relate the Orient and Europe together in some coherent way. Islam
158 Frederick Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense," in The Portable Nietzsche, ed.
and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1954), pp.46-47. cited from Edward Said,
Orientalism, p.203.
159 Edward Said, Orientalism, pp. 201-204.
160 Norman Daniel, Islam and the West: The Making of an Image (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 1960), pp.252;259. Cited from Said, Orientalism.
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was seen as just a misguided version of Christianity. In the light of functional truth
in the West, this only demonstrated a Western ignorance that was becoming more
refined and complex.161
In relation to other cultures of the West, "Orientalism aided and was aided by
general cultural pleasure that tended to make more rigid the sense of difference
between the European and Asiatic parts of world." Said says that "Orientalism is
fundamentally a political doctrine willed over the Orient because the Orient was
weaker than the West, which elided the Orient's difference with its weakness."162
Therefore, the Orientals were viewed
in a frame constructed out of biological determinism and moral-
political admonishment. The Oriental was linked thus to
elements in Western society having common an identity best
described as lamentably alien. Orientals were rarely seen or
looked at; they were seen through, analyzed not as citizens, or
even people, but as problems to be solved or confined or - as the
colonial powers openly coveted their territory - taken over.163
It became evident that the Orient existed for the West in the sense that Orientalism
became a cultural apparatus representing aggression, activity, judgement, will-to-
truth and knowledge over others. Orientalism as a discipline represented
institutionalised Western knowledge of the Orient, it came to exert a three way force,
on the Orient, on the Orientalist, and on the Western 'consumer' of Orientalism.
161 Edward Said, Orientalism, pp.61-62. See R.W. Southern, Western Views of Islam in the Middle
Ages (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1962)
162 Edward Said, Orientalism, p.204.
163 Edward Said, Orientalism, p.207.
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The Orient is Orientalized, a process that only marks the Orient as the province of
the Orientalist but also forces the Western reader to accept Orientalist codifications
as the true Orient. Truth thus becomes a function of learned judgement, not of the
material itself.164 In other words, with the functional concept of truth, under the
general heading of knowledge of the Orient, and within the umbrella of Western
hegemony over the Orient during the period from the end of eighteenth century, there
emerged a complex Orient suitable for study in the academy, for display in the
museum.165 This idea of representation is a theatrical one: "the Orient is the stage on
which the whole East is confined"; "the Orient seems to be a closed field, a theatrical
stage affixed to Europe."166
4.2 Image ofAfrica in the Western Church
The story is the same elsewhere; the image of Africa also has been
historically reconstructed as the product of a monolithic imperial propaganda, and
Africa was uniformly reproduced through a series of tropes as a 'land of darkness,'
'the white man's burden,' peopled with savages of an inherently inferior order, both
intellectually and morally, to the white coloniser. The material culture that was
brought out of Africa was understood as trophy, since it was for the whites, the result
of the civilising mission of the colonisers or missionaries. Consequently,
representation of Africa tells us more about Europeans and their interests in Africa,
164Edward Said, Orientalism, p.67.
'"Edward Said, Orientalism, p.7.
'"Edward Said, Orientalism., p.63.
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than about Africa and the African, especially in the high imperial period.167
The objects collected in the public exhibition created the image ofAfrica, in a
way which the representations would illustrate the eradication of 'the unwholesome'
superstition of the past, and Africa has no history to speak of until the colonisers'
naming of the continent.168 In fact, through representation, the African and African
continent are contained within the museum, and the public idea which was created
through the museum display, constructed the image and myth of Africa. One of the
main characteristics of the African exhibition, which was shared with many, was to
focus on the body, whether on its decoration, scarification, skin, colour, or
measurement and proportion.169 Because of the concentration on "the relation of
physical 'evidence' to mental and inherited characteristics, the association of the
body of the African with displays of material did much to encourage the popular
conflation of living African with inert 'specimens,'"170since they were classified in
detail 'scientifically.' Consequently, the materials were viewed through an
evolutionary prism, and through it, the ideology ofEuropean racial superiority.
This machinery of representation was not confined to the exhibition, but
extended to stand for something larger: the political ideology with which Europeans
began to organise the representation of the world "England is at present the greatest
167 1890 is the historical starting point, since this marks the period of concerted British imperial and
colonial expansion in Africa. One of the consequences of imperial expansion, was the subsequent
influx of material culture into Britain, from different regions of the African continent. Therefore, this
period was the beginning of promoting ethnographic collecting generally, together with the new
interest in African exhibition and collection by the general public.
168 Annie E. Coombes, Reinventing Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 131.
169 Annie E. Coombes, Reinventing Africa pp. 159-160.
78
Chapter 1. Profile of the Other
Oriental Empire which the world has ever known," proclaimed by the president of
the 1892 Orientalist Congress at its opening session. His words reflected the political
idea of the British imperial age. "She knows not only how to encounter, but how to
rule."171 This statement demonstrates that,
The endless spectacles of the world-as-exhibition were not just
reflections of this certainty but the means of its production, by
their technique of rendering imperial truth and cultural difference
in 'objective' form.172
In relation to the containing of the African continent, the evangelical
missionary societies were arguably the more active agents in both promotion and
criticism of colonial polity. It is remarkable to notice that most of the existing
scholarship on mission and the colonial encounter on the indigenous societies, is a
result of contact with the missionary communities in the field, in Africa and other
colonies. Therefore, it is important to see how the missionary societies create the
image of Africa, for the purpose of home mission, through the representation of the
mission field.173 Home mission was particularly effective in disseminating an image
of Africa and the African, and ultimately served imperial interests.174 Missionary
societies were able to capitalise on the romantic, exotic appeal of the mission fields
170 Annie E. Coombes, ReinventingAfrica, p. 160.
171 International Congress of Orientalists, Transactions of the Ninth Congress, 1892 (London:
International Congress of Orientalists, 1893), 1:35, quoted from Coombes, Reinventing Africa, p. 160.
172 Timothy Mitchell, "Orientalism and the Exhibitionary Order," in Colonialism and Culture ed.
Nicholas B. Dirks (Ann Arbor: The University ofMichigan Press, 1992), p.296.
173 Christine Bolt, Victorian Attitude to Race (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,1971), pp.110-117.
She discussed some aspects of the propaganda of the home mission regarding Africa, in dealing with
missionary societies' representation to British public.
174 Susan E. Thome, Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Imperialism: British Congregationalists and
the London Missionary Society, 1795-1925 (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1991), p.18.
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in order to recruit support. The missionary exhibition in particular was one of the
activities most energetically pursued, by the societies at home, as a primary means of
informing the congregations of the progress in the field and of drumming up financial
and moral support.175 But, it was possible to see the missionary exhibition as an
"event that consolidated the misleading sense of class unity propagated by their
recruitment and fund-raising activities, coupled with the powerful panaceas of
national unity, both ofwhich adequately served imperial interests."176
The missionary exhibition was primarily for the edification of the
congregation at home, and played a very important role in the construction of a
certain image of Africa, as Eugene Stock, the Church Missionary Society's official
historian reported,
Missionary exhibitions seem more attractive than ever. Very
large ones have been held at Birmingham, Bristol, Rochester,
Paddington, Newcastle and Liverpool The articles displayed
and still more the lectures and explanatory talks have enlightened
thousands of hearers.177
It is clear that while the missionary societies were by no means impartial bystanders
in the face of colonialism, they exploited an ambivalent position as both intrinsic to,
and on the fringes of, that enterprise. They were able to present an image of Africa
and the African thoughts through their exhibitions, as observed:
175 Annie E. Coombes, Reinventing Africa, p. 162. note: "the sustaining notion that ensured the
success of this policy was the doctrine that everyone - young, old, rich, and poor - could become
contributors for the same cause, since no matter how impoverished the Englishman, the heathen was
even more spiritually and materially bereft." Ibid., p. 163.
176 Annie E. Coombes, Reinventing Africa, p. 163.
177 Eugene Stock, A History ofthe Church Missionary Society, vol. 3 (London: CMS, 1989), p.306.
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With equal enthusiasm, the missionary served as an agent of a
political empire, a representative of a civilization and an envoy
of God. There is no essential contradiction between these roles.
All of them implied the same purpose: the conversion of African
minds and space.178
Therefore the image of Africa that emerged in the West, was also the product of a
complex network of interests, hegemonies, and power relations, and of popular
imaginations of the West. It was the West's self-definition of the African and Africa,
and the self-appropriation of the Other.
What is evident is that, after having explored the nature of Orientalism and of
the African image the West has, studying the relationship between the 'West' and its
dominated cultural 'others' is not just a way of understanding an unequal relationship
between unequal interlocutors, but is also a point of entry into studying the formation
and meaning of Western cultural practices themselves. The exploration of colonial
cultural politics is well articulated in the work of Edward Said, as seen in the last
section. My chief concern, however, is to move beyond his general critique, both in
the sense of breaking down the monolith of colonialism, and in engaging more
directly with the brute realities of an Orient that resists reification in Western
discursive or political formation. It is imperative therefore to delineate the spaces of
resistance in the continuing study. Spaces in which there is a renewed concern to
identify and celebrate resistance, although there is similar concern to avoid the
178 V.Y. Mudimbe, The Invention of Africa, Gnosis, Philosophy and the Order of Knowledge
(Bloomingdale, 1988), p. 47.
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pitfalls of romantic affiliation against forces that we resist far too often in vain.
In terms of the imperialism of representation, this dominating universal
narrative may bring about the projection from the civilising imperial centres of
fetishised image of Africa, the Orient, Latin America, etc. as civilisation's Other, in
ways that simultaneously bring these regions into being for Europe, fulfil its need for
psychological and political centring, and silence any attempts at self-representation
by these people and their post-colonial descendants. As Edward Said writes, the
Orient was not Europe's interlocutor, but its silent Other.179 For Franz Fanon, the
struggle was to find a form of self-definition for the black man that is not the
obedient reproduction of Western paranoiac projections. He declares "I am not a
potentiality of something. I am wholly what I am. I do not have to look for the
universal. No probability has any place inside me. My Negro consciousness does
not hold itself out as a lack. It is its own follower."180
While the imperialism of the colonial period tended to license only a cultural
discourse that was formulated from within, today's post-imperialism has produced a
cultural discourse of suspicion on the part of formerly colonised peoples. More
recent studies, however, have emphasised the need to focus on the margins and have
become suspicious of binary models; this suspicion is grounded in the belief that
such oppositional models themselves may derive from and reproduce colonial
179 Edward Said, "Orientalism Reconsidered', Literature, Politics and Theory: Papers From the Essex
Conference, 1976-1984, ed Francis Barker, Peter Hulme, Margaret Iversen and Diani Loxley
(London: Methuen, 1986), p.215.
180 Franz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks{London: Pluto Press, 1986), p. 135
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structure of thought. There is a need for careful deconstruction of the very structure
of 'dominance' and 'margin.' It is necessary to demonstrate the inner principles of
weakness within the Orientalism of the West (although Edward Said was concerned
with the internal contradictions within the dominant Western forms of knowledge)
and the ideology of'blackness' and multiculturalism. What has been most criticised
is a mode of representation, the systematic appropriation of different others in the
name of rationalism and multi-culturalism, in the controlled space of West, where
traditional theological principles also operate. There is a great danger in our
theological articulations, especially in the West's relation to other cultures and
different traditions, of being an abstract multicultural or ecumenical machine of so-
called openness (charitable openness) or 'nice.' Since this understanding may come
hand in hand with ignorance and indifference to historical and political reality of
other culture and people, therefore the matter is not one of charity but of justice. It
is, therefore, not only a question of communicating across borders but of discerning
the ideologies or forces which generate the borders in the first place. Only then can a
challenge be made to Western claims to a serene self-aware rationality and reveal its
existential dependence upon otherness.
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I can say that I know of only one people which felt able to assert
that it actually had a divine command to exterminate whole
populations among those it conquered; namely Israel.
Nowadays Christians, as well as Jews, seldom care to dwell on
the merciless ferocity of Jewish as revealed not by hostile source
but by the very literature they themselves regard as sacred.
Indeed they continue as a rule to forget the very existence of the
incriminating material.1
In constituting a relation with the others, Western traditional theology has been
characterised as one that 'speaks to/for the others' claiming its universal authority and
validity for all. These characteristics were particularly practiced in biblical
interpretation. The task of exegesis was conceived as establishing the meaning (usually
single) of the text, and applying it to other theological disciplines. In particular,
missionary activity and its contextualisation processes have been the chief form of
'speaking to/for the others' in attempts to translate the message or the meaning of the
text into relevant cultural terms: "the missionary's ultimate goal in communication has
always been to present the supracultural message of the gospel in culturally relevant
terms."2
1 G.E.M. de Ste Croix, in Edward Said, "Michael Waltzer's Exodus and Revolution: A Canaanite
Reading," in Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question, ed by Edward
Said and Christopher Hitchens (London: Verso, 1988). p. 166.
2 D.J. Hesselgrave and E. Rommen, Contextualization: Meanings, Methods, and Models
(Leicester:Apollos, 1989), p. 1.
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It is very much the same in the theological representation of the West, when
encountering non-Western cultures and religions. Traditionally, the Western theologians
employ those instruments which enable them to be master of theology. In the
relationship with other religions, Christian religion has always looked for something
'useful,' 'profitable,' or 'praiseworthy' in an effort to maintain its superior ground, in
terms of its own development. But, even in Karl Rahner's famous concept of the
'anonymous Christian,' an idea of co-constitution, which recognises non-Christian
religions as 'lawful' religions that share one history of the one world in their own
-I
particular way, such a practice of maintaining Christian superiority continues within
Christian tradition. Hans Kung says that the "theory of the 'anonymous Christian' is in
the final analysis still dependent on a (Christian) standpoint of superiority that sets up
one's own religion as the a priori true one." Here, the Other is defined in reference to
me, classifying the non-Christian within a totality described and affirmed from a
standpoint of Christian's understanding, as if the classification was already justified.
Although Rahner admits the historical solidarity of worshippers from all religions, the
concept of anonymity as the highest status of the other or the other religion, refuses to
acknowledge the other under his/her own name. The other is always dependent on my
truth, on what is of advantage to me and defined by me. Then, how is it possible to talk
about the Other, without appropriating the Other's territory? How is it possible to enter
into a full partnership with the Other? How is it possible to go beyond any tourist-exotic
3 Karl Rahner, "Christianity and the Non-Christian Religions," in Christianity and Other Religions, ed by
John Hick and Brian Hebblethwaite (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), p52-79; p.75.
4 Hans Kung, Theology for the Third Millennium: An Ecumenical View, trans, by Peter Heinegg (New
York: Doubleday, 1988), p. 236.
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ecstasy over the Other or the colonial discourse on racism, hatred and contempt which
actually makes the Other both materially and mentally a slave?
As social consciousness changed, Western traditional theologies were forced to
'listen to' the other's voices or meanings - feminist, other minority groups and so on.
The non-Westem theologians raised their voices against Eurocentrism, sexism, racism,
and patriachalism. But, even in this more liberal position that adopts a positive attitude
toward minorities out of a sense of guilt, what is being attempted is to contextualise
'our' work, so that 'we' will help 'them' resolve 'their' problems. What still remains
unchanged is 'our' claim of universality, the refusal to acknowledge that 'our' critical
theology is in the interest of, and promoted by male European Americans,
contextualised for the interests and concerns of the group. An alternative solution,
however, is to abandon absolutisation and universalisation to recognise 'ours' as a
particular perspective that is valid and legitimate in our own context, but also to affirm
and acknowledge the validity of the otherness of others. In other words, to reject the
tendency to absolutise what is not absolute. This is only possible after the recognition of
the limitedness of one's particularity, where one places oneself in a position to 'speak
with' others.
The first step would be the realisation of the givenness of the Other; the Other is
always already there with us. It is essential to realise that in the human relation, the
Other whom I meet is given. This means that the Other's reality is neither created nor
controlled by me, because 'I' encounter the Other already there. As Edward Farley says,
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"the other .... is what I do not and cannot experience in the mode of I experience myself.
It is an 'I' which is not I." It is similar to the parental relationship children are not
extensions of their parents, but they exist 'with,' not 'to,' their parents. On the other
hand, in relation to other cultures, studying the relationship between the West and its
dominated cultural 'others' is not just a way of understanding an unequal relationship
between unequal interlocutors, but also a point of entry into studying the formation and
meaning of Western cultural practices themselves. The discourse that we are about to
begin, is "not a mere depository of thin linguistic layers, an archive of structures, or the
testimony,... [it is] instead, the essential element of a practice involving the sum of
unconscious, subjective, and social relations in gestures of confrontation and
appropriation, destruction and construction - productive violence." 6
The Western philosophical reflection hitherto consisted in neutralising the Other,
the stranger, by means of a strategy of self-consciousness - which reduced the Other to
one's own self. The cultural other was assimilated as a part of Western thought, and
became a part of the self-consciousness of the West. Therefore, through radical
reflection on post-colonial discourse, Western cultural reality and thought reveal their
inability to answer the questioning of the Other, because the Other breaks through into
my being as a trace, and accuses me of a crime in the history of violence against the
possibility of genuine human solidarity.
5 Edward Farley, Good and Evil: Interpreting a Human Condition (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990),
p.35.
6 Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language (New York: Columbia University, 1984), p. 16.
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Therefore, the relationship with the Other is a point of entry into engaging and
evaluating the totalising tendency of the West, especially in relation to colonialism and
its impact on the people, both the coloniser and the colonised. One of the well read
colonial modern realistic novels is Robinson Crusoe: a story about a man (European)
who created his own world on a remote non-European island. This narrative and others
like it have influenced the West in creating an idea about strange parts of the world as
empty space to be filled, and accordingly, the identity of the West to the non-Western
world was formed. It was part of a process of fixing relations between Europeans and
others. It inscribed the fixity of that alterity (the Other), naturalising difference within
its own cognitive codes. Colonialist literature is an exploitation and a representation of a
world at the boundaries of civilisation, a world that has not (yet) been domesticated by
European signification or codified in detail by its ideology. Motivated by his desire to
conquer and dominate, the imperialist configures the colonial realm as a confrontation
based on difference in race, language, social customs, cultural value, and modes of
production. It is significant that while the surface of each colonialist text purports to
represent specific encounters with specific varieties of the Other, the subtext valorises
the superiority of European culture, of the collective process that had mediated that
representation. Its literature is essentially speculative: instead of seeing the native as a
bridge toward syncretic possibility, it uses the Other as a mirror that reflects the
colonialist's self-images.7
7Abdul J. Janmohamed, "The Economy of Manichean Allegory" in Race, writing and difference, ed by
Henry Louis Gate, Jr. (Chicago: University ofChicago, 1986), p 87.
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1. Post-colonial Discourse
Edward Said's Orientalism demonstrated the way which the West has
conceptualised its relationship to the non-West. In the imperial process, the globe and
its people were treated as an object to be studied, ruled, and exploited. More
importantly, the knowledge of cultural others was produced as a cultural project of the
West's colonialism. In other words, "colonial knowledge both enabled colonial
conquest and was produced by it; in certain important ways, culture was what
colonialism was all about."8 As explained in the previous chapter, other cultures and
traditional societies are classified, categorised, and reconstructed by colonial
technologies. In fact, the anthropological concept of culture might never been invented
without a colonial theatre that necessitated the knowledge of culture, and without
colonialism, it could not have been facilitated. Therefore, culture was both the means
and the end of colonial conquest, and culture was invented in relationship to a variety of
colonial desires.9 In other words, it could be argued that
the power of colonialism as a system of rule was predicated at least
in part on the ill-coordinated nature of power, and colonial power
8 Nicholas B. Dirks, "Colonialism and Culture," in Nicholas B. Dirks (ed) Colonialism and Culture (Ann
Arbor: The University ofMichigan Press, 1992), p.3.
9 Nicholas B. Dirks, "Colonialism and Culture pp.3-4.
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was never so omniscient nor secure to imagine itself as totalizing,
and that while colonial rulers were always aware that their power
was dependent on their knowledge, they themselves were never
similarly aware of all the ways in which knowledge was, in any
direct or strategic sense, power.10
This study is focused on the genealogies of problems that have been grown by the
colonial encounters of the West with non-Western others, by explaining the
characteristics of Western culture through the historical process.
1.1. Coloniality as a Shared Experience
Colonialist fiction is generated predominantly by ideological machinery, yet the
relation between imperial ideology and fiction is not without direction. Ideology does
not simply determine fiction. Rather through a kind of symbiosis, fiction forms ideology
by articulating and justifying the position and aims of the colonialist. Thus, the
ideological function of all symbolic colonialist literature is to articulate and justify the
moral authority of the coloniser and to mask the pleasure the coloniser derives from that
authority. As T. S. Eliot indicated, tradition is not just inherited, it can only be obtained
by 'great labour':
10 Nicholas B. Dirks, "Colonialism and Culture," p.7
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Tradition involves, in the first place, the historical sense, which we
may call nearly indispensable to anyone who would continue to be a
poet beyond his twenty-fifth year; and the historical sense involves a
perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence;
the historical sense compels a man to write not merely with his own
generation in his bones, but with a feeling that the whole of the
literature of Europe from Homer and within it the whole of the
literature of his own country has a simultaneous existence and
composes a simultaneous order. This historical sense, which is a
sense of the timeless as well as of the temporal and of the timeless
and of temporal together, is what makes a writer traditional. And it
is at the same time what makes a writer most acutely conscious of
his place in time, of his own contemporaneity. No poet, no artist of
any art, has his complete meaning alone.11
It is significant that the existence of empire depends upon the idea of having an empire.
For the citizens of nineteenth century Britain and France, empire was a major topic of
cultural attention. Edward Said states,
British India and French North Africa alone played inestimable roles
in the imagination, economy, political life, and social fabric of
British and French society and, if we mention names like Delacroix,
Edmund Burke, Ruskin, Carlyle, James and John Stewart Mill,
Kipling, Balzac, Nerval, Flaubert, or Conrad, we shall be mapping a
tiny comer of a far vaster reality than even their immense collective
talents cover. They were scholars, administrators, travellers, traders,
parliamentarians, merchants, novelists, theorists, speculators,
adventurers, visionaries, poets, and every variety of outcast and
misfit in the outlying possessions of these two imperial powers, each
of whom contributed to the formation of a colonial actuality existing
at the heart ofmetropolitan life.12
11 T. S. Eliot, Critical Essays (London: Faber & Faber, 1932), pp. 14-15.
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At the same time, as seen in the words ofEliot, the significance of colonial experience in
the past became a part of tradition and reality for hundreds ofmillions of people living
in the post-colonial era, as shared memory and as conflictual texture of culture and
ideology. Edward Said remarks, "Westerners may have physically left their old colony
in Africa and Asia, but they retained them not only as markets but as locales on the
9J13
ideological map over which they continued to rule morally and intellectually."
Therefore, to study the relationship between the West and its dominated cultural others
is not just a way of looking at an unequal relationship between unequal interlocutors, but
also a point of entry for studying the formation and meaning of Western cultural
practice. Moreover, having accepted the historical reality of colonialism in the non-
Western world, it is important not to separate but to connect them, by articulating
cultural dynamics and complexity in such a way that we can create 'space' for dialogue.
1.2. Post-colonial Discourse as a Resistance
Here, the 'post' in the post-colonial is not the same as the 'post' in the
postmodernism (whether it is the cultural logic of late capitalism, or not), because 'post-
colonial' doesn't mean 'post-independence' or 'after independence'( for this would
falsely ascribe an end of the colonial process). Rather post-colonialism begins from the
very first moment of colonial contact; it is the discourse of oppositionality which
12 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism, p.8
13 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism, p.27
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colonialism brings into being. Therefore, in a sense, post-colonialism has a very long
history.
This post-colonial discourse articulates the nature of the colonised and of cultural
and political resistance, the cultural impact of colonialism on the psyches of the
colonised and vice versa and views of cultural identity. These matters are profoundly
involved in searching for identity; "who in India or Algeria today can confidently
separate out the British or French component of the past from present actualities, and
who in Britain or France can draw a clear circle around British London or French Paris
that would exclude the impact of India and Algeria upon those two imperial cities?"14
Therefore post-colonial cultures are inevitably hybridised, involving a dialogical
relationship between European ontology and epistemology and the impulse to create or
recreate independent local identity. Since it is not possible to create or recreate national
or regional identity beyond the implications of European colonialism, its main project is
to interrogate European discourse from the position between the two worlds (the
coloniser and colonised). Post-colonial cultures are constituted in counter-discursive,
and offer 'fields' of counter-discursive strategies to the dominant discourse.15 Post-
colonial counter-discourse is dynamic, not static, in its operation; it does not seek to
subvert the dominant with a view to taking its place, but to evolve textual strategies
which continually 'consume their own biases,' at the same time as they expose the
14 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 15.
15 Dannis Lee, Savage Fields: An Essay in Literature and Cosmology (Toronto: Anansi, 1977), p.32-33.
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dominant discourse.16 Therefore, the post-colonial counter-discursive strategies involve
a mapping of the dominant discourse, a reading and exposing of its underlying
assumptions, and the dismantling of these assumptions from the cross-cultural
standpoint.
On the other hand, post-colonial desire is the desire of decolonized communities
for an identity. The search for an identity, both in literature and politics, centres around
language. For the post-colonial to speak or write in the imperial tongue is to call forth
the problem of identity; the question of language is political and cultural. The post-
colonised identify with the culture destroyed by imperialism and its tongue. But there is
not always a choice, because for many ex-colonies, the native tongue is English. This is
not just true for Australia and Canada, but is also true for West Indians, many Maoris,
Aboriginals and others. Therefore, what we encounter here is a politics of language
which rests not on the power within language, but on the power behind language. Simon
During, in "Postmodernism or Postcolonialism Today,"17 cited Salman Rushdie's novel
Shame. Near the beginning, the narrator is interrupted by a speaker who disputes his
authority to tell the tale.
Outsider! Trespasser! You have no right to this subject... I know:
nobody ever arrested me. Nor are they ever likely to. Poacher!
Pirate! We reject your authority. We brow you, with your foreign
language wrapped around you like a flag: speaking about us in your
16 Wilson Harris, "Adversarial Contexts and Creativity," New Left Review 154 (Nov.-Dec. 1985), p. 127.
17 Textual Practice 1 (1), 1987. pp.32-47.
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forked tongue, what can you tell but lie? I reply with more
questions: Is history to be considered the property of the participants
solely? In what courts are such claims staked, what boundary
commissions map out the territories? Can only the dead speak?18
This is to indicate, in the dialogue across the bar between the post-colonisers and the
post-colonised in Shame, that the domination of people's language by the language of
colonising nation was crucial to the domination of the mental universe of the colonised,
because the colonial language functions as a carrier of culture. The English language is
more than just the language of colonial British empire used just to communicate, rather
it has great utility value as an instrument of propaganda to perpetuate imperial ideology
and reinforce its hierarchical structure of power through the metaphors deployed in a
rhetoric of democracy and persuasion. Colonialist writers fictionalised objects of
conquest and built psychological power structures into their discourses and language.
As Davis indicates,
A country must do more than simply steal another country: a series
of explanations, representations, and rationalization must intervene
as the project of colonizing cannot exist without the help of
ideological and justifying political action. Even the inhabitants of
the targeted colony must, for a successful colonization, accept the
domination of language and symbols of this takeover. To win hearts
and minds, one must occupy hearts and minds - in the dominant as
well as the occupied countries.19
18 Salman Rushdie, Shame (New York: Vantage, 1984), p. 23.
19 Lennard J. Davis, Resisting Novel, p.63
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Therefore, the task of post-colonial discourse is to demonstrate a strategy for
demystifying power in discourse by tracing the internal operations through which textual
structures capture the reader in a moment of collusion and coercion. By doing so, it
reveals a colonial ideology which is set to operate on the mind of both coloniser and
colonised so that they are conditioned to accept colonial ideals as ethical and mutually
beneficial. As Said points out that whole world could and has been invented by the
sheer power ofwords and its life sustained by a network of institutional support systems,
90
such as institutions, traditions, conventions. And moreover, this ideal involves a
"flexible positional superiority, which puts the Westerners in a whole series of possible
91.
relationships with the Orient without losing him the relative upper hand." It is,
therefore, necessary to explain the way in which power is exercised and how the webs of
rules, traditions, and conventions are at work. The mutual implication of power and
knowledge, is very important, when we talk about the Western power that enables the
production of knowledge about other cultures. Such knowledge enables the
development of Western power in those other countries. Colonial discourse and post-
colonial theory, then, are critiques of the process of production of knowledge about the
Other; it is a new academic inquiry, focused on the variety of textual forms in which the
West produced and codified knowledge about non-Western, non-metropolitan areas and
cultures, especially those under colonial control. It is important to note the reason for
22the success of Orientalism; this lay in the bringing together of two apparently very
20 Edward Said, Orientalism, p.22
21 Edward Said, Orientalism p.7
22 It was proceeded by a number of academic texts from a German intellectual tradition which shared with
Said's concerns with the historical and theoretical relation between Western economic/political global
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different areas: post-structuralism23, in the shape of Foucault, and Western Marxism, in
the shape of Gramsci.
These power exercises are particularly well articulated in Michael Foucault; he
explains that knowledge enables power to be wielded, that each body of knowledge
creates a new form to exercise this power. This knowledge self-constitutes expertise, so
that it will make this particular discourse an acceptable reference for validating truth. In
Discipline and Punish (1977), Foucault speaks of a new concept of the human being as
disciplinary object that has resulted in new ways of designing prisons, schools, hospitals
for the purpose of effective surveillance; in The History ofSexuality (1979), he surveys
the changing sets of knowledge on sexuality which contributed to our attitudes to the
human body through the ages; in Madness and Civilisation (1967), he discussed how the
madness came to be classified and treated by systems of our own making. Therefore, for
him, "truth is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production,
regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements. Truth is linked in a
domination and Western intellectual production. Those thinkers are Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer,
Walter Benjamin, Hannah Arendt. Especially, Arendt's Origins of Totalitarianism (London: Andre
Deutch, 1986) contains a major and comprehensive account of the knowledge/power relations of
nineteenth century imperialism which in many ways anticipates Foucault's archaeological methods of
investigation; Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno's Dialectic of the Enlightenment (1944) offers a
critique of the epistemic violence of Enlightenment philosophy which precedes post-structuralist critiques
by several decades; Walter Benjamin described the process of commodity production as 'the always-new
in the context of the ever-same', where the need of the commodity to present itself as always new,
different, desirable.
23 Patrick William and Laura Chrisman,, "An Introduction," in Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial
Theory, pp. 5-6.
It is important to point out that post-structuralism has criticized existing models of individual subjectivity,
above all the bourgeois liberal concept of the autonomous individual, while post-modernist theory, in the
shape of Jean- Francois Lyotard, has announced the end of Tes grands rents', the 'grand narrative' of the
Enlightenment.
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circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of
power which it induces and which extend it. A regime of truth."24 Since
knowledge/truth is what counts as true within the system of rules for a particular
discourse, and the power that determines and verifies this truth, it is very important to
engage in a radical questioning of basic assumptions, of rules, and therefore of truth.
Through this realistic mode of presentation, then, the colonial milieu is made
intelligible to the reader who is being positioned in discourse and is persuaded to collude
with the narrating voice. Realist texts, in claiming to tell the truth by representing
things as they are, assume that the fictional characters represented are intelligible and
consistent; that the reader has a privileged position from which events and characters
become intelligible; and moreover that the author who creates them has a coherent
power to determine and endorse meaning. In this self-perpetuating form, realism allows
for the invisible author to become the voice of knowledge, pursues the reader to collude
with the author, and makes the reader forget that the text is an artefact. By doing so, the
realist text conceals its own structuredness and places its reader into a position to accept
the reality presented. In fact, realist text missed one fundamental step in the process of
mediation between art and life, and that is, that novels can only depict life as it is
9 5
presented by ideology.
24 Paul Rabinow, The Foucault Reader (1984), p,74. An interview with Foucault by Rabinow.
25 Althusser's notion of the interpellated subject as a product of a larger system he calls the ideological
state apparatus will be adapted to suit the much narrower operations at the level of textual response.
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It is ideology as a signifying system that makes sense out of the complex and
uncoordinated events and perceptions we call life. In other words, since the realistic
novel depends on its ability to make us feel that we are witnessing not art but life, it
conceals, as ideology, its own structuredness as ideologically loaded structure - which in
this case, we call colonialist discourse. It is seeking a master position, a perspective, a
single viewpoint from which the immensity of the colonial world can be reduced to
proper dimensions, and as a result, places can be summarised, controlled, and intended
for specific purposes. It had the power to make the natives see and experience
themselves as 'Other.'
But post-colonial discourse is an alternative position which reads colonialist
discourse from a native perspective; here, the native readers will approach the text with
their own cultural schema to interpret what is culturally not-said through what is actually
said by the author and his colonial characters. Its critical approach is to question the
basic assumptions of the binary oppositions of black-white, dark-light, good-evil, true-
false, noble-savage, subject-object..., and then offer ways of demystifying and
subverting these dominant, self-perpetuating literary forms, dismantling colonialism's
signifying system, and exposing its operation in the silencing and oppressing of the
colonised and of different cultures. In addition, although post-colonial discourse shares
a lot with the contemporary reading practice of postmodernism and deconstructionism,
its reading is different from the western literary theories which ask the reader to leave
his/her cultural identity at the door and disappear into the anonymity of the universal
figure - the mock reader (Gibson), the implied reader (Booth, Iser), the model reader
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(Eco), the super reader (Riffaterre), the inscribed, encoded reader (Brooke-Rose), the
narratee (Prince), the ideal reader (Culler), the literent reader (Holland), the actual reader
(Jauss) and the informed reader (Fish).26 Here, post-colonial discourse encourages
different cultures to have different interpretations of culturally sensitive materials, which
means that, because of the difference the reader brings to the text, these differences
arise.
Here, a significant contribution to this post-colonial reading practice, in
recognising the voice of the Other (here, the native), is not only just to recognise the fact
that reading inevitably entails a cultural input and therefore critical theory should accept
this reality, but also to give speech to the silent native and the victim voice, - to have
dialogues in discourse. Having a dialogue with the Other means to have a new
philosophical counter-tradition, in which egocentricism, ethnocentrism, and
eurocentricism have come to a dead end. This counter-tradition relativises the position
of the traditional philosophy, theology, and anthropology of the West, as the Other
shows the cultural difference. Clifford Geertz insists that
To see ourselves as others see us can be eye-opening. To see others
as sharing a nature with ourselves is the merest decency. But it is
from the far more difficult achievement of seeing ourselves amongst
26 Elizabeth Freud, The Return ofthe Reader (London: Methen, 1987), p. 7.
Iser and Jass described the reading process in terms of reader's consciousness, while Fish describes it in
terms of reader's response to the sequence of words in sentences. Culler believes that a theory of reading
should uncover a whole latent system of conventions used by the reader. Holland concentrates on the
psychological needs of the reader to process the text according to his/her most urgent motivation.
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others, as a local example of the forms human life has locally taken a
case among cases, a world among worlds, that the largeness of
mind, without which objectivity is self-congratulation and tolerance
a sham, comes. If interpretive anthropology has any general office
in the world it is to keep reteaching this fugitive truth.27
This counter-tradition is heterological, which is a new concept of knowledge that rejects
the notion of truth as the instrument of mastery exercised by the knower over areas of
28
the unknown. As Lyotard insists, knowledge must surrender its global pretensions,
because it is always limited to local knowledge;29but this localisation does not mean a
call for the rediscovery of the 'original' culture or 'pure' self, but rather, as Fanon
emphasised, a call for a project of developing culture - the dynamic nature of cultural
formation.
1.3. Something In-Between: Franz Fanon
Traditionally, the notion of ideal authenticity or authentic identity was fixed in
the beginning or origin, but Franz Fanon's position on national culture m The
27 Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge (London: Fontans Press, 1993), p. 16.
28 See Jean Franafois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Minneapolis:
University of Minneapolis, 1984).
29 See Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge
30 Bom on 20 July 1925. The Martiniquean psychiatrist who had become an Algerian militant through the
Algerian Revolution of 1954-62, died on December 1961, in the United States. It was in Algeria that he
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Wretched of the Earth represents a good articulation of the cultural implications of
colonialism and resistance, the anti-colonial struggle. Although Fanon's position on
culture is "predicated on his essentially materialist recognition of the exploitative
economic motives of colonialism as the decisive determinant of all aspects of the life of
the colonized," his 'culture' "transcends such mechanical materialism and perceives
31
certain inner dynamics within the development of culture among the colonized."
Therefore, for him, national struggles were expressions of the national culture.
Fanon wrote about black culture, although it is debatable how much he wrote on
the basis of his experience in black Africa, as opposed to his experience as a black man
in white European society. He had experienced tremendous pride and happiness in the
discovery of the black past, although he had struggled with the meaning of negritude.
For him the central question was the liberation, the double task of liberating black men
and liberating all colonial peoples, in political and cultural terms. However, he was also
one of the earliest theorists to warn of the pitfalls of national consciousness as a perverse
form of victory over colonialism; the victory of a reverse racism that indicated that the
colonised were still unfree of the need to combat the coloniser by imitating him.
experienced his political awakening, and it was through the Revolution that he came to understand the
meaning of the struggle for liberation . It was a concept which for Algerians, and for Fanon , meant more
than political independence; it was the regeneration of men and societies. It was the process of self-
liberation and rebirth; it was the travail of people undoing the effects of colonization and restructuring
their relations with one another and with the former colonizing power on the basis of their new situation.
Fanon wrote four books: Black Skin, White Masks, Toward the African Revolution, A Dying Colonialism,
and The Wretched ofthe Earth. Also see David Caute, Fanon (London: Colins, Fontana, 1970), and Peter
Geismar, Fanon (New York: Dial Press, 1971).
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What Franz Fanon wanted was a nationalist pride that acknowledged the unique
historical experience of a people without degenerating into chauvinism. He insisted that
it is only possible through a "consciousness of oneself' to achieve an international
consciousness.
The consciousness of self is not the closing of a door to
communication. Philosophic thought teaches us, on the contrary,
that it is its guarantee. National consciousness, which is not
nationalism, is the only thing that will give us an international
dimension.32
On the question of national culture, Fanon began with a discussion of the relevance of
the past in colonised societies; he acknowledged the need to return to the past as a means
of resisting the role of colonialism. But, he also understood the danger of a counter
action, to counter the colonial prohibition on expressions of a national culture.
The claim to a national culture in the past does not only rehabilitate
that nation and serve as a justification for the hope of a future
national culture. In the sphere of psycho-affective equilibrium it is
responsible for an important change in the native. Perhaps we have
not sufficiently demonstrated that colonialism is not simply content
to impose its rule upon the present and the future of a dominated
country. Colonialism is not satisfied merely with holding a people in
its grip and emptying the native's brain of all form and content. By a
31 Chidi Amuta, "A Dialectical Theory of African Literature: Categories and Springboards" Ch.4, The
Theory ofAfrican Literature (London: Zed Books, 1989), p. 147
32 Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (London: Macgibbon & Kee, 1967), p. 198. It was from the
statement made at the Second Congress ofBlack Artist and Writers, Rome, 1959.
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kind ofperverted logic, it turns to the past of the oppressed people,
and distorts, disfigures and destroys it,33
It was in response to this disfigurement that native intellectuals were unconsciously
taking the methods of the coloniser and turning them against themselves, by their own
evocations of African culture. Fanon spoke of the dangers of reverse racism and,
concentrating on black people and Africa, of the myth which assumes that there was one
black nation identical all over the world. Fanon argued that the African sees himself as
the coloniser saw him; undifferentiated, a representative of blackness, a brother to all
other black people, because there were no African peoples, no nations, only the
unrelieved blackness of the natives.
The concept ofNegro-ism, for example, was the emotional if not the
logical antithesis of that insult which the white man flung at
humanity. This rush ofNegro-ism against the white man's contempt
showed itself in certain spheres to be the one ideal capable of lifting
interdictions and anathemas. Because the New Guinean or Kenyan
intellectuals found themselves to the combined contempt of their
overloads, their reaction was to sing praise in admiration of each
other. The unconditional affirmation of African culture has
succeeded the unconditional affirmation of European cultures.34
In other words, he writes that the "historical necessity in which the men of African
culture find themselves to radicalise their claims and to speak more of African culture
■j c
than of national culture will tend to lead them up a blind alley." For the only basis on
33 Franz Fanon, The Wretched ofthe Earth, p. 170. [my italic]
34 Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, pp. 171-172.
35 Franz Fanon, The Wretched ofthe Earth, p. 173.
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which Africans and black men generally could compare their experience was as blacks
in relation to white society. It was to deny the role of history in the predicament of the
black masses and in the colonial phenomenon.37
In this manner, it was absurd to suppose that American blacks had the same
history, the same interests, and the same problems as Africans. Fanon wrote,
little by little the American realised that the essential problems
confronting them were not the same as those that confronted the
African Negroes. The Negroes of Chicago only resemble the
Nigerians or the Tanganyikans in so far as they were all defined in
relation to the whites. But once the first comparisons had been made
and subjective feelings were assuaged, the African Negroes realized
that the objective problems were fundamentally heterogeneous. The
test cases of civil liberty whereby both whites and blacks in America
try to drive back racial discrimination have very little in common in
their principles with the heroic fight of the Angolan people against
38the detestable Portuguese colonialism.
36 When the African Cultural Society was created by the African intellectuals, to affirm the existence of
African culture, to get to know each other and to compare their experiences, the society fulfilled another
need, the need to exist side by side with the European Cultural Society, which threatened to transform
itself into a Universal Cultural Society. Now, this Society will very quickly show its inability to shoulder
these different tasks, and will limit itself to exhibitionist demonstrations, while the habitual behavior of the
members of this Society will be confined to showing Europeans that such a thing as African culture exists,
and opposing their ideas to those of ostentatious and narcissistic Europeans. (Ibid., p. 173)
37 The degradation of the aims of this Society will become more marked with the elaboration of the
concept of Negro-ism. The African Society will become the cultural society of the black world and will
come to include the Negro dispersion, that is to say the tens of thousands of black people spread over the
American continents. (Ibid., p. 174)
38 Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, p. 174. Note: during the second congress of the African
Cultural Society the American Negroes decided to create an American society for people of black cultures
(Ibid.).
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It is Fanon's argument against the idea of a common black culture that under the
circumstances, the historic situations of blacks in the United States, in Europe, and in
Africa could be observed as distinct. In The Wretched of the Earth, while he had been
deeply affected by Senghor's anthology of black poetry in his earlier period, he came to
reject Senghor's position as a reactionary one.39 For him, negritude was meaningful, but
not as a national ideology. Therefore, for him, this negritude ought to be transcended
and the black man, having discovered his pride and his past, would be free to join other
men in a common struggle. Fanon noted in a reference he made to Senghor;
At the last school prize-giving in Dakar, the president of the
Senegalese Republic, Leopold Senghor, decided to include the study
of the idea ofNegro-ism in the curriculum. If this decision was due
to an anxiety to study historical causes, no one can criticize it. But if
on the other hand it was taken in order to create black self-
consciousness, it is simply a turning of his back upon history which
has already taken cognizance of the disappearance of the majority of
Negroes.40
On the issue of negritude, Fanon did not see it as a form of black nationalism, but as a
cultural phenomenon. What he was trying to do was to analyse the fact of blackness
correctly, not to eternalise it but to put it into place and to return to the matter at hand -
the liberation of all human being in colonial societies.41
39 Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, p. 198.
40 Franz Fanon, The Wretched ofthe Earth, p.198, note (1).
41 When he turned to Algeria and the Arab world in the same context, it was in order to apply his
observations on national culture to this part of the world.
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1.4. Criticism on Native Intellectuals
The implications of Fanon's national culture have brought us into a complex
discourse of post-colonialism: cultural identity. In post-colonial societies, the discovery
of this identity is often the object of study, as Fanon calls it a
passionate research and this anger are kept up or at least
directed by the secret hope of discovering beyond the misery of
today, beyond self-contempt, resignation and abjuration, some
very beautiful and splendid era whose existence rehabilitates us
both in regard to ourselves, and in regard to others.42
He warned the native intellectuals, as they decided to go back further and to delve
deeper down, that they would discover that there is nothing to be ashamed of in the past,
but dignity, glory and solemnity, escaping from the barbarity of today.43 It is understood
that coloniser domination denies the colonised's cultural development, as the coloniser
denies the colonised's historical development. The colonial experience shows that the
coloniser, in the effort to perpetuate domination and exploitation, not only creates a
system which represses the cultural life of the colonised people; the coloniser also
provokes and develops the cultural alienation of a part of the population, either by so-
called assimilation of indigenous people, or by creating a social gap between the
42 Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, p. 170.
43 Franz Fanon, The Wretched ofthe Earth, p. 170
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indigenous elites and the popular masses. As a result of this process, a considerable part
of the population (the urban or peasant petites bourgeoisies) assimilates the coloniser's
mentality, considers themselves culturally superior to their own people and looks down
upon their cultural values.44 On the native intellectual side, according to Franz Fanon,
While at the beginning the native intellectual used to produce
his work to be read exclusively by the oppressors, whether
with the intention of charming him or of denouncing him
through ethnic or subjective means, now the native writer
progressively takes on the habit of addressing his own
people.45
Fanon explains this process, in The Wretched of the Earth. The native intellectual who
has fdtered into Western civilisation (in other words, exchanged his own for another),
who has managed to become part of the body of European culture, is anxious to appear
original, and feels that he must get away from white culture. But after witnessing the
present situation throughout the continent which he wants to make his own, the
intellectual is terrified by the void and the degeneration he sees there. Now, he must seek
his culture elsewhere; and if he fails to find the substance of culture of the same
grandeur as displayed by the ruling power, he will often fall back upon emotional
attitudes and will develop a psychology. He sets a high value on the customs, traditions
and the appearance of his people; but his inevitable, painful experience only seems to be
a banal search. Here, the native intellectual gives proof that he has assimilated the
44 Amilcar Cabral, "National Liberation and Culture," in Return to the Source: Selected speeches of
Amilcar Cabral (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973), p. 39-56
45 Franz Fanon, The Wretched ofthe Earth, p.193.
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culture of the occupying power. His writings correspond point by point with those of his
opposite numbers in the mother country. His aspiration is European and we can easily
link up these works with definite strands in the literature of the mother country, such as
the Parnassians, the Symbolists and Surrealists.46
In other words, this is the native intellectual who wants to remember his
authentic identity and rejects any attempt to assimilate him. But because of his own
cultural alienation, the native intellectual's attempts at cultural reaffirmation remain
romanticizations of the past in terms of the philosophical and aesthetic tradition of the
world of the coloniser. This resuscitation of past glories is only a defence mechanism
by native intellectuals "to shrink away from that Western culture in which they all risk
being swamped."47 Fanon was aware of the limitations of this retrospective fixation in
terms of altering the present material conditions of life among the colonised: "all the
proofs of a wonderful Songhai civilization will not change the fact that today the
Songhais are underfed and illiterate."48
In this cultural nationalism, "the native intellectual who decides to give battle to
colonial lies fights on the field of the whole continent."49 Here, Fanon was realistic
enough to admit the legitimacy and historical necessity of doing so in the consciousness
of the native, but he also cautioned that it must constitute only a transient phrase. To
46 Franz Fanon, The Wretched ofthe Earth, pp. 177-179.
47 Franz Fanon, The Wretched ofthe Earth, pp.169.
48 Franz Fanon, The Wretched ofthe Earth, p. 169
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adopt continental cultural reaffirmation and nostalgic romanticism as a permanent stance
would amount to a false consciousness totally dysfunctional in the task of national
liberation:
The historical necessity in which the men of African culture find
themselves to racialize their claims and to speak more of African
culture than of national culture will tend to lead them up a blind
alley.50
In this respect, Fanon anticipated some of the most radical positions of contemporary
criticism by emphasising the need for the intellectual or writer to see and understand
clearly the people who constitute the object of his study or writing (poetry) through a
process of "self-immersion that literally approximates class suicide." Therefore,
cultural action cannot be divorced from the larger struggle for the liberation of the
nation. Fanon, although he put emphasis on the present and the immediate, never totally
discountenanced the insight which the past could provide in the process of national
liberation. For Fanon, the nationalist writer "ought to use the past with the intention of
opening the future, as an invitation to action and a basis for hope."51 It is the
responsibility of the writer not to immerse the people in the past they have left behind
but to join and inspire them to confront the present as a historic moment. As Fanon puts
it,
49 Franz Fanon, The Wretched ofthe Earth, p. 171.
50 Franz Fanon, The Wretched ofthe Earth, p. 173.
51 Franz Fanon, The Wretched ofthe Earth, p. 187.
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The responsibility of the native man of culture is not a responsibility
vis-a-vis his national culture, but a global responsibility with regard
to the totality of the nation, whose culture merely, after all,
represents one aspect of that nation To fight for the national
culture means in the first place to fight for the liberation of the
nation, that material key-stone which makes the building of a culture
possible. There is no other fight for culture which can develop apart
52
from the popular struggle.
In this reciprocal relationship between history and culture, the national struggle as a
historical act also becomes an act of cultural resistance. What emerges here is his view
on culture as a struggle, because culture "has never the translucidity of custom; it abhors
all simplification. In its essence it is opposed to custom, for custom is always the
deterioration of culture. The desire to attach oneself to tradition or bring abandoned
traditions to life again does not only mean going against the current of history but also
opposing one's own people."53 Particularly, after the time of liberation, there comes a
time of cultural uncertainty and of undecidability, but the native intellectuals
forget that the forms of thought and what it feeds on, together with
modern techniques of information, language and dress have
dialectically reorganized the people's intelligence and that the
constant principles which acted as safeguards during the colonial
52 Franz Fanon, The Wretched ofthe Earth, pp. 187-188.
Fanon gave an example: "all those men and women who are fighting with their bare hands against French
colonialism in Algeria are not by any means strangers to the national culture of Algeria. The national
Algerian culture is taking on form and content as the battles are being fought out, in prisons, under the
guillotine and in every French outpost which is captured or destroyed." p. 188. [my italic].
53 Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, p. 180. "In an under-developed country during the period of
struggle traditions are fundamentally unsuitable and are shot through by centrifugal tendencies. This is
why the intellectual often runs the risk of being out of date. The peoples who have carried on the struggle
are more and more impervious to demagogy; and those who wish to follow them reveal themselves as
noting more than common opportunists, in other words latecomers." Ibid.
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period are now undergoing extremely radical changes [W]e must
join the people in the fluctuating movement which they are just
giving a shape to, and which, as soon as it has started, will be the
signal for everything to be called in question it is to this zone of
occult instability where the people dwell that we must come.54
As Stuart Hall indicates in his essay "Cultural Identity and Diaspora", there are
at least two different way of thinking of 'cultural identity'; the first position defines
'cultural identity' in terms of one, shared culture, a sort of collective 'one true self,
hiding inside the many other, more superficial or artificially imposed 'selves', which
people with a shared history and ancestry hold in common; the second position
recognises that there are also critical points of deep and significant difference which
constitute 'what we really are,' or 'what we have become.'55 From the second position,
on this 'passionate research', there is a danger of "losing their lives and thus becoming
lost to their people, these men, hot-headed and with anger in their heart, relentlessly
determine to renew contact once more with the oldest and most pre-colonial spring of
life of their people."56In other words, it is not the discovery of identity, but the
production, because cultural identity is not located in a folklore, nor an abstract
populism that believes it can discover the people's true nature. Cultural identity is
54 Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, pp. 181-182.
55 Stuart Hall, "Cultural Identity and Diaspora," in Identity: Community, culture, difference, ed by J.
Rutherford (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1990), pp.223-225.
56 Franz Fanon, The Wretched ofthe Earth, pp. 169-170.
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a matter of 'becoming' as well as of 'being'. It belongs to the future
as much as to the past. It is not something which already exists,
transcending place, time, history and culture. Cultural identities
come from somewhere, have stories. But, like everything which is
historical, they undergo constant transformation. Far from being
eternally fixed in some essentialized past, they are subject to the
continuous 'play' of history, culture and power.57
Cultural identity is not a fixed essence, lying unchanged outside history and culture, and
not a fixed origin to which we can make absolute return, as we read in the myth of
Odysseus on his journey home from Troy to Ithaca.
Culture is also an expanding and developing phenomenon, and in its fundamental
character, it is the "highly dependent and reciprocal nature of its linkage with the social
and economic reality of the environment, with the level of productive forces and the
mode of production of the society which created it." Culture reflects "the material and
spiritual reality of society, of man-the-individual and of man-the-social-being, faced
with conflicts which set him against nature and the exigencies of common life."
Therefore, it is composed of "essential and secondary elements, of strengths and
weakness, of virtues and failings, of positive and negative aspects, of factors of progress
and factors of stagnation or regression."58 In this perspective, it is imperative to value
the culture within the framework of the struggle, not within the ontological fixture of the
past.
57Stuart Hall, "Cultural Identity and Diaspora," p.225.
58Amilcar Cabral, "National Liberation and Culture," pp.39-56.
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1.5. Black Skin, WhiteMasks: As a Mode of the Consciousness of
Freedom
Here, within the struggle, this nature of identity has profoundly challenged the
question of 'self,' as we realise that, "identity only becomes an issue when it is in crisis,
when something assumed to be fixed, coherent and stable is displaced by the experience
of doubt and uncertainty."59 Because of the growing complexity of modern society,
there is a growing awareness that the subject was not autonomous and self-sufficient, but
formed in relation to significant others. As we are all aware, there has been a shift from
the traditional concept of identity (subject) of a unified and stable entity; the subject
having no fixed, or permanent identity, is becoming fragmented and open-ended. As
Anthony Giddens puts it, "In traditional societies, the past is honoured and symbols are
valued because they contain and perpetuate the experience of generations. Tradition is a
means of handling time and space, which inserts any particular activity or experience
with the continuity of past, present and future, these in turn being structured by recurrent
social practices," but in highly reflexive modern society, "social practices are constantly
examined and reformed in the light of incoming information about those very practices,
thus constitutively altering their character."60 Hall also indicates that "identity becomes a
59 K. Mercer, "Welcome to the jungle," in Identity, ed by J. Rutherford, p.43.
60
Anthony Gidden, The Consequences ofModernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), pp.37-38.
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'moveable feast': formed and transformed continuously in relation to the ways we are
represented or addressed in the cultural systems which surround us"61
Fanon recognises the importance of asserting the colonised indigenous cultural
tradition, but he is also aware of the danger of the fixity and fetishism of identity within
the classification of colonial cultural system. In Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon
criticises the colonial condition: the problem of identity. As he writes "What is often
called the black soul is a white man's artefact."62 This reveals the deep psychic
uncertainty of the colonial relation itself.63 Fanon vows to understand why it was that
black men wore white masks, and in the process he acknowledges the universal
implication that colonial racism does not differ from any other racism. From his
experience from being Martiniquean, he realised the fact of blackness that, through the
education and language of 'whiteness,' their relations to whites in the West Indies and
in France was distorted. In other words, the 'whiteness' has been "hammered into the
native's mind" by the colonialist structure.64
61 Stuart Hall, "The Question of Cultural Identity," inModernity and its Futures, eds by Stuart Hall, David
Held, and Tony McGrew (Cambridge: The Open University Press, 1992),p.277.
62 Franz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, p. 16.
63 Fanon as a psychiatrist, said "If psychiatry is the medical technique that aims to enable man no longer to
be a stranger to his environment, I owe it to myself to affirm that the Arab, permanently an alien in his
own country, lives in a state of absolute depersonalization.... The social structure existing in Algeria was
hostile to any attempt to put the individual back where he belonged." Toward the African Revolution
(Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1967), p.63.
64 Franz Fanon, The Wretched ofthe Earth, p. 47.
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It is about the black man and language; it is about any man whose native
language is not the language of the country in which he lives, and who carries his own
tongue as a cultural mark of Cain. Here he explodes the myth of the neutrality of
language, and offers what it means to speak the language of the dominant class. In his
opening chapter, "The Negro and Language," he writes that for the Martiniquean to
speak the Frenchman's French is to speak the language of the master, the language that
opens door to French culture and society. But the interesting fact is that the French
spoken in Martinique is not only shaded by the accents of the islands, it translates the
intonations of the islander's status, it reflects the extent to which he is black, white, or a
mixture of the two. To a certain degree, the Martiniquean who wishes to progress in
society, will learn the correct Parisian French, and if he is fortunate enough to make a
trip to the mother country, he will perfect his language.65 "The black man who has lived
in France for a length of time returns radically changed. To express it in genetic terms,
his phenotype undergoes a definitive, an absolute mutation."66 Fanon explains that
"Negroes who return to their original environments convey the impression that they
have completed a cycle, that they have added to themselves something that was lacking.
They return literally full of themselves."67 This ambiguous circumstance of the
Martiniquean is that he knows that his destination is French and white, and he is
impelled to progress in this direction; but the dimensions of his success will also
determine the extent of his alienation from his own culture.
65 Franz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, pp. 17-19.
66 Franz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, p.19.
67 Franz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, p. 19, note 3.
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The use of language as a tool of assimilation and the subsequent rebellion against
linguistic integration and alienation have been familiar aspects of colonial life. It is
significant that what Fanon described in Martinique, could be reproduced elsewhere,
wherever a colonial situation introduced a coloniser whose language differed from that
of the colonised. Here in Martinique as in the other colonised territories, French was the
key to admission to another world, the world of the West, of progress, and of power. In
the case ofNorth Africa, Arabic was the mother tongue and the language of the people;
to choose both French and Arabic was perhaps the solution to the problem, but it was a
difficult choice and it was made successfully by relatively few people. Moreover, it has
been illustrated by writers who suffer a permanent nostalgia as a result of their inability
to address their people in their own language, and it remains one of the most visible
signs in Algeria today of the cultural and psychic damage brought about by colonisation,
z:o
as in the other territories under colonial control.
In Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon discussed the roots of pathology for the child
brought up in a Martiniquean home and sent out into a white world, under the section,
"The Negro and Psychopathology." The black schoolboy in an environment totally
68
Any discussion with contemporary writers in Algeria reveals this to be one of the most sensitive and
difficult problems facing the modem state. The intensity with which arabization is pursued, even though it
is motivated by political considerations as well, cannot be understood except by an appreciation of what
the language problem means. Literacy is extremely limited, and those who have had schooling, until
recently, were French speaking and French reading as a result. The trend is to change this pattern and to
reintroduce Arabic as the language. In the interval, however, a generation of writers and intellectuals who
have contributed to the nationalist movement, and who are unreservedly patriotic, nevertheless find
themselves unable to address their fellow compatriots in their own language. This elite is still French
speaking.
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different from his own, was taught to identify with the society from which he was
excluded. The black child identifying with the hero found himself identifying with the
white figure against the black one, i.e. against himself (although he did not perceive this
as such); and he will be growing up in the image of the white models he reads about and
will not be aware of any conflict. In Fanon's reply to M. Mannoi's analysis of the
Malagasy reaction to white men, he states:
It is of course obvious that the Malagasy can perfectly well tolerate
the fact of not being a white man. A Malagasy is a Malagasy; or,
rather, no, not he is a Malagasy but, rather, in an absolute sense he
"lives" his Malagasyhood. If he is a Malagasy, it is because the
white man has come, and if at a certain stage he has been led to ask
himselfwhether he is indeed a man, it is because his reality as a man
has been challenged. In other words, I begin to suffer from not being
a white man to the degree that the white man imposes discrimination
on me, makes me a colonized native, robs me of all worth, all
individuality, tells me that I am a parasite on the world, that I must
bring myself as quickly as possible into step with the white
world....69
Flere, Fanon was concerned with the dynamics of acculturation; he recognised that both
sides were affected, the dominant and the dominated, in this mutuality of human
relations and communication. As Sartre had studied the anti-Semitic Christian which led
him to affirm that it is the anti-Semite who creates the Jew,70 Fanon discovered that the
69 Franz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, p.98.
70 Jean-Paul Sartre, Anti-Semite and Jew, trans. G.J. Becker (New York: Schocken Books, 1965), pp. 134-
135, quoted " It is society, not the decree of God, that has made him a Jew and brought the Jewish
problem into being. As he is forced to make his choices entirely within the perspective set by his problem,
it is in and through the social that he chooses even his own existence If in consequence he is
reproached for his metaphysical inauthenticity, if attention is called to the fact that his constant uneasiness
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alienated Martiniquean existed only where there was a dominant society that had
reduced him to an inferior status. Fanon's concern was the gradual process of alienation
from his own culture and tradition, and the fact that this was accompanied by self-hatred
or at the least, a profoundly disturbed ambivalence. This is the rejection of self that
came as a result of identification with the other and as a result of the acceptance of the
other's image of one's inferior caste. Having acknowledged that his existence was
predetermined by the perception of him which the other had, Fanon understood that this
perception did not coincide with his own image of himself, and yet his self was not
completely distinct from the reflection which came back to him in such a disturbing
fashion, as shown in Jean-Paul Sartre,
If we start with the first revelation of the Other as a look, we must
recognize that we experience our incomprehensible being-for-others
in the form of possession. I am possessed by the Other; the Other's
look fashions my body in its nakedness, causes it to be bom,
sculptures it, produces it as it is, sees it as I shall never see it. The
Other holds a secret - the secret of what I am. He makes me be and
thereby he possesses me, and this possession is nothing other than
the consciousness of possessing me.... By virtue of consciousness the
Other is for me simultaneously the one who has stolen my being
from me and the one who causes 'there to be' a being which is my
being I am responsible for my being for others, but I am not the
foundation of it But he is not responsible for my being although
he founds it in complete freedom... Thus to the extent that I am
revealed to myself as responsible for my being, I lay claim to this
being which I am; that is, I wish to recover it, or, more exactly, I am
the project of the recovery of my being. I want to stretch out my
hand and grab hold of this being which is presented to me as my
is accompanied by a racial positivism, let us not forgert that these reproaches return upon those who make
them: the Jew is social because the anti-Semite has made him so."
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being but at a distance - like the dinner of Tantalus. I want to found
it by my very freedom. For if in one sense my being-as-object is an
unbearable contingency and the pure 'possession' of myself by
another, still in another sense this being stands as the indication of
what I should be obliged to recover and found in order to be the
foundation ofmyself. But this is conceivable only if I assimilate the
Other's freedom. Thus my project of recovering myself is
fundamentally a project of absorbing the Other....71
The desire for the Other is doubled by the desire in language, which splits the difference
between Self and Other so that both positions are partial; neither is sufficient unto itself.
Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks reveals the doubling of identity: the difference
between personal identity as an intimation of reality, and the psychoanalytic problem of
identification that always begs the question of the subject: 'What does a man want?'
Binary identities function in a kind of narcissistic reflection of the One in the Other,
72confronted in the language of desire by the psychoanalytic process of identification:
"For identification, identity is never an a priori, nor a finished product; it is only ever the
problematic process of access to an image of totality."73 And it is only possible in the
negation of any sense of originality or plenitude, in the process of displacement and
differentiation, which renders it a liminal reality.
Fanon is not posing the question ofpolitical oppression as a violation of a human
'essence,' nor raising the question of colonial man in the universalistic terms of the
71 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. H. Barnes (New York: Citadel Press, 1969), pp. 340-
341. Fanon shares with Jean-Paul Sartre the overwhelming sense of comprehension and empathy.
72 Homi Bhabha, The Location ofCulture, pp. 50-51.
73 Homi Bhabha, The Location ofCulture, p.51.
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liberal-humanist, nor posing an ontological question about man's being. But he
historicises the colonial experience of the Other.74 As we have observed before, the
ambivalent identification of the racist world turns on the idea of man as his alienated
image, not Self and Other but the 'Otherness' of the self inscribed in the perverse
palimpsest of colonial identity. Fanon, in exploring such questions of the ambivalence
of colonial inscription and identification, illustrates the complexity of colonial relation
in Black Skin, White Masks. He writes, "The black man has two dimensions:" "one with
his fellows, the other with the white man. A Negro behaves differently with a white
man and with another Negro. That this self-division is a direct result of colonial
subjugation is beyond question."75 But, in Fanon, what is suggested is not the exile that
results from the assumption of the white mask discourse, but volitional manipulation of
that mask as a means of struggle, as he says, "I should constantly remind myself that the
real leap consists in introducing invention into existence. In the world through which I
travel, I am endlessly creating myself."76 It is recognising a possibility of existence,
rather than agonising in the dilemma, turning white or disappearing. Fanon says,
if society makes difficulties for him because of his color.... my
objective, once his motivations have been brought into
consciousness, will be to put in him a position to choose action (or
passivity) with respect to the real source of the conflict - that is,
77toward the social structures.
74 Homi Bhabha, "Remembering Fanon: Self, Psyche and the Colonial Condition," Foreword to Franz
Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (London: Pluto Press, 1986), pp. vii-xxvi.
75 Franz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, p. 17.
76 Franz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, p. 229.
77 Franz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, p. 100.
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It is not the colonialist Self or the colonised Other, but the disturbing distance in-
between that constitutes the figure of colonial otherness - the white man's artifice
inscribed on the black man's body. This is the place where the liminal problem of
colonial identity and its vicissitudes emerges.78 For Fanon, the willed action ofwearing
white masks was used as a means of struggle in this possibility of freedom. It is from
this edge of meaning and being, and from this shifting boundary of otherness within
identity, such ambivalent identification - black skin, white masks- is possible as a mode
of freedom: the existential, creative and demanding freedom of consciousness.
Therefore, the question of identification is never the affirmation of a pre-given
identity or participation within a pre-existing social structure, but it is always the
production of an image of identity and the transformation of the subject in assuming that
image. On the other hand, since the colonial desire is always articulated in relation to
the Other, the place of the Other must not be imagined, as a fixed phenomenological
point, opposed to the self, that represents a culturally alien consciousness. Thus, the
Other must be seen as the necessary negation of a primordial identity - cultural or
psychic - that introduces the system of differentiation which enables the 'cultural' to be
7Q
signified as a linguistic, symbolic, historical reality. Here, it was the challenge to
authenticity, to understanding the existential postulates of the situation which
determined the limits ofman's freedom, the freedom to choose to be himself as he chose
78 Homi Bhabha, The Location ofCulture, pp. 44-45.
79 Homi Bhabha, The Location ofCulture, pp. 51-52.
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himself to be, and not merely as others allowed him to be. In a sense, identification is a
question of interpretation, since it is always spoken in the desire of the Other, the
difference.
Having acknowledged the doubleness and splitting of the subject, the identity is
to be imagined between the incommensurable differences, as Lacan described it, "the
OA
process of gap" within which the relation of subject to other is produced. This means
the undecidability in the signification of self and other; there can be no total negation or
transcendence of difference. It is the process of becoming within the doubleness and
splitting of the subject, as what Derrida calls the logic or play of the 'supplement':
If it represents and makes an image, it is by the anterior default of a
presence. Compensatory and vicarious, the supplement is an
adjunct, a subaltern instance which takes - the - place. As
substitute., it produces no relief, its place is assigned in the structure
by the mark of an emptiness. Somewhere something can be filled up
of itself.... only by allowing itself to be filled through sign and
81
proxy.
This idea resists the traditional concepts; it does in a relation that is differential rather
than original, ambivalent rather than accumulative, doubling or dialogical rather than
dialectical. Therefore, cultures come to be represented by virtue of the processes of
iteration and translation through which their meanings are addressed and produced
80
Jacque Lacan, "Alienation" in his The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (London: The
Hogarth Press, 1977), p.206.
81
Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. G.C. Spivak (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University,
1976), p. 145.
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through the Other, as opposed to the essentialist claims for the inherent authenticity or
purity of culture.82 It is the in-between, where the Other falls upon the Self, and from
here, the cultural difference/particularity emerges as an enunciative category, as opposed
to the relativistic notion of cultural diversity, or the exoticism of the diversity of culture.
The global cultural reality of today, especially in the city, leads us to realise the
limitations of a consensual or collusive idea of culture, and insists that cultural identity is
constructed through an interaction with the Other. In the same way, identity is a
construction, a consequence of a process of interaction between people, traditions and
practices, because groups maintain boundaries to limit the type of behaviour within a
• RT
defined cultural territory. In fact, if culture is understood as a complex of meanings
that is unique to a particular group, then humanity is very much fragmented, and
expressed in different meaning, as opposed to the universal vision of Enlightenment
anthropology. Multiculturalism of today, is calling for more stringent forms of
separation and segregation, and we have an ideology calling for the proliferation of
fragmented 'centrism.' Taken to its logical extreme, the logic ofmulticulturalism turns
out to be a logic of ethnic cleansing, as shown in recent events in the Bosnian city of
Sarajevo.
82 Homi Bhabha, The Location ofCulture, p. 58.
83 Madan Sarup, Identity, Culture and the Postmodern World (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
1996), p.ll.
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Therefore, culture should be understood in terms of difference, rather than
diversity, which is a category of comparative aesthetics or ethnology, and which is the
recognition of unique and pre-given identity; it is "a process of signification through
which statement of culture or on culture differentiate, discriminate and authorise the
production of fields of force, reference, applicability and capacity."84 In other words,
the cultural diversity ofmulticulturalism is an epistemological project in which culture is
an object of empirical knowledge, whereas cultural difference is a process of cultural
encountering with the others.
2. Cultural Identity and Difference
The previous section brings us to focus on the issue of 'subject' and 'identity,' in
the process and changing. Talking about subjects and identities is not simple, but rather
complex, fragmented and polydimensional in its process of separation and connection,
and in the network of crossing and crossed aspects of identity. The significance of this
project is that we understand our identities by reflecting on what we do, and by
interpreting the texts we produce. Therefore, subjectivity is a starting point for the
project itself.
84 Homi Bhabha, The Location ofCulture (London: Routledge, 1994), p.43.
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In this process of becoming, the subject is necessarily incomplete, less
autonomous, less self-controlled and less free than it may assume, but rather a socio-
cultural construction which is again split and incomplete. In other words, identity has a
long genealogy, and the place of identification is a place of splitting in the tension of
demand and desire. Therefore, the question of identification is never the affirmation of a
pre-given identity, but rather "a production of an image of identity and the
transformation of the subject in assuming that image." And "the demand of
identification - that is, before an Other - entails the representation of the subject in the
differentiating order of otherness." In fact, identification is "always the return of an
image of identity that bears the mark of splitting in the Other place from which it
??85comes." This process of identification is very ambivalent, not certain, in the desire of
the Other, as also practiced in activities of interpretation that one-self meets with
another-self in an elusive manner: the doubleness or splitting subject is enacted in the
writing. Subjects do exist as 'subjects-in-process,'86in a creative project of identity.
Kristeva indicates that it is "this unlimited and unbounded generating process, this
unceasing operation of the drives toward, in, and through language; toward, in, and
through the exchange system and its protagonists - the subject and his institutions." And
"this heterogeneous process.... is a structuring and de-structuring practice, a passage to
the outer boundaries of the subject and society."87 Identity is thus a construct; therefore
85 Homi Bhabha, The Location ofCulture, pp. 44-45.
86 Julia Kristeva develops a theory of the subject-in-process in Revolution in Poetic Language (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1984).
87 Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, p. 17.
126
Chapter 2, Challenge ofthe Other
subject needs to understand both the historical determinations of subject formation and
the activity of subjects that creates the future. In addition, identity is always related to
what the subject is not - the Other, and only possible through difference, as all
understanding of subject is a combination of self-understanding and interpretation of
others.
Therefore, to study culture is to relocate Western culture from its privileged
position, into the realm of many others; cultural study is not only about the West's
relation to the different cultures, but also the suspicion of, and challenge to the
foundational assumptions of this inquiry in itself. As Raymond Williams stated, "you
cannot understand an intellectual or artistic project without also understanding its
formation; that the relation between a project and a formation is always decisive; and...
Q O
the emphasis of Cultural Studies is precisely that it emerges with both." Therefore, in
a way, this is not a brand new approach or subject, rather it is a re-examination, a re¬
negotiation, and a re-interpretation of major Enlightenment and humanistic rationalist
ideals, yet, not in terms of repetition of older ideals and themes, but in terms of
comprehensive new ground which dissociates and scrutinises the materials of cultural
studies of the past, showing an interpretation of how certain ways of thinking about
culture have come into being, especially in relation to other cultures.
88
Raymond Williams, "The Future of Cultural Studies," in The Politics ofModernism (London: Verso,
1989), pp.151-152
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In this re-examination of a largely male, European world view, cultural studies
have been linked with the development in previously marginalised areas, such as studies
on women, ethnic minorities, race, diverse sexuality, different cultures, and unacademic
subjects. By its orientation, this agenda is multi-directional, heterogeneous, and multi-
textual, and its political potentiality is immense. It sets out to criticise the
presuppositions within structures as a whole, and reveals that even structuralism, which
was posited as a scientific, objective enquiry, a positive truth claim, is grounded in
subjective, experiential reality, unable to transcend its place in the structure of
civilisation/culture as it is presently situated. This is echoed by Derrida, whose
deconstructive analysis demonstrates how the process ofwriting/reading is always being
hindered by its own structurality. These deconstructive/poststructuralistic studies
clearly show how knowledge is produced and circulated, and ultimately textualised
within Western culture (such as art, literature, philosophy, law, politics, history, and
aesthetics). Knowledge, as it is constructed, is implicated in language as a sign-system,
meaning is thus arbitrary or locked into the power of the person who owns the language.
These investigations demonstrate how such language is deployed discursively in culture.
This assertion of difference has become the principle in postmodern society
today; "the emergence ofnew subjects, new genders, new ethnicities, new religions, new
communities" has given hitherto invisible groups "the means to speak for themselves for
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the first time."89 It means the rejection of grand narratives.90 It is hostile to
universalism, that is a 'Eurocentric' viewpoint, a means of imposing European (and
American) ideas of rationality and objectivity on other people. Universalism is racist
because it denies the possibility of non-European viewpoints. What we need is, as is the
case in the reading practice of deconstruction, to free the reader from orthodox
conventional reading and to reveal the ideological assumptions of the colonising West
about itself and its Others. Postcolonial discourse seeks to relocate the master position
of the single perspective and viewpoint, and to read from a silent native perspective or
viewpoint. Hence, the postcolonial counter-discursive language of the native culture
becomes a signifying system.
Postcolonial counter-discursive strategies involve a mapping of the
dominant discourse, a reading and exposing of its underlying
assumptions, and the dis/mantling of these assumptions from the cross-
cultural standpoint of the imperially subjectified 'local'... Wild sargasso
sea directly contests British sovereignty - of persons, of place, of
culture, of language. It reinvests its own hybridised world with a
provisionally authoritative perspective, but one which is deliberately
constructed as provisional since the novel is at pains to demonstrate the
subjective nature of point of view and hence the cultural construction of
91
meaning.
89 Stuart Hall, "The Local and the Global," in Anthony D. King (ed.), Culture, Globalization and the
World System: Contemporary Conditions for the Representation of Identity (Basingstoke: Macmillan,
1991), p. 43.
90 Jean Francos Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, p.23.
91 Helen Tiffin, "Post-colonial literatures and counter-discourse', Kunapipi, 9:3, 1987, p.23. quoted from
Peter Hulme, "The locked Heart: the Creole family romance of Wild sagasso sea", in Colonial
Discourse/Postcolonial Theory, ed. by Francis Barker, Peter Hulme and Margaret Iversen (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1994), p. 73.
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Post-colonial discourse insists that knowledge must not serve as an instrument of
domination, but rather renounce mastery over others, because as Foucault warned,
Q9
"power produces knowledge", and "power and knowledge directly imply one another."
In other words, its relation and discourse with the Other must be governed by ethical
response; it is not offering "a better definition of the alien but rather a certain change of
attitude," and "instead of asking what the alien is or how it functions, I take the alien as
QT
what we respond to and what we must respond to, whatever we say or do." The Other
is not to be understood as something at which our saying and doing aims but as
something from which it starts. Thus, what the Other is or means is determined during
and by the event of response, and it will never be determined in a complete and univocal
sense.94 It is an on-going process of constituting a self through an encounter with the
other/s.
3. Bible and Post-colonial Discourse
Colonialism is a part of the history of Christianity, and colonial exploitation was
one of the tragic events in which Christianity played a crucial role. Today, the memory
92 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge (Brighton: Harvester, 1980) p. 27.
93 Bernhard Waldenfels, "Response to the Other," in Encountering the Other(s): Studies in Literature,
History, and Culture, ed by Gisela Brinker-Gabler (Albany: SUNY, 1985), p.73.
94 Bernhard Waldenfels, "Response to the Other,", p.73
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of the colonial and imperial past raises questions about the religious roots of
exploitation; the native voice or the post-colonial discourse is not a set of linguistic
structures, but represents an alternative perspective demonstrating that there is such a
thing as a colonised version of a colonial story which is already inscribed in the text.
What is being attempted is to initiate a dialogue between the unspoken (silent)
perspective with what the text seems to be saying, and to bring the ethical question into
this dialogue, in relation to several issues.
In the Biblical narrative of Exodus, the Hebrew who came out from Egypt,
invaded the land of Canaan which was already occupied. As the story goes, the people
in the land were systematically killed; this biblical account is mandated by God who
requires the destruction of other people: "You shall devour all the peoples that Yahweh
your God is giving over to you, showing them no pity"(Deut. 7:16). Such texts were
used in support of colonialism; the native people were cast as Hittities, the Girgashites,
and others; the land was God's gift. And these biblically recorded accounts of the
Israelites, according to Arnold Toynbee, sanctioned the British conquest of North
America, Ireland and Australia, the Dutch conquest of South Africa, the Prussian
conquest of Poland and the Zionist conquest ofPalestine.95
Although recent studies indicate that the Exodus story can be interpreted
differently, and used to fight against colonialism, imperialism and oppression,
95 Arnold Toynbee, A Study ofHistory, VIII (London: Oxford University, 1954), p. 310.
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especially in the Third World, the pattern of reading this story has not changed. In this
understanding of the biblical narrative of Exodus, the perspective of Canaanites was
excluded. Pui-Lan Kwok questions the Exodus narrative, "What is the promised land
now?.. Can I believe in a God who killed the Canaanites and who seems not to have
listened to the cry of the Palestinians now for some forty years?"96 The Palestinian
theologian Nairn S. Ateek observes that,
The Bible is being used by both Jews and Western Christians to
silence us, to make us invisible, to turn us into the negated antithesis
ofGod's "chosen people." How can we interpret the Bible so that it
becomes a redemptive message for us, for all people, but not in a
way that sets one people against another, as was happening with the
Jewish religious Zionists and some Western Christian
fundamentalists' use of the Bible?97
Ateek reiterates the fact that the Bible is continuously quoted to give the primary claim
of land to the Jews, and used in a way that has supported injustice as justice.98
Therefore, as far as the Palestinian Christians are concerned, this brings an ethical
question in relation to the Bible, asking "Can a text partial to ancient Israel be life-giving
for Palestinians who are being oppressed by modern Israelis?"99 Ateek also takes a
96 Pui-lan Kwok, Discovering the Bible in the Non-Biblical World (Maryknoll, NY: Orbid Books, 1995),
p. 99.
97 Nairn S. Ateek, "The Emergence of a Palestinian Christian Theology," in Faith and the Intifada:
Palestinian Christian Voices, ed by Nairn S. Ateek, Marc H. Ellis and Rosemary Radford Ruether
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1992), p. 5.
98 Nairn S. Ateek, "A Palestinian Perspective: The Bible and Liberation," in Voices from the Margin:
Interpreting the Bible in the Third World, ed by R.S. Sugirtharajah (London: SPCK, 1991), pp. 280-186.
99
Mary H. Schertz, "People, Power, and Pages: Issues in Ethical Interpretation," in Voices from the
Margin, p. 141.
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critical attitude towards the traditional reading of the Western Christian, by asking "How
can the Bible, which has apparently become a part of the problem in the Arab-Israeli
conflict, become a part of its solution? How can the Bible, which has been used to bring
a curse to the national aspirations of a whole people, again offer them a blessing? How
can the Bible, through which many have been led to salvation, be itself saved and
redeemed?"100
In this ethical questioning, what is significant is to read the Bible from the
victim's perspective, in searching for a new hermeneutics for human liberation and
justice, that does not just end as a source of understanding or a model for liberation, but
as a source of action in concrete socio-political conflict. In this sense, we need to read
the Bible with the eyes of Canaanites, as the American Indian theologian insists, "The
obvious characters for Native American to identify with are the Canaanites, the people
who already lived in the promised land.... I read the Exodus stories with Canaanite eyes.
And, it is the Canaanite side of the story that has been overlooked by those seeking to
articulate theologies of liberation. Especially ignored are those parts of the story that
describe Yahweh's command to mercilessly annihilate the indigenous population."101
What is needed is to see how the Bible has been used as an instrument of oppression,
and to find what the misuse of the Bible is rather than the text of the Bible itself. The
100 Nairn S. Ateek, Justice and Only Justice: A Palestinian Theology ofLiberation (Maryknoll, Ny: Orbis
Books, 1989), p. 77.
101 Robert Allen Warrior, "A Native American Perspective: Canaanites, Cowboys, and Indians," In Voices
from the Margin, p. 289
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blame is to be on the interpreter. When Pope John-Paul II visited Peru, he received an
open letter from the indigenous people:
John-Paul II, we, Andean and American Indians, have decided to
take advantage of your visit to return to you your Bible, since in five
centuries it has not given us love, peace or justice. Please take back
your Bible and give it back to our oppressors, because they need its
moral teaching more than we do. Ever since the arrival of
Christopher Columbus a culture, religion and values which belong to
Europe have been imposed on Latin America by force. The Bible
came to us as part of the imposed colonial transformation. It was the
ideological weapon of this colonialist assault. The Spanish sword
which attacked and murdered the bodies of Indians by day and night
became the cross which attacked the Indian soul.102
This traditionally silent perspective of the victim and native questions the way the Bible
has been interpreted, and brings ethical demands that lead to the construction of a new
hermeneutic of justice and liberation while demonstrating the oppressor or coloniser's
myth and internal operation of power and ideology.
Throughout history, Zionism provided a political condition to warrant for
colonialism, as it happened in Palestine, South Africa,., etc. and later developed as so-
called 'Christian nationalism' that took this paradigm as its ultimate goal, in many
Western countries. For example, in South Africa, the Reformed Calvinist Afrikaners
used the Bible to justify their treatment of the blacks and coloureds, since they
understood the Exodus paradigm as the South African nationalist myth. The church
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justified the apartheid as a divinely instituted division of nations as instituted in Deut.
4.37-38; 7:7-8; 10:14-15. Their interpretation of Deuteronomy in a particular way,
103
promoted the unity ofAfrikaners, on the other hand the separation from the blacks. It
is clear that a theological and biblical perspective played a significant role in developing
the Afrikaner nationalist ideology.
Accordingly, the task we are facing is to rehabilitate the reading of the Bible
from the native's or victim's perspective, so that there will be a critical space in
between, an ambivalence. Ateek places the Palestinian situation against the Bible in
searching for an ethical critique,
The Old Testament has generally fallen into disuse among both
clergy and laity, and the Church has been unable to come to terms
with its ambiguities, questions, and paradoxes - especially with its
direct application to the twentieth-century event in Palestine. The
fundamental question ofmany Christians, whether uttered or not, is:
How can the Old Testament be the Word of God in light of the
Palestinian Christians' experience with its use to support Zionism?104
102 Pablo Richard, "1492L The Violence of God and the Future of Christianity," in 1492-1992: The Voice
of the Victim, ed by Boff and Elisondo, Concilium 1990, no. 6. (London: SCM Press), pp. 64-65.
IOj F.E. Deist, "The Dangers ofDeuteronomy: A Page from the Reception History of the Book," in Studies
in Deuteronomy, ed by F.G.Martinez, A. Hilhorst, J. van Ruiten, and A. van der Woude (Leiden:Brill,
1994), pp.22-24.
104 Nairn Stifan Ateek, Justice and Only Justice: A Palestine Theology ofLiberation, pp. 77-78.
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Instead, Ateek raises the issue of universal ethics. Ethical Judaism (and its universal
outlook) has been ignored or manipulated by the resurgence of a racially motivated
concept of a people and their god.105
The emergence of the Zionist movement in the twentieth century is a
retrogression of the Jewish community into the history of its very
distant past, with its most elementary and primitive forms of the
concepts of God. Zionism has succeeded in reanimating the
nationalist tradition within Judaism. Its inspiration has been drawn
not from the profound thought of the Hebrew Scriptures but from
those portions that betray a narrow and exclusive concept of a tribal
a 106god.
This Palestine perspective challenges the role that the institutionalisation of distorted
biblical knowledge has played in the minds of the Western Christian, in which Israel is
often portrayed as a modern David fighting the Arab Goliath, while the Palestinians are
using the very same weapons of David, the stones, and the Israeli army is playing
Goliath.107 This discourse is to rehabilitate the conventional reading of Exodus in the
light of the victim's perspective: we are challenged to read the Exodus narrative in the
light of the story of Naboth's vineyard (I Kings 21) in order to give voices to American
Indians, black South Africans, Palestinians, and the silent others, and in order to bring
victim's perspective or voice into the reading of Scripture, so that there would be
struggles and ambivalences. It means not just to read again, but "to take a fresh look at
105 Nairn Stifan Ateek, Justice and Only Justice: A Palestine Theology ofLiberation, p. 102.
106 Nairn Stifan Ateek, Justice and Only Justice: A Palestine Theology ofLiberation, p. 101.
107 Elias Chacour, "A Palestine Christian Challenge to the West," in Faith and the Intifada: Palestine
Christian Voices (Maryknoll: Orbis Book, 1992), p. 86.
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the data and read anew and reformulate the message. It means investing the text with
new meanings and nuances."108
The colonial conquest has been justified by traditional biblical exegesis. What is
being proposed here, is not just to protest against Western biblical hermeneutics, but
also an attempt to reclaim or rescue the Bible from being an instrument of oppression of
the people: the key to the recovery of the Bible is to read from the victim's or silent
native's perspective, in bringing ethics into the discourse. It is listening and responding
to the "crying out" of the victim in Psalm 107, as "God heard our cry" in Exodus 2:25.
It is to create a space for the native or victim's voices in relation to the rival version of
the 'said' in its incompleteness of understanding the text. This incompleteness, in fact,
can become a site of resistance to colonialist interpretation, official unitary ideology, and
monologic discourse. In this post-colonial reading, what is needed is to re-negotiate the
power dynamics inherent in such oppositions as 'colonised-coloniser,' 'victimiser-
victim.' In a way, the post-colonial reading itself is a battle ground for the
decolonisation of linguistic and cultural control, against the dominant imperial language
that is related to social structure, including the educational system and socio-economic
structures. Its reading brings them into the sphere of ethics - the realm of justice and
peace.
108 R.S. Sugirtharajah, "Inter-faith Hermeneutics: An Example and Some Implications," in Voices from the
Margin: Interpreting the Bible in the Third World, p. 353.
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4. On the Border with the Other
The perspective of 'victim' radically challenges our mode of reading and creates
conflicts in 'us', and shows how our perspective is charged with ideology and power.
This is breaking one's totality, denying one's absoluteness, and realising the
incompleteness of the present situation, and moreover creating ambiguities through the
encounter and relation with others. Therefore, living and reading in 'incompleteness'
means engaging or working with/to the Other on the borders or edges; it is boundary
crossing and destabilising one's identity. It also means experiencing and
acknowledging the self-limitedness, that has created and separated boundaries and
categories. For Jacques Derrida, 'incompleteness' is the issue of translation and a
resistance to a text that is defined by one's borders and the limits of structure.109 Living
on the borderline is a dangerous life transgressing the limits that ensure security and
stability. The important point ofbeing on the border, is the positioning in line with other
perspectives - a standpoint which creates a critical space in order to challenge
hegemonic discourses.
109
Jacques Derrida, "Living On: Border Lines," in Deconstruction and Criticism, ed by Harold Bloom et.
al. (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), p. 85.
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Abdul R. JanMohamed categorises a person in this position as "the border
intellectual"110who stands at the borders of two cultures, and who questions "the
unpleasant questions, the questions which are in bad taste, the embarrassing questions,
the taboo questions"111 to both cultures or traditions. Edward Said articulates a
relationship between the notion of "home" and "exile" indicating the ironic reversion
that home becomes a place of endangerment and exile,112 and he says,
In a secular and contingent world, homes are always provisional.
Borders and barriers which enclose us within the safety of familiar
territory, can also become prisons, and are often defended beyond
reason or necessity. Exile cross borders, break barriers of thought
and experience.113
Border-crossing means 'a voyage in,' a 'going into' the liminal space; it means
negotiating between home and the other country, old and new, self and other. But, this
crossing into 'exile' is different from that of Western intellectuals who crossed the
borders, like Joseph Conrad, Eric Auerbach, T.E. Lawrence, and others. According to
110 Abdul R. JanMohamed, "Worldliness -without world, homelessness-as-home: Toward a definition of
the specular border intellectual," in Edward Said: A Critical Reader, ed by Michael Sprinker (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1992), p. 97.
111
George Steiner, "The Responsibility of Intellectuals: A Discussion," Salmagundi, No. 70-71 (Spring-
Summer), p. 194.
112 See Edward Said, "The Mind of Winter: Reflections on Life in Exile," Harper's Magazine, No. 269
(September 1984), pp. 49-55.
113 Edward Said, "The Mind of Winter: Reflections on Life in Exile," Harper's Magazine, No. 269
(September 1984), p. 54.
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Said, these Western intellectuals cross the borders and re-crossed the border into the
West in order to draw a map of other cultures constructed in their own image.114
Said's notion of "voyage in" as the movement and interrogation of Third World
thinkers in the metropolitan First World, implies a crossing of the space separating the
First and Third World:
The voyage in, then, constitutes an especially interesting variety of
hybrid cultural work. And that it exists at all is a sign of adversarial
internationalisation in an age of continued imperial structures. No
longer does the logos dwell exclusively, as it were, in London and
Paris. No longer does history run unilaterally, as Hegel believed,
from east to west, or from south to north, becoming more
sophisticated and developed, less primitive and backward as it goes.
Instead, the weapons of criticism have become part of the historical
legacy of empire, in which the separations and exclusions of 'divide
and rule' are erased and surprising new configurations spring up.115
This brings a displacement of the Eurocentric logos from its secure position, into a place
of negotiation not just to depose the authority of the West, but also to redefine its
meaning as well as a recomposition and a redistribution. In this process, what is being
created is 'double-vision or double-consciousness,' as Said describes the liminal
crossing to the First World - the crossing of a liminal space presupposing not complete
detachment but rather a mixing of "half-involvement and half-detachments."116 And
114 Abdul R. Janmohamed, "Worldliness -without world, homelessness-as-home: Toward a definition of
the specular border intellectual," in Edward Said: A Critical Reader, p. 98.
115 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 295.
116 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 49.
140
Chapter 2, Challenge ofthe Other
what is being realised in this process, is that "there is a double perspective that never
sees things in isolation."117
But, the notion of 'voyage in' can be understood as an instrument to serve neo¬
colonialism by removing the intellectuals from the Third World and placing them in the
First World. However, it must be remembered that exile or 'voyage in' is not a matter of
choice but rather a condition of existence, internally as well as physically or
geographically in many cases. This notion of hybrid cultural work as anti-imperialism
also implies the struggle for decolonisation within a global context, addressing the
Third World peoples, and warning national movements with their patriotic dogmas not
••118
to fetishise and romanticise the past, which Said calls the "pitfalls of nationalism."
Anthony Appiah criticises nativism or cultural nativism and its claims to ancestral
purity. He accuses those who develop monolithic notions of identity of being trapped in
the coloniser's discourse and not being able to divest themselves from the institutional
determinations of the West. In other words, although native argument is addressed to the
West, the pattern of discourse and its mechanism remain with western discourse.119
Appiah insists that "the overdetermined course of cultural nationalism in Africa has been
to make real the imaginary identities to which Europe has subjected to us."120 Robert
117 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 60.
118 Jennifer Wicke and Michael Spinker, "Interview with Edward Said," in Edward Said: A Critical
Reader, p. 233.
119 Benita Parry, "Resistance theory/ theorising resistance or two cheers of nativism," in Colonial
Discourse / Postcolonial theory, ed by Francis Barker, Peter Hulme and Margaret Iversen (Manchester:
Manchester University, 1994), p. 177.
120
Anthony Appiah, "Out of Africa: topologies of nativism," Yale Journal of criticism, vol. 1, no. 2,
p. 164.
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Young indicates in a similar way that a "nativist alternative" may represent "the
5? 1 2 1narcissistic desire to find an other that will reflect Western assumptions of selfhood."
Again, Appiah argues that,
Railing against the cultural hegemony of the West, the natives are of
its party without knowing it. Indeed the very argument, the rhetoric
of defiance, that our nationalists muster are... canonical, time
tested.... In their ideological inscription, the cultural nationalists
remain in a position of counter identification which is to continue
to participate in an institutional configuration - to be subjected to
cultural identities that ostensibly decry Time and time again,
cultural nationalism has followed the route of alternate
genealogising. We end up always in the same place; the achievement
122
is to have invented a different past for it.
Accordingly, what is being said in the notion of 'exile' is that cultural identities cannot
be ascribed to pre-given, original, or ahistorical cultural traits, but rather it is a
negotiation of cultural identity that involves the continual interface and exchange of
cultural performances that produce a mutual recognition, in the liminal space of the
123
hybrid. The existence of 'exile' or 'voyage in' indicates a liminal space that does not
separate but rather mediates their mutual exchange and relativises meanings with the
critical view in a transcultural manner. Consequently, as Said suggests "solidarity
121 Robert Young, White mythologies: writing, history and the west, p. 165, cited from Benita Parry,
"Resistance theory/ theorising resistance or the cheers of nativism," in Colonial Discourse / Postcolonial
theory, p. 178.
122
Anthony Appiah, "Out of Africa: topologies of nativism," Yale Journal of criticism, vol. 1, no. 2, pp.
162, 170.
123 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location ofCulture, pp.2-3.
142
Chapter 2, Challenge ofthe Other
before criticism means the end of the criticism"124as he applies 'criticism' not only to
nationalism but also to class solidarity,125 a critical mind is needed to resist and oppose
the manipulating and fetishising discourse at 'home.'
In this voyage crossing the liminal zone separating the First World and the Third
World, the role of the intellectual is to construct an identity on the border, negating "the
twin dangers of essentialism and infinite heterogeneity," and refusing to provide a
typology of border intellectuals.126 On the site of the border, the danger is a desire for
an authentic identity or origin within the socio-political structuation of reality. Here, the
task of the intellectual on the border as space, is to reflect the gap, and to present "a
sophisticated awareness of the politics produced by socio-cultural-classed-gendered
locations." It is an awareness that "does not subjugate itself to that politics," but
presents a freedom from "the politics of imaginary identification and opposition, from
conflation of identity and location, so on - in short, from the varied and powerful forms
• ... 127of suturing that are represented by and instrumental in the construction of 'home.'"
Thus, from a space outside 'home,' ambiguous space, what is needed for the intellectual,
in reifying the relationship with the others, is to present the world as a dubious space of
competing interests, so that the real questions for the intellectual can be addressed:
124 Edward Said, The World the Text and the Critic, p. 28
125 Edward Said, The World the Text and the Critic, p. 28
126 Abdul R. Janmohamed, "Worldliness -without world, homelessness-as-home: Toward a definition of
the specular border intellectual," in Edward Said: A Critical Reader, p. 114.
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However much intellectuals pretend that their representations are of
higher things or ultimate values, morality begins with their activity
in this secular world of ours - where it takes place, whose interests it
serves, how it jibes with a consistent and universalistic ethic, how it
discriminates between power and justice, what it reveals of one's
128
choices and priorities.
Therefore, in the post-colonial discourses on 'exile' or 'voyage in,' what is implied is
not a national solidarity, but rather a transnational solidarity of justice and peace as a
fundamental element that conditions human relations, As Anthony Appiah says, "they
reject not only the Western imperium but also the nationalist project of the postcolonial
national bourgeoisie... the basis for that project of delegitimation cannot be the
129
postmodernist one: rather it is grounded in an appeal to an ethical universal."
What is being created of the border-crossing, is a 'double-vision' or 'double-
consciousness' that offers the intellectual creative responsibility in facilitating dialogues
in difference, without promoting hierarchy, exclusiveness, and appropriation. What
emerges from this positioning or dialogue with others, is a sense of ethics that only
comes from the physical setting or encounter with others. Through ethical
responsibility on the border, the virtue of situatedness within a particular culture or value
system and structure, can be re-constituted and trans-nationalised by critical encounter
127 Abdul R. Janmohamed, "Worldliness -without world, homelessness-as-home: Toward a definition of
the specular border intellectual," p. 114.
128 Edward Said, Representation ofthe Intellectual, thel993 Reith lectures, London: Vintage,1994, p.
120.
129. Anthony Appiah, , "Is the post- in postmodernism the post- in postcolonial?," Critical Inquiry, Vol.
17, no.2, 1990, p. 353.
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with and reflection of the Other. This positioning on the border creates a critical space
to resist the language of dominant and hegemonic discourse, and also the militant
particularism of all embracing discourse. From this ethical sphere, the reflection from
the margin's or victim's position brings a counter-hegemonic discourse, as bell hooks
indicates,
This marginality [is] a central location for the production of a
counter-hegemonic discourse that is not just found in words but in
habits of being and in the way one lives. As such, I was not
speaking of a marginality one wishes to lose - to give up or surrender
as part of moving into the center - but rather of a site one stays in,
clings to even, because it nourishes one's capacity to resist. It offers
to one the possibility of radical perspective from which to see and
130
create, to imagine alternatives, new worlds.
This ethical space on the border is a place of struggle, and that of ambivalence, that is
open to a different kind of becoming through the encounter with the Other; it is not a
place of domination but a place of resistance to find more than what we used to know
(the surplus), beyond the hegemonic rule of determination, in order to escape the
dominant logic. This space is called 'home,' as bell hooks says,
the very meaning of 'home' changes with the experience of
decolonization, of radicalization. At times, home is nowhere. At
times, one knows only extreme estrangement and alienation. Then
home is no longer just one place. It is locations. Home is that place
which enables and promotes varied and everchanging perspectives, a
130 bell hooks, Yearning: Race, gender, and cultural politics, cited from David Harvey, Justice, Nature
and the Geography ofDifference (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 103.
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place where one discovers new ways of seeing reality, frontiers of
difference.131
So, the important point as revealed in the idea of 'home,' is our constant 'positioning'
with the different others. Hence, in the process of becoming, 'Othernesses' or
"significant others"132 as George Herbert Mead calls them, are necessarily internalised
within the subject (or the self) in a dialogical mode, seeing others in us, in this
continuing conversation with the Other.133
The Other is, however, not to be understood in terms of epistemological
diversity, but rather in terms of the signification of difference in a real socio-political
reality. David Harvey warns of the danger:
while it opens up a radical prospect by acknowledging the
authenticity of other voices, postmodernist thinking
immediately shuts off those other voices from access to more
universal sources of power by ghettoising them with an opaque
otherness, the specificity of this or that language game. It
thereby disempowers those voices (ofwomen, ethnic and racial
minorities, colonized peoples, the unemployed, youth, etc.) in a
world of lop-sided power relations.134
131 bell hooks, Yearning: Race, gender, and cultural politics, cited from David Harvey, Justice, Nature
and the Geography ofDifference, p. 104.
132 See George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), cited
from Charles Taylor "The Politics of Recognition" in Multiculturalism, ed by Amy Gutmann (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 32.
133 Charles Taylor "The Politics of Recognition" inMulticulturalism, pp. 32-33.
1,4 David Harvey, The Condition ofPostmodernity, p. 117.
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Therefore, what is required in this relation, is a critical evaluation of the socio-political-
economy. This evaluation has a role in bringing or establishing a concept of social
justice and human solidarity that comes from ethics, and resisting the hegemonic
monologic ideology and its discourse. In this sense, the task of this border discourse of
ethics is to defend social justice and human solidarity from the perspective or position of
the oppressed or the victim: the Other.
This question of the colonised or victimised Other leads us to the radical
questioning of the foundation of Western thought, and to show that one of the
characteristics ofWestern metaphysics is to deny the otherness of the Other(s), or if not
to actually deny its otherness, then at least to appropriate it, subsuming the Other
dialectically within the 'same' of the absolute subject. It is also a protest against the
original Enlightenment idea of reason, the entrenched reason, for being the latest and
most dangerous totalizing authority of all; it is also against the notion of truth as the
instrument of a mastery being exercised by the knower or interpreter over the Other. It
is a critique of this epistemology from the outside - the victim, the oppressed, and a
questioning of the fundamental mechanism of 'violence' and of institutionalised
knowledge.
Emmanuel Levinas objects to the very idea of knowledge in the traditional sense,
for in the process of understanding, Western philosophy undermines and devalues
whatever societies, cultures or modes of living it comes across: "Western philosophy
coincides with the discourse of the other where the other, in manifesting itself as a being,
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loses its alterity. From its infancy philosophy has been stuck with a horror of the other
that remains other."135 What Levinas means is the inability of Western conventional
knowledge, to allow the objects of study to remain outside of its epistemological
boundaries or to be defined in their own terms. He calls this 'the imperialism of the
same.' In contrast to conventional knowledge, Levinas conceives the Other in terms of
alterity, exteriority, distance. Something radically different - radical in terms of the
illimitability of the Other, something we cannot fully comprehend, but we must respect,
instead of grasping. Something that calls for responsibility in an ethical relationship and
discourse that constitute forms of actual social interaction and practice. What is being
attempted in the next chapter is to explore a kind of relationship without the violence of
comprehension that would reduce the other(s) to the self, and to create an ethical space
or signification that conditions or orients the "face-to-face relationship" between every
form of inter-subjectivity and inter-culturality.
135 Emmanuel Levinas, "The Trace of the Other," in Mark C. Taylor (ed.), Deconstructing in Context
(Chicago University Press, 1986) p. 346.
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Chapter 3. Discourse on the Other
The philosophical discourse of the West claims the amplitude of
an all-encompassing structure or of an ultimate comprehension.
It compels every other discourse to justify itself before
philosophy.
Rational theology accepts this vassalage. If, for the
benefit of religion, it reserves a domain from the authority of
philosophy, one will know that this domain will have been
recognized to be philosophically inverifiable. (Emmanuel
Levinas, "God and Philosophy"1)
All forms of rhetoric agree that action of some kind is implied
in communication, and those who are interested in theology will
rejoice that we are moving toward an emphasis on thinking as a
form of action or on the action that is intended as a result of
thinking. (David Cunningham, "Theology and Rhetoric in the
University,")2
David Cunningham has said that the analytic presumptions of modern
philosophy have left theology lost within what he calls an "inadequate methodological
framework."3 According to him, there are three main problems in contemporary
theology: an apolitical pretence, an inordinate separation of the object of study from the
1 Emmanuel Levinas, "God and Philosophy," in Collected Philosophical Papers, trans, by Alphonso
Lingis (Fordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), p. 153.
2 William Beardslee, "Theology and Rhetoric in the University" in Theology and the University: Essay in
Honor ofJohn B. Cobb, Jr., ed by David Ray Griffin and Joseph C. Hough, Jr. (Albany: SUNY Press,
1991), p. 187.
3 David Cunningham, "Theology as Rhetoric," Theological Studies, no. 52, 1991, p.408.
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studying subject, and a claim to universality,4 indicating theology's inability to enter
into a highly contentious and disputed social reality. Thus, the task is to place or
resituate theology and make a theological claim within contemporary socio-political-
cultural discourses.5 Instead ofbeing a definitive and totalising system, theology should
realise that it is only within the contingent socio-political-cultural circumstances that
theological or religious ideas are invented, advocated, interpreted, and revised. The task
of theology is to participate in the physical or concrete setting of real life; it is taking
theology back in to the public discourse. It is only within the public discourse and the
physical settings of human relation with the others that the Christian message becomes
'gospel' and good news.
The need for a paradigm shift away from theology as an analytic discipline
toward theology as a socio-politically engaging discourse, is obviously apparent. In this
concrete human reality, theology should be a discourse that critically evaluates the
fundamental human relation with the others. The relationship with the other has been
traditionally acknowledged as an object of (mis)interpretation and (mis) representation,
through fetishism, as argued in Said and others. And, especially in contemporary post¬
modern society, where there is a sense of increasing cultural fragmentation that produces
particularities and privatised judgements; where the individual self-discovery is
4 David Cunningham, "Theology as Rhetoric," pp. 410-411. Cunningham cites David Tracy, Plurality
and Ambiguity and The Analogical Imagination as exemplars of the first problem; George Lindbeck, The
Nature ofDoctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age, as an exemplar of the second problem;
and Dietrich Ritschl, The Logic of Theology: A Belief Account of the Relationships between Basic
Concepts in Theology, as an exemplar of the third.
5 David Cunningham, "Theology as Rhetoric," pp. 419-420.
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becoming disengaged, from the responsibility of common life, contemporary theology is
also tempted to become particularised and privatised. As David Harvey indicates, there
is a tendency to reduce everything into an undifferentiated multiplicity emphasising the
difference without acknowledging meanings or values. For which, David Harvey points
out in The Condition ofPostmodernity,
while [postmodernism] opens up a radical prospect by
acknowledging the authenticity of other voices, postmodernist
thinking immediately shuts off those other voices from access to
more universal sources of power by ghettoising them with an opaque
otherness, the specificity of this or that language game. It thereby
disempowers those voices (of women, ethnic and racial minorities,
colonised people, the unemployed, youth, etc.) in a world of lop¬
sided power relations. The language game of a cabal of international
bankers may be impenetrable to us, but that does not put it on a par
with the equally impenetrable language of inner-city blacks from the
standpoint of power relations.6
This indicates that the totalising power relation is still enforced even in the so-called
Post-modern discussion, which is supposed to acknowledge everything in its own
terms, but which actually fails to see real socio-political change.
Against this retreat, Rowan Williams writes that "proclaiming the Gospel may
have much to do with the struggle to make explicit what is at stake in particular human
decisions or policies, individual and collective, and in this sense bring in the event of
6 David Harvey, The Condition ofPostmodernity, p. 117.
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judgement, the revaluation of identities."7 Thus, the task of postmodern theology is to
participate in this recovery through "an engagement of solidarity, a willingness to listen
o
and response." It is waging an effective critique of the hegemonic discursive patterns
of power and privilege, from the perspective of "perfect communality of language and
action free from the distortions imposed on understanding by the clash of group interests
and the self-defence of the powerful."9 This means that theology is to be a discourse
that comes from the on-going struggle between forces of social oppression and forces
resisting oppression, and that includes other marginal voices in transforming human
relations. In this sense, theology is a critical space or discourse that lays bare the
structure of human discourse which contains violence or manipulating desires against
humanity.
So, what is needed here is to relocate the standpoint in order to create a critical
space, in order to challenge hegemonic tradition. This space is "a site of creativity and
power" as bell hooks emphasises,
This marginality [is] a central location for the production of a
counter-hegemonic discourse that is not just found in words but in
habits of being and in the way one lives. As such, I was not
speaking of a marginality one wishes to lose - to give up or surrender
as part of moving into the centre - but rather of a site one stays in,
7 Rowan Williams, "Postmodern Theology and the Judgement of the Word," in Postmodern Theology:
Christian Faith in a Pluralist World, ed by Frederic B. Burnham (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1989),
p. 97.
8 Rowan Williams, "Postmodern Theology and the Judgement of the Word," p. 103.
9 Rowan Williams, "Postmodern Theology and the Judgement of the Word," p. 102.
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clings to even, because it nourishes one's capacity to resist. It offers
to one the possibility of radical perspective from which to see and
create, to imagine alternatives, new worlds.10
In other words, it is a site of encounter; the attempt to see oneself through the eyes of the
Other - the victim, the marginalised, and the oppressed; it is an attempt to relocate and
place ourselves with the Other; an attempt to leave the place called 'home,' and break
our own totality. This critical space is not an epistemological one, but rather an ethical
one demanding commitment and responsibility for the Other and solidarity with the
Other.
Hence, in ethical demanding, the question of the Other requires a deconstructive
task. Deconstruction needs to take place ethically - it is an ethical criticism. In this
sense, it is not something negative; it is not a process of demolition, rather the goal of
deconstruction is to locate a point of otherness within traditional conceptuality and then
to deconstruct this conceptuality from that position of the other; it is called into question
by the Other. Here, ethics is defined as "the putting into question ofmy spontaneity by
the presence of the Other,"11 who is "exceeding the idea of the other in me."12 If the
Other is to remain as other, it cannot be appropriated within the context of any particular
culture. On the contrary, that particular culture must find its origin and meaning in the
exteriority of the ethical relation.
10 bell hooks, "Choosing The Margin as a Space of Radical Openness," in Yearning Race, Gender, and
Cultural Politics, quoted from David Harvey, Justice, Nature & the Geography of Difference (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1996), p. 103.
" Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 43.
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1. Toward Transcultural Ethics
Ethical discourse theory demands that we grasp the reality that language is not
just a means of communication with others, but rather it is the language in which we
conduct our social life. It reveals that language and the social use of language as a
vehicle of power, as indicated in Foucault whose main idea is the hegemonic nature of
discourse and power. As previously demonstrated in post-colonial discourse, ethical
discursive theory demonstrates a strategy for demystifying power in discourse by tracing
its internal operations. Edward Said said that the whole world could and has been
invented by the sheer power of words and its life is sustained by a network of
institutional support systems. Thus is the oriental world made visible, "there" and the
"other" by generations of Western writers, using techniques of representation that rely
for their sense and effect "upon institutions, traditions, conventions, agreed-upon a
distinct and amorphous Orient."13 Moreover, Said criticised these discursive structures
that have fixed the colonised East in a powerless object position. They guaranteed the
colonising West a superior subject position in which a negative image of the East has
been contained and circulated to legitimise Western territorial expansions. Accordingly,
this strategy involves a "flexible positional superiority, which puts the Westerner in a
whole series of possible relationships with the Orient without ever losing him the
12 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p.50
13 Edward Said, Orientalism, p.22.
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relative upper hand."14 In other words, it is a discourse of power-construct, an inter-
discursivity that inflicted violence, enforced exclusion and maintained relations of
injustice.
There have been some attempts to find a counter discourse, the ethical discourse,
developed by such writers as Jurgen Habermas, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Michel Foucault
and Richard Rorty. Particularly, in his Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas
claimed that the ethical universal could be retrieved from discourse itself. He argued
that discursive exchange has "the intersubjective communality of mutual
comprehension, shared knowledge, reciprocal trust and accord with one another,"15in the
rationally based consensus. But, for him, agreement depends on the degree of validity
claimed and accomplished in four different ways: the comprehensibility of what is being
said, the truth of what is being said, the sincerity of the speaker and the appropriateness
of fit between what is said and the social context in which it is said.16 However, in
order to be successful, there must be an unforced consensus which is free from
distortion and constraint, and must be governed by no strategic intention, other than that
of establishing truth.
Habermas seems to want to argue that the very existence of human language
creates the possibility of a rationally arrived-at consensus between people, which
14 Edward Said, Orientalism, p. 7.
15
Jurgen Habermas, "What is Universal Pragmatics?" in Communication and the Evolution ofSociety,
trans. Thomas McCarthy (London: Heinemann, 1979), p. 3.
16Jiirgen Habermas, "What is Universal Pragmatics?," p. 2.
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develops toward ideal consensus, which is a Utopian orientation within the structure of
discourse. It is his notion of the 'ideal speech situation,' which seems to imply the
desire to close the gap between actuality and reality. But his ideals are implausible
because of the irreducible heterogeneity of human interests and the inevitable conflict
which this entails. But, for him, it could be said that the heterogeneity of human interest
is precisely what makes the orientation towards consensus most necessary and
desirable. On the other hand, Habermas's attempt to create the ideal speech situation,
indicates his ethics of discourse to be formalistic and systematic in the direction of a
search for universal consensus, where what matters most is the procedure of rational and
unconstrained discourse, rather than the content of that discourse. 7 His sociology is
that of "regulated system, which orders and organises reality in ways which are often
incompatible with the human needs of individuals."18
On the other hand, Jean-Francois Lyotard is very critical of Habermas' addiction
to the Enlightenment ideals of reason and truth. While Habermas argues for the
hierarchy of certain forms of language game over others - rational communication over
purposive or instrumental language, Lyotard argues and assumes the decentring and
multiplication of language games in denouncing oppressive attempts. And where
Habermas assumes and promotes the ideal of consensus, Lyotard calls upon theory and
criticism to tolerate difference and dissensus. For Habermas, Lyotard's rejection of the
17 Steve Connor, Theory and Cultural Value (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 102-110.
18
Bryan S. Turner, Orientalism, Postmodernism & Globalism (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 172.
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ideal of rational consensus is dangerous irrationalism, while for Lyotard, Habermas's
adoption of this ideal can lead only to new versions of Auschwitz and the Gulag.
Lyotard, therefore, rejects the principle of translatability between particular
languages and language games, and emphasises the notion of incommensurability. He
argues that two different areas of activity cannot be measured according to the same
scale, as he observes that "the linkage between the SS phrase and the deportee's phrase
is undiscoverable because their phrases do not rise from a single genre of discourse."19
What he is trying to affirm is the absolute incommensurability of language games, which
he then extends to the idea of translation. But, the point he is trying to make is that
universal truths and norms are to be explained as the operation of a particular sinister
linguistic violence, in which the force of a particular 'we' subsumes and assimilates the
force of the 'you' and the 'they.'
For Lyotard, the principle of justice lies in the heterogeneity of language games,
the irreducibility of any one language game to another. In other words, to assimilate
others forcibly to one's own project of emancipation or cultural style more generally is
an unjust violation. His principle for ethical discourse must be an absolute suspicion of
all such principle. This means that, rather than seeking to confirm and subordinate the
rule of law, ethical consciousness must represent an endless putting of the law into
question. For Lyotard, there would be no possibility of embodying a universal norm in
19 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Differend (Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota, 1988), p.106.
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practice, since such a thing is, or is always likely to be unjust. Whereas, for Habermas,
everything is staked on this possibility. In their crucial difference, for Lyotard, ethical
orientation must be carried out in embodied forms of value, whereas for Habermas,
orientation means nothing without the possibility of such arrival at rational consensus.
So, if we accept Lyotard's characterisation of the conflict, then we must call it a
'differend,' or a situation in which two discursive worlds are in opposition without the
possibility of a higher principle of discursive justice with which to mediate that
opposition. But, ifwe adopt Habermas's account of the opposition, then we must call it
a disagreement, since the very structure of intersubjective speech presupposes a universe
90
of shared rational norms.
In fact, in Habermas, enlightenment reason remains in the privileged position,
and he tends to over-emphasise the question of communicative reason; he sees this
reason as the normative foundation of his critical theory of contemporary society and
politics. For Habermas, discursive ethics provides the formal universal principle that
replaces Kant's ethical normative category. Thomas McCarthy argues that Habermas
shifts the Kantian questions of 'How is experience possible' to 'How is mutual
understanding possible?' in emphasising the intention of achieving agreement (even in
everyday, conflictual, cross-cultural communication) to the same ethical model. But
Thomas McCarthy points out the problem of transcultural ethics that this model poses:
"if the structures of communicative action and discourse.... are to be found with
20 Steve Connor, Theory and Cultural Value (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 110-115.
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significant frequency only in certain cultures at certain times, how then is it possible to
defend the view that these structures are universal-pragmatic feature of communication
as such?" If such an ideal exists, a transcultural ethics must be free from chauvinism
or ethnocentrism and demonstrate "the ability to act communicatively" over all
cultures.21
However, Habermas maintains his position on universal reason or morality by
defining ethical differences between cultures as belonging to diverse stage of moral
development. Here lies the most crucial problem of Habermas in relation with
transcultural ethics: the elitist moral development theory that he imposes upon the
others, forcing others into the same mechanism of risky agreements within and between
real-life-worlds. As history reveals, in any cross-cultural evaluation, "the so-called
enlightenment ideals (including transcultural ethics) are not - and never were - universal;
they are Eurocentric and patriarchal," and moreover, the ideals "have actually hidden
and obscured a much darker, uglier and more brutal reality" of violent oppression and
ruthless imperialism and colonisation on the other cultures.22
Here, the argument is caught between two unacceptable choices: Habermas's
defensive position in relation to the Enlightenment project, and Lyotard's celebration of
postmodern collapse. However, as we have seen, it is not possible to decide which one
21 Thomas McCarthy, Ideals and Illusions: On Reconstruction and Deconstruction in Contemporary
Critical Theory (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 134-135.
22 Richard Bernstein, "The Hermeneutics of Cross-Cultural Understanding," in Cross-Cultural
Conversation (initiation), ed by Anindita Niyogi Balslev (Atlanta, GA.: Scholars Press, 1996), pp. 29-30.
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to take, which indicates an inability to break away from the hegemonic system that is
being denounced. This oversimplified binary argument between the two is again
developed in an essentialist way, an irrevocably Euro or western-centric attitude
traditional in its whole episteme. However, the attempts made by Habermas and
Lyotard should at least be seen as a refusal and a resistance to such violence and
exclusion. Their efforts indicate an urgent sense of responsibility in rejecting the
distortions and subordinations and violences created by an orientation toward universal
rules for the resisting of false universalisms.
2, Ethical responsibility and the Other
Therefore, what is being suggested, is to present an unusual conception of ethics,
which will foster a new understanding and a reformulation of the traditional problem of
subjectivity, in relation to the Other. Here, the traditional ontological tradition employed
in discovering and describing the ultimate structure of reality, is questioned by an ethics
of responsibility that involves the characteristics of self-reflection. Derrida calls this " a
community of the question about the possibility of the question."23 Traditionally, an
ethical project aims to submit freedom of will to the rule of rationality in an attempt to
Jacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas," in
Writing and Difference. Trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 80.
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find a criterion for human action that is universally intelligible and applicable for
everyone. In doing so, the particular human situations are subsumed under universal
order. Therefore, when a philosopher talks about ethics, it is not as an individual, but
always with regard for the universality of reason. 24
But, unlike the traditional philosophical approach, Emmanuel Levinas does not
treat ethics as one branch amongst others, but as the basis of philosophy, what he calls
"First Philosophy." Ethics arise not from the ontological universality of reason, but
from the uniqueness of the moral situation itself, and therefore, moral obligation comes
exposed before understanding (knowledge) or consciousness. In his theological essay
"God and Philosophy," Levinas devotes extensive attention to the position of
philosophy and rejects it. Against the position occupied by a totalising ontology,
Levinas disrupts this concept of philosophy by putting a God who is infinite, a God who
"comes to mind" in an attempt to change and challenge the traditional concept of
philosophy presented in chapter one. Levinas sees philosophy as a mode of reflection
that reduces everything to immanence, as the museum representation manages to hold
the past and the future as present in consciousness. He challenges this presence of
representation, such as objective and scientific investigations, and even religious
experience locked within consciousness. For him, philosophy has been unable to bear
God and "rational theology accepts this vassalage,"25 "thematizing God into the course
24 Fabio Ciaramelli, "Levinas's Ethical Discourse between individuation and Universality," in Re-Reading
Levinas, ed by Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana
University Press, 1991), pp. 84-85.
25 Emmanuel Levinas, "God and Philosophy," p. 153.
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of being,"26and as a result, doctrinal theology would simply apply philosophical
conceptuality to the question of dogma. Thus he says,
Rational theology, fundamentally ontological, strives to take account
of transcendence in the domain of being; God is said to exit
eminently or par excellence. But does the height, or the height
above all height, that is thus expressed belong to ontology?27
The idea is the infinite, an idea that exceeds my capacities and that thinks more
than it can think; the infinite cannot be thought, cannot be represented in my
consciousness within the rule of reason. In other words, there are thoughts that exceed
my capacities and break my autonomy. Thus, Levinas insists that "the in of infinite"
28does not only mean negation, but also indicates that the infinite comes into the finite.
He says,
The in of the Infinite designates the depth of the affecting by which
subjectivity is affected through this "putting" of the Infinite into it,
without prehension or comprehension. It designates the depth of an
undergoing that no capacity comprehends, that no foundation any
longer supports, where every process of investing fails and where the
screws that fix the stem of inwardness burst. This putting in without
a corresponding recollecting devastates its site like a devouring fire,
catastrophying its site, in the etymological sense of the word.29
26 Emmanuel Levinas, "God and Philosophy," p. 154.
27 Emmanuel Levinas, "God and Philosophy," p. 154.
28 Emmanuel Levinas, "God and Philosophy," p. 163.
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The site of ontology is catastrophised and the I becomes passive. In fact, it is clear that
Levinas talks about transcendence in "God and Philosophy," however, this turns out that
the way the infinite interrupts consciousness and shatters its foundation is in my ethical
responsibility for another person. He clearly says in one foot note, "It is the meaning of
the beyond, of transcendence, and not ethics, that our study is pursuing. It finds this
meaning in ethics. There is signification, for ethics is structured as the-one-for-the-
other; there is signification, of the beyond being, for one finds oneself outside of all
finality in a responsibility which ever increases, in a disinterestedness where a being
undoes itself of its being."30
Levinas explores ethical responsibility that precedes my consciousness and calls
consciousness into the responsibility for the others, without limits. And the metaphysical
structure of the infinite is performed and understood in relation to another person, a
person with material needs. In other words, the question of the infinite becomes a matter
of interhuman relations - ethics.
2.1. Emmanuel Levinas
^ 1
Emmanuel Levinas particularly, has written about the relation to the Other in a
radical and powerful way. His thinking was influenced by the critique of philosophical
29 Emmanuel Levinas, "God and Philosophy," p. 163.
30 Emmanuel Levinas, "God and Philosophy," p. 163, note no. 15.
31
Born in Lithuania in 1906, into an orthodox Jewish family but has spent most of his life in France,
since emigrated to France in 1923. His philosophical writings can be tentatively divided into three periods,
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reason in the writings of Husserl, Heidegger and Rosenzweig. His work constitutes a
distinct voice in philosophy which resists attempts to incorporate it into some theoretical
cataloguing. Jacques Derrida calls Levinas's work in "Violence and Metaphysics," a
radically different idea that demands a completely different mode of thought. It is, he
says,
a thought for which the entirety of the Greek logos has already
erupted, and is now a quiet topsoil deposited not over bedrock, but
around a more ancient volcano. A thought which, without philology
and solely by remaining faithful to the immediate, but buried nudity
of experience itself, seeks to liberate itself from the Greek
domination of the Same and the One as if from oppression itself - an
oppression certainly comparable to none other in the world, an
ontological or transcendental oppression, but also the origin or alibi
of all oppression in the world. A thought, finally, which seeks to
liberate itself from a philosophy fascinated by the "visage of being
that shows itself in war" which "is fixed in the concept of totality
which dominates Western Philosophy."32
It is clear that, in Levinas, the essential characteristic of philosophy is a Greek way of
thinking and speaking, as he says that philosophy is primarily a question of language,
one before the Second World War and two afterward. The first period begins in 1930 with The Theory of
Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology. During the 1930s, his work continued with interpretations and
translations of Husserl and Heidegger. Several of these are collected in En decouvrant I'existence avec
Husserl and Heidegger. While in a German stalag for five years as a French prisoner of war, he wrote
what is considered the first of his highly original works, Existence and Existents. That book and Time and
the Other, appeared after the War. The Second period gathers Levinas's writings around his seminal 1961
text, Totality and Infinity. In addition to that book, three essays are referred to in this study: "Philosophy
and the Idea of Infinity," "Phenomenon and Enigma," and "Freedom and Command." The Third period
gathers essays leading to his 1972 book Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence and includes work to
the present. See Robert Manning, Interpreting Otherwise than Heidegger: Emmanuel Lcvinas's Ethics as
First Philosophy (Pittsburgh: Dequesne University Press, 1993), pp. 1-14.
32
Jacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics," in Writing and Difference (London: Routledge, 1993),
p.83.
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and employs a series of terms and concepts - such as morphe (form), ousia (substance),
nous (reason), logos (thought) or telos (goal), etc. - from Greek. Western philosophy
has most often been an ontology: a reduction of the other to the same by interposition of
a middle and neutral term that ensures the comprehension of being. The neutralisation
of the other who becomes a theme or an object is precisely his reduction to the same33.
For Levinas, thematisation and conceptualisation which are inseparable, are not at peace
with the other but threaten suppression or possession of the other. Possession affirms the
other, but only within a negation of its independence. Therefore, ontology as first
philosophy is a philosophy ofpower, and that does not call into question the same.34
Assuming the Greek origin of philosophy which lies in reason, science, and
ontology (ontos, being and logos reason, language), Levinas calls this radical
questioning "meontology35 (me-on, non-being)." Moreover, he placed his thinking at
the "end" of philosophy, associating the modern era with the culmination of the whole
enterprise ofphilosophy that has characterised Western culture, as he says "It is true that
philosophy, in its traditional forms of ontotheology and logocentrism has come to an
end."36 But when Levinas was asked the question what role remains for philosophy if
philosophy has indeed ended, he added that although philosophy as traditionally
conceived is spent and can no longer think and perform a world in comprehensible
33 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p.43.
34 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p.46.
35 Emmanuel Levinas and Richard Kearney, "Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas," in Face to Face with
Levinas. ed by Richard Cohen (Albany: State University ofNew York, 1986), p.25.
36 Emmanuel Levinas and Richard Kearney, "Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas, p.33.
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totalities, yet he asserted that there remains much room for philosophy as "critical
speculation and interrogation."37
Having described his initial idea, it seems important to place Emmanuel Levinas
in relation to other philosophers. Levinas was influenced by an early teacher, Edmund
Husserl who was considered the father of twentieth century phenomenological
philosophy. Levinas's first book was the first interpretation of Husserlian
phenomenology . According to Husserl, European philosophy into the twentieth century
had been caught in a "dogmatic slumber" bom of Idealist striving after complete and
self-sufficient knowledge of the real.38 A new philosophy was needed. According to
Levinas, Husserl is to be credited for demonstrating the inability of thought to separate
itself from the temporal quality, or horizon, of consciousness, characterising its
methodological disclosure of how meaning comes to be, how it emerges in our
consciousness. In a way, phenomenology is a way of becoming aware of where we are
in the world. Therefore, for Levinas, phenomenology was a way of suspending our
preconceptions and prejudices in order to disclose how essential truth and meaning are
generated. In fact, it was a methodological return to the beginning, the origins, of
-3Q
knowledge.
37 Emmanuel Levinas and Richard Kearney, "Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas," p. 33
38 Husserl's assessment of Modern European thought is well examined in his book The Crisis in the
European Science (pp. 7-20; 274-275)
39 Emmanuel Levinans and Richard Kearney, "Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas," pp. 14-16.
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Another important influence on Levinas is the work of Martin Heidegger. In
Heidegger, Husserl's phenomenological description of transcendental consciousness is
transformed into a description of the primordial ontological condition of consciousness.
Levinas said that "It [Heidegger's philosophy] completely altered the course and
character of European philosophy,"40as Heidegger redefined philosophy in relation to
other forms of knowledge as fundamental ontology.41 Because, in Heidegger, "the
difference between being and the beings does not presuppose anything common," and
that in other words, it is a "difference without common ground,"42 which he
acknowledges to be critical to his own thoughts - the ontological difference.43 But it is
not possible to speak about the significant relation between Heidegger and Levinas,
except to say that while Levinas sees in Heidegger the culmination of Western
philosophy, he does not finally see in Heidegger any movement beyond philosophy,
which is the "Greek language of intelligibility and presence."44 Because Levinas
believes that Heidegger finally returns the ontological difference to the 'common
ground' of presence - Being made present to being in a representing of meaning. "While
Heidegger heralds the end of the metaphysics of presence, he continues to think of being
as a coming-into-presence; he seems unable to break away from the hegemony of
presence that he denounces."45 Levinas describes the core of Western philosophy as
40 Emmanuel Levinans and Richard Kearney, "Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas,"p. 15
41 Emmanuel Levinas, "Ethics and Infinity," in Collected Philosophical Papers, p.38.
42 Emmanuel Levinas, "Transcendence and Evil," in Collected Philosophical Papers p. 177.
43 Emmanuel Levinas, "Transcendence and Evil, p 177
44 Emmanuel Levinas and Richard Kearney, "Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas," p.20.
45 Emmanuel Levinas, "Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity" in Collected Philosophical Papers, p. 20.
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'ontologism.' Fundamental ontology describes the phenomenological ground of
'ontologism,' but cannot step out of it. It demonstrates that there is no ontological
escape route from being, only the meontological route.46
Western philosophy has never got past this point. In opposing
ontologism - when it has opposed it - it has struggled for a better
being, for a harmony between ourselves and the world, or for the
perfecting of our own being. Its ideal of peace and equilibrium has
presupposed the adequacy of being. The inadequacy of the human
condition has never been conceived in any other way than as a
limitation of being - otherwise the meaning of 'infinite being' would
never have been considered. The transcendence of these limits,
communion with infinite being, has remained its only concern.47
In other words, though fundamental ontology uniquely opens philosophy to the
primordial aspects or phenomena of existence, it risks forgetting the possible quiddity of
Being itself - its possible quiddity, that is, in relation to something other than being.
This is to say that there is a relationship of Being to being myself - as a fundamental
relationship - in a prior relationship to something other than what can be understood or
described fundamentally. Levinas calls this possibility of a something other than the
difference between Being and being an "otherwise than Being." He also calls it a
40
"metaphysical exteriority" This meontological possibility gives birth to the whole of
46
Wesley Damian Avram, Theo-homilia (Ph.D. Dissertation, Northwestern University, 1994), p.60.
47 The French reference is from Recherches Philosophiques 5 (1935-6), p.377; quoted from Steven G.
Smith, Argument to the Other- Reason Beyond Reason in the Thought of Karl Barth and Emmanuel
Levinas (Chico, Ca.: Scholars Press, 1983), p.58.
48 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p.29.
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Levinas's philosophy.49 Although Levinas's rejection of Heidegger's fundamental
ontology is sometimes extreme, his struggle to escape "a long tradition of pride,
heroism, domination and cruelty"50 is significant to this investigation.
In addition to Husserl and Heidegger, Levinas was significantly influenced by
the German Jewish thinker Franz Rosenzweig who called for a new thinking beyond the
ontologism of Western philosophy. It seems that though Levinas's philosophical
method comes from Husserl and Heidegger, much of the inspiration comes from
Rosenzweig,5'as shown in Totality and Infinity, where he states that "We were
impressed by the opposition to the idea of totality in Franz Rosenzweig's Stern de
Erlosungf52 According to Rosenzweig, philosophy's first word is the is (as in God is
Being), but as an alternative, Rosenzweig argued for the and (as in God and being, one
person and the other....etc.). He called his articulation for the and a 'premise of
separation' in which the differences between things are not necessarily reconciled in an
interpretation of their meaning according to one side or the other of the juxtaposition.
This new thinking had a different presupposition from the traditional philosophy that
was preoccupied with the interpretation of being . His thinking was to be a philosophy of
radical pluralism in which intersubjective relationships are mediated not primarily
through one's interpretation of an other or of a thing, but through the contingent and
49 See Existence and Existents, "Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity" (esp. pp.51-53), Totality and Infinity
(esp. pp.33-53), and Ethics and Infinity (esp. pp.37-44) for Levinas's Criticism of Heidegger.
50 Emmanuel Levinas, "Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity," p.52.
51 Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, p.76.
52 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p.28.
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historic communicative practices of speaking persons in which knowledge is created.
These practices, however, are not to be considered a new starting point for a more
accurate sort of knowledge, nor merely shifting from analytic premises to dialectical
premises. Rather, they are set outside of reason, in an arena in which differences
flourish without common ground.53
Rosenzweig called this new thinking oriented from these practices a 'speech-
thinking.' This 'speech-thinking' is representative of the post-Enlightenment's new
reasoning. He promoted his speech-thinking as a new paradigm in which "the method
of speech replaces the method of thinking maintained in all earlier philosophies."54 The
norms of this new thinking are 'grammatical' rather than 'logical,'55 dependent on the
temporal, historical, social, and personal contexts of speech. Rosenzweig went in
search of an 'absolute empiricism,'56 by which he meant an empiricism which reached
behind the 'static truths'57 of the classical empiricists to those relational truths, or 'truths
CO
for someone,' of his speech-thinking.
53 See Franz Rosenzweig, "The New Thinking," in Glatzer, Franz Rosenzweig: His Life and Thought
(New York: Stocken, 1967), pp.190-208, and The Star ofRedemption, trans, by William W. Hallo (Notre
Dame, In.: Notre Dame Press, 1985).
54 Franz Rosenzweig, "The New Thinking," p. 198
55 Franz Rosenzweig, "The New Thinking , p.200
56 Franz Rosenzweig, "The New Thinking , p.207.
57 Franz Rosenzweig, "The New Thinking , p.206.
58 Franz Rosenzweig, "The New Thinking , p. 206
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The "premise of separation" in Rosenzweig's speech-thinking echoes in
Levinas's defence of a "principle of separation" between speaking persons in which
Levinas believes that "it becomes possible to sustain a pluralism which is not reduced to
a totality" of interpretative perspective.59 It seems that Levinas exercises this 'premise
of separation,' with a view to sustaining a radical pluralism in the simple interhuman
encounter. Levinas identifies separation as the fundamental condition of ethics.60 Here,
he calls this encounter the 'face to face.' In this face-to-face encounter, the face of an
other appears to a knowing person as a visage simultaneously knowable and
unknowable, experienced both as an interpreted other and in a personal address
commanding immediate attention and response. In fact, this face-to-face relation
indicates the "end" of philosophy and its totalising ability to know, or understand,
experience.
2.2. Ethics at the End of Philosophy
Having been influenced and inspired in a radical way, Levinas believes that by
grounding ideas in concrete experience, this rethinking (phenomenological and me-
ontological) challenges the intellectual privilege that continental philosophy has
59 Emmanuel Levinas, "Signature," in Research in Phenomenology 8 (1978), p.187.
60 Robert Gibbs, "Jewish Dimension of Radical Ethics," in Ethics as First Philosophy (New York:
Routledge, 1995), p. 14. Levinas said "the idea of Infinity requires this separation" Totality and Infinity,
p. 102
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historically taken upon itself as the universally reliable interpreter of the real, thinking
for all cases and all people. As Adriaan Peperzak sums up Western culture:
The roots of Western civilisation lie in an attitude that precedes its
theory as well as its practice: the human subject affirms itself as a
freedom engrossing and reducing to itself all that resists its power,
even if only by the obscurity of its being. Thought's ideal is the
integration of everything in the immanence of a total knowing.61
To Levinas, Europe is philosophy, and against it "Husserl has thus brought into
question the Platonic privilege, until then uncontested, of a continent which believes
itself possessed of the right to colonise the world."62 And, more significantly, the Nazi
and Stalinist terrors have shown the culmination and bankruptcy of the Western mind;
they could not cope, could not interpret, and could not prevent the ethical eruption of an
evil beyond human comprehension. With regard to this aspect of Levinas, Robert
Manning cites Maurice Blanchot: "how can we philosophise after Auschwitz is the
thought that traverses the whole of Levinas's philosophy and that he proposes to us
without saying it"63 Levinas identifies the cultural reality of the West, and will not
excuse philosophy in the face of European history. His meditations on philosophy qua
61 Adriaan Peperzak, To the Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas (West
Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1993), p.45.
62 Emmanuel Levinas, "Signature," in Research in Phenomenology 8 (1978), p. 179.
Derrida quotes Husserl's observation that "the irruption of philosophy"("Aufbruch oder Einbruch der
Philosophic," Husserl, Krisis) characterizes Europe's spiritual figure, in Writing and Difference, pp.311-
312, note 4). Husserl characterizes Europe as the "epoch of mankind which now seeks to live, and only
can live in free shaping of its existence, its historical life, through ideas of reason, through infinite tasks"
{The Crisis in the European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans, by David Carr, Evanston,
111: Northwestern University Press, 1970, p.274).
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philosophy become meditations of culture and politics, the fate of philosophy being the
fate ofEuropean being:64
the Holocaust is the moment, the event that necessitates a radical
questioning and revision of the task and essence of philosophy.
Whatever can be said about philosophy and its reflections on human
existence, meaning, political order, ethics, etc., before the Holocaust,
what must be said after Holocaust is that not only were all of the
West's philosophical, ethical and religious teachings and reflections
unable to prevent Auschwitz, but they also may have provided a
certain legitimisation to the devaluation and desecration of human
life.65
Levinas in Totality and Infinity, is explicitly critical of the totalising vision of the
previous philosophical system in the West. Here, he "rejects the synthesising of
phenomena in favour of a thought that is open to the face of the other. The term 'face'
here denotes the way in which the presentation of the other to me exceeds all idea of the
other in me. The proximity of the face-to-face relation cannot be subsumed into a
63 Robert Manning, Interpreting Otherwise than Heidegger: Emmanuel Levinas's Ethics as First
Philosophy (Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press, 1993), p. 187.
64
Wesley Damian Avram, Theo-homilia, p.80.
"In light of this equation of Europe and philosophy, when Levinas says that he "cannot forgive
Heidegger," despite his admiration for Heidegger's thought, he speaks ofmore than Heidegger's apparent
complicity with Nazism or the possible role of Heidegger's philosophy in justifying the Nazi terror. He
speaks through Heidegger to Western thought, culture and history in general, i.e., to the very phenomenon
of Being and the thinking that attends it." (Avram, Theo-homilia, p.80-81 note 28)
65 Robert Manning,Interpreting Otherwise than Heidegger: Emmanuel Levinas's Ethics as First
Philosophy pp. 185-186.
See the dedication to Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence-. "To the memory of those who were
closest among the six million assassinated by the National Socialists, and of the millions of millions of all
confessions and all nations, victims of the same hatred of the other man, the same anti-Semitism."
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totality."66 For Levinas, the idea of infinity is set in opposition to totality, not as an
alternative philosophical ordering in a simple negation of one totality for the totalling
idea of infinity, but as the Otherness that interrupts philosophy. Infinity is not the
negation of imperfection, rather an irreducible surplus to Being, because a perfection
exceeds conception and overflows the concept.67
Levinas disrupts the ontological concept of philosophy and its mode of reflection
that reduces everything to immanence, and instead, inserts a God who is infinite. And,
he shows how philosophy has been unable to bear God, and re-evaluates what reason
and philosophy are. Therefore, the idea ofperfection is an idea of infinity. Levinas says
that "the perfection designated by this passage to the limit does not remain on the
common plane of the yes and no at which negative operates; on the contrary, the idea of
infinity designates a height and a nobility, a transcendence... The idea of the perfect and
of infinity is not reducible to the negation of the imperfect; negativity is incapable of
transcendence."68 This idea of infinity negates neither theory nor practice; it
interrogates and judges them according to a responsivity to an "ethic" of genuine
transcendence. It is clear that, while Levinas talks about transcendence, not primarily on
ethics, it just happens to turn out that the way the infinite interrupts consciousness is in
my ethical responsibility for another person.
66 Sean Hand, "Introduction" in The Levinas Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), p.5.
67 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 25
68 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p.41. [my italic]
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Here, Levinas attempts to reorient the space by ethics, by drawing the place of
height and nearness; he writes of the 'height' 9 of the Other, against the tendency to
regard the Other as simply another being alongside me and therefore like me in all
essential respects. Height is encountered through the other person's destitution and
hunger,70but he resists the claim that the other person is simply an incarnation of God.
Height is the gradient of transcendence71 in which my vision changes, as Levinas writes:
"The other person is not the incarnation of God, but precisely by his face, where he is
disincarnated, and the other person is the manifestation of the height where God reveals
72himself." And then, Levinas changes emphasis from height to nearness (alongside)
. .... . 7-3
and explains some of the difficulty with height in the essay "God and Philosophy."
Levinas criticises the cosmic sense of height (the dimension of the sky over our heads)
as bound to the realm of being, because, in a theological sense, height fails to evoke
ethical transcendence.74
Rather, the metaphysical structure of the infinite, beyond being, is performed in
relation to another person. Levinas explores the way that I am bound in a responsibility
without limits. For him, to be human with the other is not some secondary option, but to
be human is to be with one who is other, as we speak of creation of human being in
69 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p.251
70 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 200.
71 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 86.
72 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 79.
73 Emmanuel Levinas, "God and Philosophy," p. 154.
74 Emmanuel Levinas, "God and Philosophy," pp. 154-155.
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God's image: male and female God created them (Gen. 1:27), being created with
another, who is identified from the beginning as other: "the relation between the same
and the other, metaphysics, is primordially enacted as conversation, where the same,
gathered up in its ipseity as an "I", as a particular existent unique and autochthonous,
leaves itself."75 Conversation or speech presupposes a world of objects which it
articulates, and the other to whom it is addressed. Here, the other is not simply that of
an alter ego, and not to be conceived, comprehended by varying the attributes 'I' grasp
in myself. It does not consist in a simply spatial or temporal remoteness from 'me,' nor
is it reducible to the privation of some content of cognition which de facto eludes me.
Rather the other is positive and a force, in the experience of being addressed, appealed
to, and contested. Therefore, speech or conversation has not only an indicative function
but also an imperative and vocative force constituted by the infinite. When faced with
the other, the other is not just to be recognised, but answered, by a speaking that is
responsive. In other words, to face another is to answer to him. To recognise the
alterity of the other is not to grasp, to conceive, but to answer his solicitation and to
answer for my being; it is to give - not a spontaneous giving of meaning (,Sinngebung),
but a giving ofwhat is meaningful for him.76
75 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p.39.
76
Alphonse Lingis, "Translator's Introduction,' in Emmanuel Levinas Collected Philosophical Papers
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), pp.xii-xiv.
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Therefore, this new thinking arises from "the idea of the overflowing of
objectifying thought by a forgotten experience from which it lives."77 Levinas states this
rethinking in Totality and Infinity.
The traditional opposition between theory and practice will
disappear before the metaphysical transcendence by which a relation
with the absolutely other, or truth, is established, and of which ethics
is the royal road. Hitherto the relation between theory and practice
was not conceivable other than as a solidarity or a hierarchy: activity
rests on cognitions that illuminate it; knowledge requires from acts
the mastery ofmatter, minds, and societies - a technique, a morality,
a politics - that procures the peace necessary for its pure exercise.
We shall go further, and, at the risk of appearing to confuse theory
and practice, deal with both as modes of metaphysical
transcendence. The apparent confusion is deliberate and constitutes
one of the theses of this book.78
Levinas uses the term 'ethics' to interrogate and to reorder theory and practice. Ethics,
in this respect, becomes the new place for philosophy, as shown in Levinas's work
"Ethics as First Philosophy."79 Levinas's 'ethics' inserts a forgotten questioning into
this traditional philosophical pursuit of an ethics constituted in knowledge. Robert
Manning says, "Levinas's question is not: How does the solitary subject know the other
person when the two initially confront one another? Instead, Levinas's question is:
What is the significance of the fact that knowing occurs within and is a result of the
77 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p.28.
78 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 29. [my italic]
79 Published for the first time in Justifications de I'ethique (Bruxelles: Editions de l'Universite de
Bruxelles, 1984, pp.41-51) "Ethics as First Philosophy" is a clear and powerful summary of Levinas's
methodical and yet radical move away from Husserl's transcendental idealism and Heidegger's
hermeneutics towards the ethical question ofmeaning of being, presented in the face-to-face relation.
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intersubjective relation? How does this fact affect our conception of knowing? Levinas
has consistently thought out this question and, consequently, devised a novel and radical
80
remterpretation of the process of a human being knowing and what it means to know."
With 'ethics' as a new thinking (or rethinking), Levinas challenges the power
with which philosophical comprehension in the West has drawn all forms of theory and
practice into its thematic gaze. And he asks demanding questions ofwhat he perceives to
be a link between the privileging of synoptic vision and comprehensive reason in the
philosophical tradition and a tyrannous history of violence against the possibility of
genuine transcendence and human solidarity.81 Levinas believes that Western thought
is marked by a spirituality that equates synoptic vision, comprehensive reason, and
knowing subjectivity. This equation has reduced the meaning of interhuman encounter
to a structure of understanding, persons known to each other in the thematising gaze of
consciousness, reduced to categories of comprehension already held within the language
of the one perceiving. This is what he calls a reduction of the Other into the categories of
the Same, as in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence :
The meaningful refers to a cognitive subjectivity and to the
mathematical configuration of logical structures, as the eidetic
(appearances) of the contents refers to the 'spirituality' of the
intention conferring a sense on what manifests itself in the openness,
by gathering up this sense. In conformity with the whole tradition of
80 Robert Manning, Interpreting Otherwise than Heidegger: Emmanuel Levinas's Ethics as First
Philosophy, p. 183.
81
Wesley Damian Avram, Theo-homilia, p.70.
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the West, knowing, in its thirst and its gratification, remains the
norm of the spiritual, and transcendence is excluded both from
intelligibility and from philosophy.82
In speaking against this reduction, Levinas believes that the fundamental human
encounter with another is potentially mediated by something other than intelligibility.
Levinas described this "forgotten experience" as an imperative preceding every
indicative. It is an unconditioned hortatory "do" and "do not" preceding and
conditioning the propositional is and is not ofphilosophy.84
2.3. Idea of Freedom and Ethics
This brings us another important question on moral consciousness and freedom.
In his essay, "Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity," Levinas speaks of the idea of
thematic consciousness that presumes a primordial freedom in human being, and that
philosophy presupposes that freedom itself is of its own right, like Narcissus.85
Freedom is reduced to being the reflection of a universal order which maintains itself
and justifies itself all by itself, like the God of the ontological argument. In fact, it is
evident that in every relation between the same and the other, especially in the Western
82 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans, by Alphonso Lingis (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), p.96.
83 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p.28.
84 Emmanuel Levinas, "God and Philosophy" p. 162, and " Freedom and Command." p. 21.
85 Emmanuel Levinas, "Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity," pp.58-59.
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philosophical tradition, when it is no longer an affirmation of the supremacy of the
o/r
same, it reduces itself to an impersonal relation within a universal order.
In Levinas, "the sober coldness of Cain consists in conceiving responsibility as
proceeding from freedom or in terms of contract. But responsibility for another comes
87
from what is prior to my freedom." Therefore, he says:
Freedom is put into question by the other, and is revealed to be
unjustified, only when it knows itself to be unjust. Its knowing itself
to be unjust is something added on to spontaneous and free
consciousness, which would be present to itself and know itself to
be, in addition, guilty. A new situation is created; consciousness'
presence to itself acquires a different modality; its position collapses.
88
In other words, within intersubjective relation, this freedom is not equivalent to license;
it is the human potential continually to reinterpret and represent the world within given
limitations. The idea of moral consciousness presumes a responsibility preceding
freedom. It puts freedom into question.
This moral consciousness is an absolute obligation, a sheer response-ability.
Therefore, Levinas's description of moral consciousness explains the imperative nature
of the "ethics" he posits outside of ontology, and this questioning to my free
86 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, pp.87-88.
87 Emmanuel Levinas, "God and Philosophy," p. 167.
88 Emmanuel Levinas, "Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity," pp. 50-51.
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consciousness, is to discover ourselves in injustice - this is what Levinas calls the
"exposedness of my freedom to the judgement of the other"89 It is a sense of
responsibility or obligation for the other, that halts our ontological comprehension. But,
it is not simply ontological freedom to be responsible, but it is the meontological
responsiveness of freedom, the absolute obligation to the Other that precedes every so-
called free act.90
[The neighbour] orders me before being recognised... It is not
because the neighbour would be recognised as belonging to the same
genus as me that he concerns me. He is precisely other. The
community with him begins in my obligation to him. The neighbour
is a brother. A fraternity that cannot be abrogated, an unimpeachable
assignation, proximity is an impossibility to move away without the
torsion of a complex, without 'alienation' or fault.91
Levinas insists that the moral consciousness inspired by the proximity of the neighbour
is a consciousness that stretches toward all others, even to the point of accepting the
burden of their responsibilities for their neighbours. This responsibility for the
neighbour "is precisely what goes beyond the legal and obliges beyond contracts; it
9*92
comes to me from what is prior to my freedom, from a non-present, an immemorial."
He quotes Dostoevsky in The Brothers ofKaramozov, to describe this effect of moral
consciousness.
89 Emmanuel Levinas, "Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity,", p.59.
90
Wesley Damian Avram, Theo-homilia, pp. 134-136.
91 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p.87.
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It is I who support all. You know that sentence in Dostoevsky: ' We
are all guilty of all and for all men before all, and I more than the
others.' This is not owing to such or such a guilt which is really
mine, or to otherness that I would have committed; but because I am
responsible for a total responsibility, which answers for all the others
and for all in the others, even for their responsibility. The I always
has one responsibility more than all the others.93
Assuming responsiblity for all may be the liberation from the striving for knowledge of
all, because Levinas believes that an overdetermination and measurement in human
relation is more dangerous than the apparent excessiveness ofmoral consciousness. For
behind the fair measuring of human responsibility is a totalising thematic consciousness
that betrays the otherness of the very others it attempts to bring into appropriate and well
understood relationships.
In this scope of moral consciousness, Levinas claims that the moral life is
essentially passive, and counter-constitutive to the philosophical milieu that presumes
that ethical action is predicated upon an ability adequately to determine one's
responsibilities toward others within a comprehensible world of rights, duties, and
prosperities. This passivity is the very precondition for an "ethical" life.
It does not allow me to constitute myself into an I think, substantial
like a stone, or, like a heart of stone, existing in and for oneself. It
ends up in substitution for another, in the condition - or the
unconditionality - of being a hostage. Such responsibility does not
92 Emmanuel Levinas, "God and Philosophy," p. 167.
93 Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, pp.98-99. Also see Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence,
p.146.
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give one time, a present for recollection or coming back to oneself; it
makes one always late. Before neighbour I am summoned and do
not just appear; from the first I am answering to an assignation.
Already the stony core ofmy substance is dislodged.94
The self as substitution for another is an existing through the other and for the other; it is
an inspiration and the ultimate responsibility of the ethical self, a passivity of the I
before the Other.
This substitution of the self for the other is the event of hearing the command, of
being addressed by a speech outside of being and of signifying that hearing in
response.95 The Biblical 'Here I am' (I Samuel, 3:4) which is offered as a responsibility
for the other prior to commitment does not involve the reduction of subjectivity to
consciousness. Instead it is subjectivity as substitution and action for the other.
Therefore, the responsibility for the other represented by 'Here I am' is other than an
epistemological one.
The psyche, a uniqueness outside of concepts, is a seed of folly,
already a psychosis. It is not an ego, but me under assignation.
There is an assignation to an identity for the response of
responsibility, where one cannot have oneself be replaced without
fault. To the command continually put forth only a 'here I am'(me
94 Emmanuel Levinas, "God and Philosophy," p. 167.
95 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 114. Levinas calls this inspiration the
psyche. The psyche precedes consciousness and coincides with subjectivity as substitution. Moral
consciousness is psyche, is a responsibility in obsession, which, in substitution, becomes an expiation for
the other. It is like a breathing, where passivity and activity coincide without thought (Otherwise than
Being or Beyond ofEssence, pp.115, 87).
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voici) can answer, where the pronoun 'I' is in the accusative,
declined before declension, possessed by the other, sick, identical.96
Unlike representation that establishes the ego as the place of interpreting the past and
future in the present, communicating with others in moral consciousness is signalled by
a meontological substitution of one word for another, of one responsibility that does not
sacrifice the truth of the Other outside of being. The 'Here I am' is the place through
which the Infinite enters without delivering itself up to vision. In the Jewish revelation,
the freedom ofBeing becomes the 'difficult freedom' of the ethical 'Here I am', an open
greeting based on a deferring to a towards-God. Levinas is not afraid to use the term
God to designate this ethical exigency: invisible, infinite, non-thematisable and
irreducible to intentionality. But God is not an absolute rule; rather, He 'comes to the
idea' as the absolute alterity revealed in the sacredness of the face-to-face relation. It is
in this sense, as a revelation depending on an absolute ethical Law, which is never
experienced as a stigma or enslavement, that the meontological subjectivity unfolded in
Levinas' philosophy could be called Judaic, obedience to the Most High by way of the
ethical relationship with the Other.97 Because the individual is not just Dasein, he is also
the site of transcendence, responding to the unfulfillable obligation of the Revelation.
Sacred history, fidelity to the commandments of the Torah, points beyond ontology in
affirming how being-for-itself is conditional on the unconditioned responsibility of
96 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 142. Here, Levinas refers to the Song
of Songs 6:8 " I am sick with love."
97 Emmanuel Levinas, "Revelation in the Jewish tradition," in The Levinas Reader, p.207.
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being-for-the-other.98 In other words, the question of philosophy and God becomes a
matter of inter-human relation, for ethics.
2.4. New Modality
In this new modality of Levinas, moral consciousness "undoes thematisation, and
escapes any principle, origin, will, or ap%r|(arche), which is put forth in every ray of
consciousness. This movement is, in the original sense of the term, an-archial."99 In
Levinas, if the arche is the ontological beginning or overarching principle of meaning in
knowledge, his me-ontological or an-archic relationship develops the interpretive
intentionality of consciousness, opens a gap in the interpreted or defined relation
between people, and presents possibilities of further interpretation. Here, Levinas's
anarchic tendencies are not purely obstructionist, but they are set toward opening closed
systems to the infinite possibility of genuine transcendence. Transformed by the
meontological call of the Other, anarchy becomes a Utopian gesture, textured by a
responsibility. It refuses to be synthesised into a representable relation. It is the wild
and delirious edge of experience accompanying a critique which refuses synthesis.100
98 Emmanuel Levinas, "Prayer without Demand," in The Levinas Reader, p.232. Originally published
Etudesphilosohphiques, 38 (1984), pp. 157-63.
99 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 101.
100 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 191.
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Anarchy is not disorder as opposed to order, as the eclipse of themes
is not, as is said, a return to a diffuse 'field of consciousness' prior to
attention. Disorder is but another order, and what is diffuse is
thematisable. Anarchy troubles being over and beyond these
alternatives. It brings to a halt the ontological play which, precisely
qua play, is consciousness, where being is lost and found again, and
thus illuminated.101
In relation to the descriptions of the meontological significance of anarchy, Levinas
refers to the image of Creation in the Book of Genesis, in God's originating creation of
the world. When God creates the world by speaking, it is as if from nothing. The Word
is from outside of Being. Being is a 'said' in which the echoes of a 'saying' remains.
The Word of Creation, still resounding, is necessarily an-archic - the anarchy that carries
a trace of creativity. In Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, he says that the
traces of the Other leave in thematic consciousness the analogy ofCreation.
It is perhaps here, in this reference to a depth of anarchical passivity,
that the thought that names creation differs from ontological thought.
It is not here a question of justifying the theological context of
ontological thought, for the word creation designates a signification
older than the context woven about this name. In this context, this
said, is already effected the absolute diachrony of creation, refractory
102
to assembling into a present and a representation.
In other words, the Saying (le Dire) would be irreducible to the ontological language of
Said (le Dit), in which all entities are disclosed and comprehended in the light of Being.
Levinas uses the model of the Saying and the Said as the way of explaining how the
101 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p.101.
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ethical signifies within ontological language. The Saying is my exposure to the Other,
my inability to refuse the Other's approach. By contrast, the Said is a statement,
assertion, or proposition, concerning which truth and falsity can be ascertained. The
Saying is performative stating, proposing, or expressive position of myself facing the
Other. It is the sheer radicality of human speaking, of the event of being in relation to an
Other; it is the non-thematisable ethical residue103 of language that escapes
comprehension, interrupts philosophy, and is the very enactment of the ethical
movement of the Same to the Other. 104 While the Said is interpreted as the content of
speech, the Saying is the form of speech and the attitude of the interlocutor to the Other,
and is the giving of myself in giving words to another. Ethics become a part of speech
act theory.
Thus, language is the way to make myself available for the others. The Saying
leads me to a life activity of responsibility. This is the anarchy ofmoral consciousness,
through which it 'leaps' beyond philosophy to meontologically inspired practical action.
This action (work) is a way of describing the creative sensibility of Levinas's anarchic
moral consciousness; it is a leap toward the other than oneself, not absorbing and
neutralising the Other. In contrast philosophy's itinerary is that of Ulysses, whose
adventure in the world was only a return to his native island- a complacency in the
102 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 113.
103 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 18.
104
Here, Levinas is concerned with how is the Saying to be Said, or given a philosophical exposition that
does not utterly betray this Saying? How the ethical Saying is to be thematized and necessary betrayed
(Otherwise than Being., p.6) within the ontological Said.
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Same, an unrecognition of the other.105 This is an action (work) which goes freely from
the Same to the Other; "A work conceived radically is a movement of the Same towards
the Other which never returns to the Same."106 It is a departure without return, and in
fact, "as an orientation toward the other, as sense, a work is possible only in patience,
which, pushed to the limit, means for the agent to renounce being the contemporary of
its outcome, to act without entering into the Promised Land." And, in this radical
reorientation, "to renounce being the contemporary of the triumph of one's work is to
envisage this triumph in a time without me, to aim at this world below without me, to
aim at a time beyond the horizon ofmy time, in an eschatology without hope for oneself,
or in a liberation from my time."107 This radical patience reorients this work toward the
time outside of time by which Levinas breaks the totalising hegemony of consciousness.
Levinas quotes the writing of Leon Blum in Bourassol prison and the Pourtalet
Fort in 1941: "We are working in the present, not for the present. How many times in
meeting with the people have I repeated and commented on Nietzsche's word: Let the
future and the things most remote be the rule of all the present days!" Levinas interprets
the significance of Blum's meontological words.
The force of his confidence is incommensurate with the force of his
philosophy. 1941! - a hole in history - a year in which all the visible
gods had abandoned us, in which god was really dead or gone back
105 Emmanuel Levinas, "Meaning and Sense," pp. 90-91.
106 Emmanuel Levinas, "Meaning and Sense," p.91.
107 Emmanuel Levinas, "Meaning and Sense," p.92. See Deuteronomy 3:23-28; 32:48-52.
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into his non-revealedness. A man in prison continues to believe in a
nonrevealed future and invites men to work in the present for the
most remote things, for which the present is an irreducible
negation... There is a great nobility in the energy liberated from the
hold of the present.108
The anarchic work of moral consciousness is oriented toward a time outside time; and
Levinas calls this radically impatient patience an eschatology. Theologically defined as
the study of the last things, the end of history, eschatology takes on meontological
resonance in Levinas. Eschatology is, for Levinas, the beyond of history, and the
'ending' of the time of representation, a 'liberation' from the time of the ego toward the
time of 'ethics.'109
The other is both fellow man and other. This alterity is not produced as a
subjectivity that is the simple negation of his objectivity. It is present in the face and in
a trace which refers to the passing of an alterity, disturbing my order, appealing and
contesting. Levinas reads Psalm 119, " I am a stranger on the earth, do not hide from me
your commandments, and Leviticus 15:23, "No land will be alienated irrevocably, for
the earth is mine, for you are but strangers, domiciled in my land," in order to reflect the
earth as the site of hospitality. In reading Psalm 191, which calls for commandments,
for Levinas, the difference between the ego and the world is proclaimed by obligations
toward the others. "They echo the Bible's permanent saying: the condition (or the
uncondition) of being strangers and slaves in the land of Egypt brings man close to his
108 Emmanuel Levinas, "Meaning and Sense," p.93.
109 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, pp. 22-25.
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neighbour. In their condition of being strangers men seek one another. No one is at
home. The memory of this servitude assembles humanity. The difference that opens
between the ego and itself, the non-coincidence of the identical, is a fundamental non-
difference with regard to men."110
Levinas's new theological and philosophical calling, originating as it does in
'ethics' rather than comprehension, is found in the metaphor of hearing rather than
seeing. It is a cry of ethical revolt, bearing witness to responsibility for the other. This
calling transforms philosophy and theology into a 'new modality' enacted in what
Levinas calls a work. This suggests an ordinary form of action motivated not by
productivity, technique, or meaning but by an extraordinary, unthinkable, and inspiring
Other. In a way, what is important is the sense of truth rather than meaning, a 'saying'
obeyed and trusted before it is a 'said' reorganised or understood. In this face-to-face
relationship with the neighbour, Levinas shows that to be or not to be is not the ultimate
question; it is but a commentary on the better than being, the infinite demand of the
ethical relation.111 In this non-thematic relation, the movement would be unending; a
new 'relation with everyone' will be required to ensure the certainty of the first truth of
everyone, which presupposes a proximity between me and the interlocutor, not our
participation in a transparent universality.
110 Emmanuel Levinas, "No Identity," p.148-149
111 Sean Hand, "Introduction," The Levinas Reader, ed by Sean Hand (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), pp.7-8.
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The ethical indicates "a reversal of the subjectivity which is open upon beings
and always in some measure represents them to itself, positing them and taking them to
be such into a subjectivity that enters into contact with a singularity, excluding
identification in the ideal, excluding thematisation and representation - an absolute
singularity, as such unpresentable."112 This relation of proximity is the original
language, the foundation of the other one, a language without words or propositions,
pure communication. This is the precise point at which this mutation of the intentional
into the ethical occurs, and occurs continually, at which the approach breaks through
consciousness. This is the human skin and face, in which contact is tenderness and
responsibility.113
Proximity is not an intentionality, but a relationship with a neighbour. In other
words, "to approach is to touch the neighbour, beyond the data apprehended at a
distance in cognition, that is, to approach the other. This turning of the given into a
neighbour and of the representation into a contact, of knowledge into ethics, is the
human face and skin."114 In this face-to-face relation, the idea of communication is like
the idea of the infinite for Levinas, it is not a concept, but a proximity, the proximity of
Same and Other, not an opposition of "this Same" to "that Same."115 Because the Other
112 Emmanuel Levinas, "Language and Proximity," p. 116. Levinas's note: we call ethical a relationship
between terms such as are united neither by a synthesis of the understanding nor by a relationship between
subject or object, and yet where the one weights or concerns or is meaningful to the other, where they are
bound by a plot which knowing can neither exhaust nor unravel.
113 Emmanuel Levinas, "Language and Proximity," p. 119; p. 116.
ll4Emmanuel Levinas, "Language and Proximity," p. 125.
115
Joseph Libertson, Proximity Levinas, Blachot, Bataille and Communication (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1982), pp.203-204.
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is not another Same, it indicates the impossibility of closure, alterity is by definition a
non-reciprocity, but in itself describes a pure containment without terms or correlation.
This is a wilful marginality in the philosophy of proximity, a refusal to share the
epistemological horizons of its culture, in which the most common denominator is the
tendency to thematise the real in terms of limits.
Thus the artificiality of a correlation whose subordination of communication to
totalisation, is essentially violent. In Levinas's phrase, this metaphysics of autonomy
and correlation implies the 'permanent possibility of war.' There can be no 'peace with
reason,' when reason is the image of destruction and exploitation. It is for this reason
that Levinas uses the somewhat confusing term 'non-violent' to describe communication
in proximity. For the 'violence' of totalisation in Levinas is a violence heavily weighted
by its accreditation in Western culture. War, exploitation, and institutionalisation of
poverty, etc., are forms of violence which are and are not perceived as violent by a
culture in which they are 'facts of life,' correlative to and sanctioned by the logic of
limits and the destruction of limits - that is, the logic of constraint and the liberation
from constraint.116 It is interesting to point out that violence is not accidental but is
produced and required by a cultural or general configuration, as indicated in the great
religious and political upheavals ofWestern history. Those events and movements often
result from their unwitting recourse to the very concepts which organise violence: their
need to 'make war,' to 'define' and 'eliminate' an 'ultimate cause' of injustice, to
116
Joseph Libertson, Proximity Levinas, Blachot, Bataille and Communication, p. 209
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'perceive the totality' which produces violence, to sacrifice the egoism of human power
in the name of a 'higher power' or 'higher wisdom'.117
Totalisation is the principle of multiplicity; the Same is the sole context of
articulation of Same and Other, therefore incompletion, and thus communication, are not
possible in such an economy. But proximity exceeds manifestation and totalisation by
virtue of its communicational economy, when consciousness is extricated from its
rooting, and defined as a radical heteronomy or incompletion. Therefore, the principle of
the relation must be incomplete and in proximity, in order that such a moment of
disturbance as the search for truth might arise within it. Here, Levinas derives the notion
of interrogation as a desire which proceeds from an irreducible incompletion.
But the search of truth is an event more fundamental than theory,
although the theoretical search is a privileged mode of this relation to
exteriority that is called truth. Because the separation of the separate
being was not relative, was not a movement of distancing with
regard to the Other, but was produced as psychisme, the relation to
the Other does not consist in reproducing in an opposite sense the
movement of distancing, but in going forward {the Other} through
Desire, from which theory itself borrows the exteriority of its
. 118
term.
The possibility of interrogation is psychisme: a rapport with alterity which is a proximity
and a desire, that is the impossibility which haunts totalisation. It is the idea of the
infinite - which is not an idea, but a communication, as Levinas explains, and thus is not
117
Joseph Libertson, Proximity Levinas, Blachot, Bataille and Communication, pp.208-210.
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deducible from inferiority as identity, but only from inferiority as incompletion and
heteronomy. It is a call to depart from the ethics of the West and all that is foreign to
the 'foreign' proximity of a God, and depart from any theology that emerges from
human familiarity. Levinas sets out his journey, departing from transcendental idealism
where consciousness and subjectivity occupy the dominant place. He discovered that
everything is reduced into this totalitarian system of consciousness, and that alterity is
lost in the sameness of reflexive movement. God has become a working-hypothesis for
the sake of world order. Also lost is God's continual displacement, infinity and
specificity, which replace conscious acts where intent is to find God. But the Other
comes in a specific 'face-to-face' relation of proximity so real that I have no choice but
to respond, even before understanding and being conscious of the other.
As shown in the history of Israel, especially in the time of the exiles, when they
have failed to capture or see God, one knows obliquely the unspeakable Otherness of the
One who does not cease to call because he has promised to be there, utter and apart, but
proximate and life-giving. What is otherwise than being or beyond essence indicates a
meaning beyond our consciousness, as the heritage of a people in exile. Here, both
ontological claims and a tribal faith are interrupted by the Other's break. However, the
Other does not happen as it is said to happen, but as we witness, it is determined beyond
our conscious events, as an exilic faith loses itself and returns to itself as it marks the
118 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p.61.
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other beyond determination. A faith turns through itself and rediscovers itself in the
withdrawal of what it posits, and finds itself articulated in the proximity. Therefore, it
does not destroy identity, but rather in this discourse, re-establishes identity in an
unending movement of removal to rediscovery.
The good is to hear and to respond to the other not as a philosopher or a priest,
but as one who belongs to the other's proximity, and who responds out of passivity to
the other's cry or call in a real world. In this turning, I find myself belonging to my
neighbour, and feel my existence there. Here, ethics is never just a relation between
human beings, it is already marked by the relation with God. This is what Levinas calls
a 'curvature of space' expressing the relation between human beings that signifies the
proximity of God. He suggests that "this metaphor of 'curvature of space' is, perhaps,
the very presence of God."119 In this space of ethical determination, all living thing and
their meanings reveal a syntax far in excess of our grammars and logics, and a 'saying'
obeyed or trusted before it is a 'said' recognised or understood. This surplus of truth
120
over ontological being, signifies the divine intention of all truth.
Levinas understands this as a characteristic of the exodic event, in contrast to the
myth of Odyssey, in which Ulysses, the hero, returns to his native land, Ithaca. In other
words,"philosophy's itinerary remains that of Ulysses, whose adventure in the world
was only a return to his native island - a complacency in the Same, an unrecognition of
119 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p.291.
120 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 291.
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the other."121 But, Abraham leaves his native land once for all, for a still unknown
land.122 It is the Abrahamic journey towards the Other, and is to open the closed
subjectivity to the demands of the Other. It is to leave the place called 'home' to move
beyond boundaries; but home is no longer just one place. Home is a place that enables
and promotes a different and everchanging perspective; it is a place where one discovers
new ways of seeing different reality. It is a breaking of boundaries, or borders of the
solitude of the knower, and engaging with the others in proximity. This is the common
denominator which renders possible a communication with the exterior. It is irreducible
to a situation within the totality.
Levinas's me-ontological ethics redefines the inter-human relationship as
irreducibly social (exposure of) 'fact-to-face' encounters with/to the Others, and
exposes the tyranny of totalisation, of manipulation, of universalisation and of the
impersonal.123 But this society as a "multiple existing [un exister multiple] - a
pluralism," which is distinct from "numerical multiplicity," can be "defenceless against
totalisation,"124as in 'multiculturalism.' Therefore, it is necessary to provide the politics
of difference against such a totalisation. Levinas indicates as above, a universal order
121 Emmanuel Levinas, "Meaning and Sense," p.91.
122 Abraham is an obedient to the Other, and becomes the archetype of faith, as Ulysses becomes the
archetype of philosophy. "To the myth of Ulysses returning to Ithaca, we wish to oppose the story of
Abraham who leaves his fatherland forever for a yet unknown land, and forbids his servant even to bring
back his son to the point of departure." ("Trace of the Other", p. 348) What is implied, here, is that
knowledge or identity is re-constituted or re-established in this un-ending movement, for the sake of
practising an absolute responsibility to the commanding call of the Other.
123 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 242.
124 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 220.
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which reflects and respects human plurality - pluralism, and advocates the face-to-face
relationship as "the face of the Other relates us with the third party, the metaphysical
relation of the I with the Other moves into the form of the We, aspires to a State,
• • • 19S
institutions, laws, which are the source of universality."
The major threat to pluralism arises out of the clash of exclusivist claims made
by particular traditions which insist that only they possess the truth. In order to avoid
this threat, the realisation that there is an expanding religious consciousness that breaks
boundaries of particular traditions and brings forward communication that unites people
should be reached. However, it is not the discourse of universalism by which
domination occurs and is justified, rather it rests on the mutual respect of separate
individuals or groups that encounter each other.
Pluralistic society stands upon relations of true pluralism, that is, upon the
respect and responsibility that the self expresses toward the other, otherwise, as Levinas
warns, every communication that is not based upon responsibility is an effort in
domination.126 What is needed is a shared discourse in terms of ethics, as Levinas
discusses the "march towards universality of a political order" in terms of "confronting
multiple beliefs - a multiplicity of coherent discourse - and finding one coherent
1 97
discourse that embraces them all, which is precisely the universal order." This
125 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 300.
126 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 120.
127 Emmanuel Levinas, Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
press, 1990), p. 94.
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discourse must be one that respects the alterity or otherness of the other, as Levinas
writes "the relationship of language implies transcendence, radical separation, the
1 TO
strangeness of the interlocutors, the revelation of the other to me;" this discourse must
be the discourse of responsibility for others.
Ethics is an optics of the Divine. Henceforth, no relation with God is
direct or immediate. The Divine can be manifested only through my
neighbour.129
The Other is not the incarnation of God, but precisely by his face, in
which he is disincamate, is the manifestation of the height in which
God is revealed.130
Therefore, in a human political society, this ethical proximity becomes a
reference and a meaning of condition in human relation. In other words, it becomes a
desire for the other, the desire that "measures the infinity of the infinite, for it is a
1 "5 1
measure through the very impossibility of measure." This desire is like that of
religion, as Levinas said, "Religion is Desire and not struggle for recognition. It is the
surplus possible in a society of equals, that of glorious humanity, responsibility, and
1 ^9
sacrifice, which are the condition for equality itself."
128 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 73.
129 Emmanuel Levinas, Difficult Freedom, p. 159.
130 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 79.
131 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 62.
132 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 64.
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In this sense, desire is work that is "to act without entering the Promised
133Land." This exodus manifests the meta-physical character of human existence on
earth, as the exodus "does not lead to the heights of heaven nor the depths of a
netherworld," but "leads to others who share the earth with me. For 'we are in the
world.' This world is more than a space to dwell in and more than the general condition
of a common ethos; as universe it embraces all possibilities of exodus and
wandering."134 It is other-directed and neighbour-directed attitude. What is implied
here, is that the me-ontological, ethical and religious relation to the Other is conditioned
or constituted in sociality. Therefore, only in the desire of ethical responsibility for the
Other, can we open ourselves to the mystery of the future that guarantees its difference
from totalisation.
This new modality that begins at the end of philosophy, as a me-ontological
praxis that is the anarchic work of moral consciousness, brings a forgotten question of
ethics into our theologising and reminds the priority of the ethical relationship with
others as the route to God. It is a perpetual 'thinking beyond' that defines a task and
anticipates the future, rather than pure theory of knowledge or theory of reality that is
fixed in the past. This dialogical 'thinking beyond' is a thinking toward, or in response
to, the infinite reality of God.
133 Emmanuel Levinas, "Meaning and Sense," in Collected Philosophical Papers, p. 92.
134 Adrian T. Peperzak, "Transcendence," in Ethics as First Philosophy, ed and intra, by Adriaan T.
Peperzak (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 187.
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As described in this chapter, Levinas's thought displays a radical questioning of
the Western spirituality and moral urgency, as he argues towards a 'new modality,' that
breaks the ontological comprehension and totalising tendency of representation. In an
attempt to re-orient theory and practice, Levinas inserts a forgotten questioning of ethics
into the traditional philosophical pursuit in knowledge, as he insists on the priority of the
ethical for any proper understanding of transcendence. I have suggested that Levinas's
call for a 'new modality' is a call for a transformation of philosophy and theology into a
me-ontological praxis, otherwise, theology cannot think God, except as a philosophy
thinking ethics. Thus, this new modality originated in ethics transforms philosophy and
theology into a work; this ethical route within the inter-relationships with the human
other is the only way to the Absolute Other. Moreover, this new modality and its me-
ontological praxis should be inserted into ordinary discourse and real life situation, as
well as theological discourses.
The significance is not a mere understanding of the Other, but a sense of ethical
responsibility for the Other that comes from the issue of justice, while justice remains
justice only in a society and is linked in a complex manner of relationship, a community
of others. The Other awakens us to new possibilities in theology. What becomes clear is
that, since the history of humankind is a history of conflicts between egologists and their
ideologies, justice does not arise from an ego, from self-development, but from our
moral responsibilities for the Other and our solidarity with the Other. Thus, theology
must involve in liberating the victim and resisting the dominant, and at the same time, it
must avoid the clear danger of a rigid perspectivalism that can easily accommodate
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hegemonic values of militant particularism. In other words, every individual including
the marginalised perspective, must learn to read both with and against one's own
conventions in order to create an urgency for liberation and justice for all.
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Chapter 4. Dialogue with the Other
"In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the
Word was God.... And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us, full of
grace and truth; we have beheld his glory, glory as of the only Son from the
Father." John 1:1 and 14 (RSV).
"Have this mind among yourself, which is yours in Christ Jesus, who,
though he was in the form of God, did not count equality with God a thing to
be grasped, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being bom in
the likeness of men. And being found in human form he humbled himself
and became obedient unto death, even death on a cross." Phil. 2:5-8 (RSV).
1. Dialogism and Bakhtin
After having seen the implications of Emmanuel Levinas's me-ontological
responsibility in the human relation, questioning subjectivity in relation to the Other, this
chapter seeks to develop a discourse on the dialogical process of human sociality, as
developed by Mikhail M. Bakhtin.1 He extends 'new modality' into the practice of
1 Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin was bom on November 16, 1895 in Orel, Russia, and spent his childhood
in the border towns, Vilnius and Odessa, mixed with different cultures and languages -Polish, Lithuanian,
and Russian - since Vilnius was part of the ancient Lithuanian kingdom until the third partition of Poland
in 1795. Vilnius was the intellectual center of East European Jewry, the 'Jerusalem of the North,' and
Odessa was another of East Europe's large Jewish enclaves, and a city of mixed cultures, and different
languages. After a degree in classics and philosophy at the University of Petrograd, he continued to
participate in a study circle devoted to the relationship between philosophy, religion, and politics, and in
1918, the nucleus of an ongoing "Bakhtinian circle" was formed. During his years in Nevel' and Vitebsk,
from 1918-1924, he attempted to rethink the possibility of constructing a wholeness in terms more
complex than those provided by the Marburg School, emphasizing process, the radical un-givenness of
experience with its openness and energy. In 1924, Bakhtin returned to Petrograd, and he was very active
for the next six years participating in religious activity in the underground Russian Orthodox Church, the
"catacomb church," and writing several books. He was arrested in connection with a sweep of
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discourse, and concretises it within human relationship. Bakhtin reinterprets the
fundamental relationship of genre, form, speech, and inter-human relation. He
understands discourse in life and discourse in literary art, as a way towards a dialogical
process (Bakhtin calls this a 'mutual-answerability'). This is called 'dialogism,' as
Michael Holquist puts it: "Dialogism is also implicated in the modern thinking about
2 • * 3
thinking." But dialogism is not a systematic philosophy, and refuses to be systematic.
In dialogism, the traditional definitions of theory and practice become obsolete, as
shown in the previous chapter. Holquist remarks on Bakhtin, in the introduction to Art
and Answerability.
But what is essential for Bakhtin is not only the categories as such
that get paired in author/hero, space/time, self/other, and so forth, but
in addition the architectonics governing relations between them.
What counts is the simultaneity that makes it logical to treat concepts
intellectuals associated with the underground church, and sentenced to exile in Kazakhstan. During the
1930's, he wrote his famous essays on the theory of the novel (Discourse in the novel and the long essay
on the chronotope), and researched a major work on Rabelais, which was submitted as his doctoral
dissertation in 1941, to the Gorky Institute ofWorld Literature in Moscow. After his return from exile in
1936, he was recalled to take up a professorship at the former teachers' college in the town of Saransk,
and he became the chair of the faculty of "Russian and World literature." Through good fortune and his
relative obscurity, he escaped rearrest and retired to a less visible town during the insane xenophobia of
the anti-cosmopolitan camgaigns in 1950s. But there was a dramatic change in the early 1960s, when a
group of young scholars at the Gorky Institute discovered Bakhitn's writings. Since then, a second edition
of the Dostoevsky book appeared, followed by the Rabelais book, and other long-delayed Bakhtin
manuscripts. In 1972, he was permitted to move into Moscow, and there, he had a quiet life, writing new
essays and preparing his earliest texts for republication, until his death, on the morning of March 7, 1975,
at the age of eighty; his funeral followed Orthodox rites. Though his life may have been rather humble, its
significance lies in the intensive labour of writing. From Michael Holquist, Dialogism: Bakhtin and his
World (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 1-13; Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin:
Creation ofa Prosaic (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. xiii-xv; Tzvetan Todorov, Mikhail
Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle, trans, by Wlad Godzich (Manchester: Manachester University Press,
1984), pp. 3-13. Also see Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin (Cambridge, MA.:
Harvard University Press, 1984).
2 Michael Holquist, Dialogism: Bakhtin and his World (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 15.
3 Michael Holquist, Dialogism: Bakhtin and his World, p. 16.
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together. The point is that Bakhtin honours both things and the
relations between them - one cannot be understood without the other.
The resulting simultaneity is not a private either/or, but an inclusive
also/and. In other words, the logic of Bakhtin's simultaneity is -
dialogic.4
In this notion of difference and plurality, "a question that fuels Bakhtin's whole
enterprise, is, What makes difference different?"5 For Bakhtin, differences cannot be
overcome, because separateness is a basic condition of existence, but through the
concept of simultaneity, rather than through a mediating idea or common ground,
differences are reconciled.
In Dialogism, everyone is an active participant in this relation of simultaneity,
and the reality is not just perceived, but always experienced in the relation between two
bodies occupying simultaneous but different space. One has meaning only in relation to
the other. But dialogism is not merely a dualism, it is rather a multiplicity that signifies
itself as a series of distinctions depending on one's position and what is perceived of the
other.6 Bakhtin discovers an interactive space that is not hostile to difference which
resists the unifying visions of philosophical interpretation. He remarks on forms of
responsiveness in culture:
4 Michael Holquist, "Introduction" to Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays by M.M.
Bakhtin, ed by Michael Holquist and Vadim Liapunov (Austin, Tx.: University of Texas Press, 1990), p.
xxiii.
5 Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press,
1984), p. 9.
6 Michael Holquist, Dialogism, pp. 20-13.
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In our enthusiasm for specification we have ignored questions of the
interconnection and interdependence of various areas of culture; we
have frequently forgotten that the boundaries of these areas are not
absolute, that in various epochs they have been drawn in various
ways; and we have not taken into account that the most intense and
productive life of culture takes place on the boundaries of its
individual areas and not in places where these areas have become
enclosed in their own specificity.7
The openness that exists in tension with dialogical interlocutors, indicates the unfinished
nature of the self, and reveals its limit. Therefore, in dialogism, the self (I) is always at
the border both joining and separating the reality that is intertwined and encountered
with others.8 Dialogism is a shared event for us all, like language.
Bakhtin calls this interaction among words, ideas, and points of view in social
language a dialogic inter-orientation. He argued in "Discourse in the Novel," that
language should not be taken "as a system of abstract grammatical categories, but rather
language conceived as ideologically saturated, language as a world view, even as a
concrete opinion, insuring a maximum of mutual understanding in all sphere of
ideological life."9 Language as a system, is an abstraction and the product of
deliberation on language. For the individual speaker, language never exists only as
such a set of norms, but exists in its adaptability to the new situation in which language
7 Mikhail Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, trans, by Vem W. McGee, ed by Caryl Emerson
and Michael Holquist (Austin, TX.: University of Texas Press, 1986), p. 2.
8 Michael Holquist, Dialogism, p. 28-29.
9 Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, ed. by Michael Holquist, trans, by Caryl
Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin, TX.: University of Texas Press, 1981), p. 271
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must take on meaning in a ceaseless flow of becoming.10 Bakhtin says, "What is
important for the speaker about a linguistic form is not that it is a single and always self-
equivalent signal, but that it is an always changeable and adaptable sign."uHence, as for
the speaker, the important point is this concrete utterance he/she is making in a paricular
and concrete context. For Bakhtin, this dialogical inter-orientation is already in the
writing and speaking. What he is trying to do is to locate and dialogise them as words
among words.
Dialogism, therefore, is a form of architectonic, that shapes Bakhtin's practice; it
is an activity of relations. It is like architecture, ordering and manipulating parts into a
•12
whole; and its relation is never static, but always a process in relation to other things.
In a way, it is existence as sharing event with the other, and this means that we are in
dialogue not only with other human beings, but also with the natural and cultural
configurations of the world.13 Bakhtin sees otherness as "the ground of all existence and
of dialogue as the primal structure of any particular existence, representing a constant
exchange between what is already and what is not yet."14 Therefore, for Bakhtin,
10 Mikhail Bakhtin/ Valentin Voloshinov, Marxism and the philosophy of language, trans, by Ladislav
Matejka and I. R. Titunik (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 67
11 Mikhail Bakhtin/ Valentin Voloshinov, Marxism and the philosophy oflanguage, p. 68.
12 Michael Holquist, "Introduction" to Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays by M.M.
Bakhtin, pp. xxiii-xxiv.
13 Michael Holquist, Dialogism, pp. 29-30.
14 Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 65.
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architectonic refers to "the body of techniques by which its sheer flux may be erected
into a meaningful event,"15
This dialogical event, however, is decisive in human relations. In Bakhtin, both
life and aesthetics have the character of an event; in aesthetics, the author is the
individual who performs and tries to finalise what is incomplete, and who assumes "an
answerable position in the event of being,"16and, in life "being presents itself to a living
consciousness as an event, and a living consciousness actively orients itself and lives in
it as in an event."17 For Bakhtin, creativity (aesthetics) is a living, active, on-going
event, and produces not a finished world but a range of possibilities and potentials. He
assumes that life has the character of an ongoing event constituted through our deeds
more than our words; and it is not finished until death. This is why Bakhtin was
interested in artistic creation and the aesthetic sphere, especially literary prose, for
reality and life are interpenetrated within, and created in the concrete unity in the form
of architectonics or of answerability.
In Bakhtin, wholeness is always to be understood as relative. It is in answering
and responding to the other that this self-to-other responsibility is achieved in any given
action. Deed is understood as an answer. Self creates itself in crafting an architectonic
relation between the unique locus of life activity which the individual human organism
15 Michael Holquist, "Introduction" to Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays by MM.
Bakhtin, p. xxxiv.
l6Mikhail Bakhtin, Art andAnswerability: Early Philosophical Essays, p. 190..
17 Mikhail Bakhtin, Art and Answerability, p. 188.
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constitutes and the constantly changing natural and cultural environment which
surrounds it. This is the meaning of Bakhtin's dictum that the self is an act of grace, a
gift of the other.18 In this interaction, which is dialogical, Bakhtin stresses the creativity
of linguistic and literary spheres, generating new meanings, and interests in
interrelations with the other, as he remarks,
I live in a world of other's words. And my entire life is an
orientation in this world, a reaction to others' words (an infinite
diverse reaction).... All of each individual's words are divided into
the categories of his own and others', but the boundaries between
them can change, and a tense dialogic struggle takes place on the
boundaries.19
In this inter-relation, the self is an activity, not being conceived in a static way, but in
real life existence.
Self s existence in real life is like an event of language. In describing this,
Bakhtin outlines his theory of language as the concept of voicing and the relation of
speakers to their listeners. He articulates the relation of author to hero as the 'nonologic'
and 'polyphonic' in "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," diverse ways of speaking
in novels as 'heteroglossia' in "Discourse in the Novel,"; the genres of daily speech and
their relation to the genres of literary discourse in "Speech Genres," and language and
18 Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 68.
19 Mikhail Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 143.
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90
the problems of cultural analysis in "The Problem of the Text." In regarding this inter¬
relation of the self, each discussion is centred around a few concepts such as the nature
of utterance, the asystematicity of language, and the problem of dialogization (doubling
21 .... 22
voicing). For Bakhtin, this is "a departure beyond the boundaries of linguistics."
The unique nature of dialogic relations. The problem of the inner
dialogism. The seams of the boundaries between utterances. The
problem of the double-voiced word. Understanding as dialogue. Here
we are approaching the frontier of the philosophy of language and of
thinking in the human science in general, virgin land.23
Here, for Bakhtin, the basic metaphor of the simultaneous unity of difference is
the event of utterance. He believes the utterance to be the fundamental unit ofmeaning,
as opposed to "the sentence as a unit of language."24 The utterance is a metalinguistic
unit understandable only within actual speech communication. He says, "although
utterances do typically contain words and sentences, those sorts of entities do not
9 S • •
exhaust the utterance's defining feature." In a way, this is an event answering to
another utterance, and going beyond 'recognition' or 'decode' in active understanding.
It is to grasp what is being said, and relate it to the listener's own complex of interests
20
Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation ofa Prosaic, p. 124.
21
Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation ofa Prosaic, p. 124.
22 Mikhail Bakhtin, "The Probem of the Text," Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 119.
23 Mikhail Bakhtin, "The Probem of the Text," Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 119
24 Mikhail Bakhtin, "The Problem of Speech Genres," Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 73.
25
Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaic (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1990), p. 125.
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and assumption, and moreover to prepare a response to that utterance. And, this event of
answering (answerability) will be continued by the changing of listener, as "its
beginning is preceded by the utterance of others, and its end is followed by the
responsive utterance of others."26 In living dialogue, the speaking subject is responding
to the answer which is again a response to the previous utterance. In other words, the
speaker's utterance is a result of the previous utterance, and is always an answer.
Therefore, utterance in dialogism is not a completely free act of choice, but works within
the inter-relation between a particular speaker and the pre-existing generalising system.
Another aspect of utterance is the relation between what is said and what is
unsaid in actual utterance: how a thing is said on what is said. Holquist indicates that, in
Bakhtin, it is intonation that stitches the repeatable or just linguistic stuff to the
unrepeatable social situation, and that pumps energy from a life situation into verbal
discourse.27 This dimension of utterance renders value, something new beyond the
epistemological and psychological relationship. It is the "axiological weight of the I
98
and the other," conditioning the relation; in other words, it is not abstract ideal, but
ethical orientation in the world of daily experience, for ethics emerges only from the
encounter of T with the others in the concrete physical setting.
26 Mikhail Bakhtin, "The Problem of Speech Genres," Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p.71.
27 Michael Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 207.
28 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," in Art andAnswerability, p. 114.
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What is important is not the end result of action, but "the ethical deed in its
making, as an act in the process of creating or authoring an event that can be called a
9Q
deed, whether the deed be a physical action, a thought, an utterance, or a written text."
In its singularity of the act, and its singular relationship, intonation signifies the
singularity of the dialogic situation. Therefore, "no utterance can be put together
30without value judgement. Every utterance is above all an evaluative orientation." A
common illustration can be found in a telephone conversation between persons whose
identity is unknown to us; when we hear one speaker's intonation or speech patterns,
we can guess the person's relation to the other speaker (i.e. through a stitching together
of the said and the unsaid) in the context of the situation. Intonation is the simultaneity
of interrelation between the said and the unsaid: it "pumps energy from a life situation
into verbal discourse - it endows everything linguistically stable with living historical
momentum and uniqueness."31 Voloshinov/Bakhtin observes, "in living speech,
intonation often does have a meaning quite independent of the semantic composition of
speech. Intonational material pent up inside us often does find outlet in linguistic
. . . 39constructions completely inappropriate to the particular kind of intonation involved."
It reflects a situation outside language, and brings it to an evaluative conclusion, in this
active and productive nature of utterance.
29 Michael Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 63.
30
Voloshinov/Bakhtin, Marxism and the Philosophy ofLanguage, p. 105.
31
Voloshinov/Bakhtin, Freudianism: A Marxist Critique, trans. I.R. Titunkit (New York: Academic Press,
1976), p. 106.
32 Voloshinov/Bakhtin, Marxism and the Philosophy ofLanguage, p. 104.
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In all real events, such in word, speech, or literary genre, socially constructed in
their complexity, the significance of utterance is the fact that it is shared, no one owns
it. This is different from the classical attempt to fix meanings and neutralise semantic
flux between the signified and the signifier. Bakhtin says,
the word is interindividual. Everything that is said, expressed, is
located outside the 'soul' of the speaker and does not belong only to
him. The word cannot be assigned to a single speaker. The author
(speaker) has his own inalienable right to the word, but the listener
also has his rights, and those whose voices are heard in the word
before the author comes upon it also have their rights (after all, there
are no words that belong to no one). The word is a drama in which
three characters participate (it is not a duet, but a trio). It is
performed outside the author, and it cannot be introjected into the
author.33
As such, for Bakhtin, "dialogue is the internal dialogism of the word," because
"The word is born in a dialogue as a living rejoiner within it; the word is shaped in
dialogic interaction with an alien word that is already in the object. A word forms a
concept of its own object in a dialogical way."34 Bakhtin indicates two tendencies in
this interaction, as the centripetal and centrifugal force within social life and language
activity: "a contradiction-ridden, tension-filled unity of two embattled tendencies in the
life of language." The centripetal tendency seeks to impose order, centralisation and
33 Mikhail Bakhtin, "The Problem of the Text," Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, pp. 121-122.
34 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Discourse in the Novel," The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, p. 279.
35 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Discourse in the Novel," The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, p. 272.
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stability on an heterogeneous world and its complex reality, while the centrifugal seeks
to disrupt and decentralise that order into fragmentation and instability.
What Bakhtin tries to reveal, is the fact that in a common unitary language, there
is always a tendency to overcome different voices in language, and create an officially
recognised literary language, which is stable and firm. In fact, in this process, language
is ideologically saturated and politicised, in the name of maximising the mutual
understanding of discourse. "Thus a unitary language gives expression to forces working
toward concrete verbal and ideological unification and centralisation, which develop in
36
vital connection with the processes of socio-political and cultural centralization." In
Western linguistic thought, this centripetal force was considered a scientific activity.
But, in contrast to the idea of language as a system of abstract norms, language is never
a unitary system of norms that is complete, but a task, a project that requires work in an
on-going and never finishing process.
The problem now arises of the relation of particular languages to each other. For
Bakhtin, difference itself is to be dialogised in various ways. It is to see one language
through the eyes of another language.37 When this happens, the value system and
worldviews in these languages come to interact, in the heterogeneity of intersubjective
space; this dialogism prompts a radical shift, conversion of one to another, as they enter
into dialogue. In this complex interaction (dialogizing) of languages, the words become
36 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Discourse in the Novel," The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, p. 271.
37 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Discourse in the Novel," The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, p. 296.
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dialogized, disputed, and reaccented in another way, as they encounter another utterance.
What is significant is that in this dialogized or relativized situation, the various
languages of heteroglossia lose their status as the unique and unquestioned way of
speaking about a given life situation. For Bakhtin, this change is beyond
systematisation, but messy, produced by the unforeseeable events of everyday activity in
which people engage in their daily lives, where the centripetal and centrifugal forces
meaningfully interact together.
2. The Problem ofMonologism and Ideology
Traditionally European linguistics has been preoccupied with the analysis of
written texts, which are taken to be the finished and monologic utterance, as a self-
TO
contained system. Linguistics treated a "living language as if it were a dead language"
such as ancient Greek. Voloshinov/Bakhtin in Marxism and Philosophy ofLanguage,
sees language as ideology, and shifts its understanding from epistemological
preoccupation towards a concern with semiotic and linguistic processes.
38 Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 223.
39 Michael Gardiner, The Dialogics of Critique: M.M. Bakhtin and the Theory of Ideology (London:
Roudedge, 1992), p. 9.
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Voloshinov/Bakhtin rejects the suggestion that language can be understood as an
objective and abstract system, but perceives it as a dynamic process of becoming in real
historical time and space. At the same time, he rejects the subjectivism which insists on
the primacy of the creative subject. While subjectivism is correct in seeing the
individual utterance as a crucial aspect of language it mistakenly locates the meaning of
the word in the individual psyche rather than in society.40 Therefore, both objectivism
and subjectivism are monologic in nature. Bakhtin characterises the concept of
monologism:
Monologism, at its extreme, denies the existence outside itself of
another consciousness with equal rights and equal responsibilities,
another / with equal rights {thou). With a monologic approach ( in
its extreme or pure form) another person remains wholly and merely
an object of consciousness, and not another consciousness. No
response is expected from it that could change everything in the
world ofmy consciousness. Monologue is finalized and deaf to the
other's response, does not expect it and does not acknowledge in it
any decisive force. Monologue manages without the other, and
therefore to some degree materializes all reality. Monologue
pretends to be the ultimate word. It closes down the represented
world and represented persons.41
Monologism denies the equal rights of consciousness,42and does not recognise the
other's thoughts or ideas, but functions as "a mouthpiece for the transmission of the
author's own ideological viewpoint." 43
40 Michael Gardiner, The Dialogics of Critique: M.M. Bakhtin and the Theory of Ideology (London:
Routledge, 1992), pp. 11-12.
41 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, pp. 292-293.
42 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 285.
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It is the ideology that monologises the author's consciousness over other
consciousnesses, and locks other consciousnesses into a unified whole. This idealogic
monologism was exercised by the unified and exclusive reason of European rationalism
and Enlightenment thought. Bakhtin said:
Ideological monologism found its clearest and theoretically most
precise expression in idealistic philosophy. The monistic principle,
that is, the affirmation of the unity of existence, is, in idealism,
transformed into the unity of consciousness The unity of
consciousness, replacing the unity of existence, is inevitably
transformed into the unity of a single consciousness; when this
occurs it makes absolutely no difference what metaphysical form the
unity takes: "consciousness in general ("Bewusstsein uberhaupt"),
"the absolute 7," "the absolute spirit," " the normative
consciousness," and so forth.44
From the perspective of "consciousness in general," the plurality is accidental, and
everything in it that is essential, must be a part of this "consciousness in general." In
other words, there is no individual consciousness. This monologic idealism of single
and unified consciousness is inevitably related to the idea of truth that is single and
unified. Consequently, a genuine interaction and dialogue between consciousnesses are
impossible on this monologic principle, as Bakhtin points out, "Everything capable of
meaning can be gathered together in one consciousness and subordinated to a unified
43 Michael Gardiner, The Dialogics ofCritique: M.M. Bakhtin and the Theory ofIdeology, p. 27.
44 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, pp. 80-81.
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accent; whatever does not submit to such a reduction is accidental and unessential."45
Bakhtin argues that modern thought has been dominated by a monologic conception of
truth, not only reflected in philosophy but also in literature. In fact, this monologism has
permeated into all aspects of life and its ideology was accompanied by the European
rationalism of unified and exclusive reason, in developing a single Utopian
consciousness and unity.
Bakhtin's analysis of the monologic conception of truth reveals that it comprises
two elements: "the separate thought", and "the system of thoughts."46 In this monologic
thought (ideology), "there exist separate thoughts, assertions, propositions that can by
themselves be true or untrue, depending on their relationship to the subject and
independent of the carrier to whom they belong."47 These elements are "'no-man's'
thoughts," for these are "faithful to the referential world" and "are united in a systematic
unity of a referential order."48 What this means is that it really does not matter who
enunciates these thoughts; the contents of these thoughts are detached and not affected
by their source. Once enunciation takes place, the truthfulness of the thought is entirely
separable from the person who utters it. As a result, the proposition is repeatable as a
scientific experiment that can be repeated by others. Then, these separate thoughts
"gravitate" toward a system, as "the system is put together out of separate thoughts, as
45 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, pp. 81-82; 82.
46 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 93.
47 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 93.
48 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 93.
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out of elements."49 In this monologic thought, the goal is systematic unity, at least in
principle. Thus, a good example of monologic thought is the great hero(s) who
synthesises and shapes separate thoughts, insights and proposition into a coherent
system.
In a monologic work, the author assumes the power to express a truth directly, as
the 'ultimate semantic authority,' and the author's ideology functions as the limits of
what can be known.50 Therefore, the truth belongs to his work, and all other truths are
merely 'represented' in it. In the case of the novel, each character's truth is measured
against the author's ideology, because authorial ideology dominates the novel and
creates its unity. This monologic author considers 'other truths' as partial, and does not
engage in dialogue with them, because the author's truth does not lie in the same plane
as the truths of his characters. The author assumes "full control over the work and never
surrenders the right to mediate between characters and readers. If that control is lost, the
work becomes flawed."51 The hero is merely the carrier of an independently valid idea,
59
that gravitates toward the systematically monologic worldview of the author himself.
Bakhtin sees language and ideology as being determined and determining of
human consciousness, hence, monologism (as well as dialogism) is not only a literary
49 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 93.
50
Nancy Glazener, Bakhtin and Cultural Theory, eds. by Ken Hirschkop & David Shepherd (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1989), p. 124.
51
Gary Saul Morson & Caryl Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation ofa Prosaic, p.238.
52 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 79.
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tendency, but an ideological tendency in thought and language. He says, "These basic
[monologic] principles go far beyond the boundaries of artistic creativity alone; they are
• • • 5T
the principles behind the entire ideological culture of recent times." As a consequence,
monologism is a form of violence and manipulation against human consciousness
which, according to Bakhtin, is not a unified whole, but always exists in a tensile,
conflict-ridden relationship with other consciousnesses, in a constant alterity between
self and other.
Monologism is the basic ideological system and practice of modem society, in
which social languages and ideological systems correspond with antagonistic social
lines, including class, race, gender, etc. It legitimates a particular ideological point, and
claims a privileged knowledge - the official discourse and institutionalised genre.
The ruling class strives to lend the ideological sign a supraclass,
external character, to extinguish or exhaust the struggle of class
relations that obtains within, to make it the expression of only one,
solid and immutable view. Any living abuse may become praise,
any living truth is bound to sound to many like the greatest lie. The
internal dialectic character of the sign unfolds finally only in an
epoch of social crisis and revolutionary displacement. In the normal
conditions of social life that contradiction with which every
ideological sign is invested cannot completely unfold because the
ideological sign in the prevalent ruling ideology is always somewhat
reactionary and, as it were, attempts to arrest, to render immobile the
preceding moment in the dialectical flow of social coming-to-be, to
mark and fix yesterday's truth as today's truth.54
53 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 80.
54 V.N. Voloshinov/ M.M. Bakhtin, "Literary Stylistics," Bakhtin School Papers, ed. by Ann Shukman,
Russian Poetics in Translation 1983 No. 10, p. 147.
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Monologism as ideology charged with authoritative word refuses any dialogical contact;
it always assumes itself to be the 'last word,' one that cannot be responded to, and
challenged. It is the word that "retards and freezes thoughts" and "demands reverent
repetition and not further development, correction and additions." And, it is the word
that is "removed from dialogue" and is only to "be cited,"; and this "has spread
everywhere, limiting, directing and retarding both thought and live experience of life."55
3. Heteroglossia and Novelness
For Bakhtin, monologism is nothing less than the ideological expression of
forces which strive to control and to unify the social world. Monologism also
conceptualises the literary text as a closed system, that is as a self-sufficient authorial
monologue, the literary counterpart of the theoretical or ideological conception of
language as stable and monolithic. Official language takes its cue from an elite, which
defines itself over against what it identifies as the 'low' speech types found in the street.
It attempts to fix or impose an order on the heteroglot languages, and introduce official
canonical language. Nevertheless, tension or conflict between two forces - the unifying
centripetal and the centrifugal tendency - continue.
55 Mikhail Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 133.
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For Bakhtin, the place or space where this interaction between centripetal and
centrifugal forces is most powerfully expressed, is in what we call 'texts.' He considers
dialogism as the fundamental principle of constructing the literary text. Bakhtin calls
this plurality in interaction and interrelation 'heteroglossia (many voices or plurality of
relations).' This is a situation and condition of language, and a way of conceiving the
world, in which heteroglossia pervades all languages from the professional to daily life
use. Heteroglossia operates and pervades the operation of meaning in the literary text,
as in any utterance. Bakhtin sees the literary text as utterances, words that cannot be
divorced from particular subjects in specific situations, and something that depends on
the author and the socio-historical context that produced it.
In this textual space, according to Bakhtin, genre is a specific way of seeing a
given reality, like "an X-ray of a specific world view, a crystallisation of the concepts
particular to a given social stratum in a specific society."56 For him, genres are not fixed
in time, but changing, and genres are forces within the literary history. Therefore,
Bakhtin considers the history of literature as the history of struggle among genres:
They do not see beneath the superficial hustle and bustle of literary
process the major and crucial fates of literature and language, whose
great heroes turn out to be first and foremost genres, and whose
'trends' and 'school' are but second or third-rank protagonists.57
56 Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 275.
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Moreover, he perceives genres in terms of the natural centripetal and centrifugal forces
of discourse. Genres are inter-acted, complicated, and transformed in contact with other
genres. Otherness is included in the discursive context - the centrifugal forces of
otherness within discourse. Therefore, Bakhtin differentiates the novel from any other
genres or literary modes (poetry and epic), because it is plastic and evolving while other
literary genres are accounted fixed and dead. As a result, he applies the notion of genre
to all kinds of communicative practice by which communities of understanding are
established.58
For Bakhtin, poetics tends to suppress the competition and conflictual
interaction of genres. As he remarks: "The great organic poetics of the past - those of
Aristotle, Horace, Boileau - are permeated with a deep sense of the wholeness of
literature and the harmonious interaction of all genres contained within this whole. It is
as if they literally hear this harmony of the genres."59 For the epic, the absolute past is
valorised, the theme is tradition itself, and the emphasis lies on closure and
completeness, while the novel is the genre of historic present, the on-going and
unfinalizable process of every day life connected or interrelated with difference.
As the monologic representation of a single and authoritative voice, "the world
of the epic is the national heroic past: it is a world of 'beginning' and 'peak times' in the
57 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Epic and Novel," The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, pp. 7-8.
58 Mikhail Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 81.
59 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Epic and Novel," The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, p. 5.
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national history, a world of fathers and of founders of families, a world of 'firsts' and
'bests.'"60 And the epic has come down to us as an absolutely completed and finished
genetic form, in which the past is an absolute, not just a merely transitory past.61 In the
world of the epic, everything is good, and this 'good' is good for later generations as
well. In its monochrome and valorised character, it lacks any relativity, so the epic
depicts a completed, perfected world as legend, the sacred and incontrovertible.
According to Bakhtin, the epic is
as closed as a circle; inside it everything is finished, already over.
There is no place in the epic world for any openendedness,
indecision, indeterminacy. There are no loopholes in it through
which we glimpse the future; it suffices unto itself, neither supposing
any continuation nor requiring it.62
But, the novel is inherently dialogic, an unfmalized and imperfect world. The
novel is distinctive in character, as Holquist points out, it opens a window in discourse
from which the extraordinary variety of languages can be perceived; it is able to create a
work space in which that variety is not only displayed but in which it can become an
active force in shaping cultural history.63 Bakhtin singles out the novel as his "personal
hero," and "a special kind of force" which he calls "novelness," that reveals the limits of
a given system as inadequate, imposed, and arbitrary,64 and manifests the self-discovery
60 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Epic and Novel," The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, p. 13.
61 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Epic and Novel," The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, p. 19.
62 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Epic and Novel," The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, p. 16.
63 Michael Holquist, Dialogism, p. 72.
64 Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 276.
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of the other. Novelness is a correlation of the dialogized heteroglossia, and as a form of
knowledge or, of authoring, it puts alternative orders of experience into dialogue with
each other, in potential double-voicing in a single utterance. According to Bakhtin,
The novel can be defined as a diversity of social speech types
(sometimes even diversity of languages) and a diversity of individual
voices, artistically organised. The internal stratification of any single
national language into social dialects, characteristic group behaviour,
professional jargons, genetic language, language of generations and
age groups, tendentious languages, languages of the authorities, of
various circles and of passing fashions, languages that serve the
specific socio-political purposes of the day, even of the hour (each
day has its own slogan, its own vocabulary, its own emphasis) - this
internal stratification present in every language at any given moment
of its historical existence is the indispensable prerequisite for the
novel as a genre. The novel orchestrates all its themes, the totality
of the world of objects and ideas depicted and expressed in it, by
means of the social diversity of speech types and by the differing
individual voices that flourish under such conditions. Authorial
speech, the speeches of narrators, inserted genres, the speech of
characters are merely those fundamental compositional unities with
whose help heteroglossia can enter the novel; each of them permits a
multiplicity of social voices and a wide variety of their links and
interrelations (always more or less dialogued).65
It is an articulation of different voices, the heteroglossia. It resists the centripetal forces
of an official literary language, but represents an integral form of life and different
perspectives.
65 Mikhail Bakhtin, "The Discourse in the Novel," The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, pp. 262-263.
224
Chapter 4, Dialogue with the Other
The novel can be considered as an ideology which shapes a form that develops a
special view of language in their interaction and combinations. But, Bakhtin sees the
novel as "the expression of a Galilean perception of language, one that denies the
absolutism of a single unitary language - that is, it refuses to acknowledge its own
language as the sole verbal and semantic center of the ideology."66 He understands all
languages are related, but not in terms of an absolute relativism, which makes
competition among languages useless and pointless. He means that no language can
have an absolute privilege, because each language is to be interrelated and questioned
with respect to others, continuously; each language encounters the other, as it is
encountered by the other. The Other is required in this process, as "an image of a
language may be structured only from the point of view of another language, which is
[temporarily] taken as a norm."67 The novel 'dialogues' languages as intensely as
possible, by creating images of one language from the stand point of others. Therefore,
in Bakhtin, both heteroglossia and intense dialogisation are necessary for language to be
novelistic. "What is realised in the novel is the process of coming to know one's own
language as it is perceived in someone else's language, coming to know one's own
conceptual horizon in someone else's horizon."68
From this perspective, Bakhtin considers or places Dostoevsky's novel as a
double-voiced discourse. As he remarks,
66 Mikhail Bakhtin, "The Discourse in the Novel," The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, p. 366.
67 Mikhail Bakhtin, "The Discourse in the Novel," The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, p. 359.
68 Mikhail Bakhtin, "The Discourse in the Novel," The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, p. 365.
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We consider Dostoevsky one of the greatest innovations in the realm
of artistic form. He created, in our opinion, a completely new type
of artistic thinking, which we have provisionally called polyphonic.
This type of artistic thinking found its expression in Dostoevsky's
novels, but its significance extends far beyond the limits of the novel
alone and touches upon several basic principles of European
aesthetics. It could be said that Dostoevsky created something like a
new artistic model of the world, one in which many basic aspects of
old artistic form were subjected to a radical restructuring.69
In the polyphonic novel, of Dostoevsky, the multiple voices and characters are not
subsumed to the authorial world view, but independent and "equally valid" "alongside
70
the author's world." Moreover, different consciousnesses are engaged in a dialogue,
in which characters are "not only objects of authorial discourse but also their own
directly signifying discourse."71 In a conventional sense, the most significant turn is a
"radical change in the author's position,"72 since the polyphonic work demands the
author to cease exercising monologic control. It resists the traditional expectation of
unity, as he writes, "The unified, dialectically evolving spirit, understood in Hegelian
77 • •
terms, can give rise to nothing but a philosophical monologue." Rather he insisted that
"the fundamental category in Dostoevsky's mode of artistic visualisation was not
69 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, ed. and trans, by Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis:
University ofMinnesota Press, 19840, p. 3.
70 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 7. "A plurality of independent and unmerged
voices and consciousness, a genuine polyphony offully valid voices is in fact the chief characteristic of
Dostoevsky's novels a plurality of consciousness, with equal rights and each with its own world,
combine but are not merged in the unity of the event." Ibid., p. 6.
71 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 7.
72 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 67.
73 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 26.
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evolution, but coexistence and interaction. He saw and conceived his world primarily in
terms of space, not time."74 As Bakhtin perceives the world as essentially a collectivity
of subjects who are themselves social in essence, not individuals, so he also perceives
human language as permeated with many voices - a social, not a private event. Humans,
according to Bakhtin, are situated and conditioned in the world, where individuality is
never private or autonomous, but achieved in multi-voicedness and multi-centeredness.
In this polyphonic novel (of the irreducible multi-centeredness and voicedness of
human life), the consciousness of the creator is "constantly and everywhere present in
the novel, and is active in it to the highest degree. But the function of this consciousness
and the forms of its activity are different than in the monologic novel: the author's
consciousness does not transform others' consciousness (that is, the consciousness of the
n c
characters) into objects, and does not give them secondhand and finalising definitions."
Bakhtin subordinates the voice of author to the interactions of consciousness, as he
remarks on his hero, Dostoevsky:
Dostoevsky, like Goethe's Prometheus, creates not voiceless slaves
(as does Zeus), but free people, capable of standing alongside their
creator, capable of not agreeing with him and even of rebelling
against him. A plurality of independent and unmerged voices and
consciousnesses, a genuine polyphony of full valid voices is in fact
the chief characteristic of Dostoevsky's novels. What unfolds in his
works is not a multitude of characters and fates in a single objective
world, illuminated by a single authorial consciousness; rather a
74 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 28.
75 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, pp. 67-68.
227
Chapter 4, Dialogue with the Other
plurality of consciousness, with equal right and each with its own
world, combines but are not merged in the unity of event.
Dostoevsky's major heroes are, by the very nature of his creative
design, not only objects of authorial discourse but also subjects of
their own directly signifying discourse. In no way, then can a
character's discourse be exhausted by the usual functions of
characterization and plot development, nor does it serve as a vehicle
for the author's own ideological position (as with Byron, for
instance). The consciousness of a character is given as someone
else's consciousness, another consciousness, yet at the same time it
is not turned into an object, is not closed, does not become a single
object of the author's consciousness.76
Thus, in dialogic-polyphonic interrelation, the new position of the author is, in
Dostoevsky's polyphonic novel, " a fully realized and thoroughly consistent dialogic
position, one that affirms the independence, internal freedom, unfinalizability, and
indeterminacy of the hero.... As this dialogue - 'the great dialogue' of the novel as a
whole - takes place not in the past, but right now, that is in the real present of the
creative process."77 Its idea is inter-subjective and inter-individual, in relation to the
other living voice or consciousness; its relation is the 'in-between the voices,' that goes
beyond themselves, as "the word in living conversation is directly, blatantly, oriented
toward a future answer-word: it provokes an answer, anticipates it and structures itself in
■JO
the answer's direction." Bakhtin's hero is characterised by 'unfinalizability'; he is a
subject of becoming, not of being. The hero is engaging with the alien consciousnesses,
76 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, pp. 6-7.
77 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 63.
78 Mikhail Bakhtin, "The Discourse in the Novel," The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, p. 280.
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and becoming 'himself through a dynamic encounter with other's discourse - that we
call the process of dialogue. The process becomes very important in developing and
redirecting our consciousness, as Bakhtin says,
The importance of struggling with another's discourse, its influence
in the history of an individual's coming to ideological consciousness,
is enormous. One's own discourse and one's own voice, although
bom of another or dynamically stimulated by another, will sooner or
later begin to liberate themselves from the authority of the other's
discourse. This process is made more complex by the fact that a
variety of alien voices enter into the struggle for influence within an
individual's consciousness (just as they struggle with one another in
surrounding social reality). A conversation with an internally
persuasive word that one has begun to resist may continue, but it
takes on another character: it is questioned, it is put in a new
situation in order to expose its weak sides, to get a feel for its
boundaries, to experience it physically as an object.79
In the conflation of two voices in one utterance, languages are hybridised when
the languages are viewed from each other's perspectives in a discourse. This is what he
calls "hybridisation," which is "a mixture of two social languages within the limits of a
single utterance, an encounter, within the arena of an utterance, between two different
linguistic consciousnesses, separated from one another by an epoch, by social
RO
differentiation or by some other factor." For Bakhtin, the concept of 'mode of
production' is determined intersubjectively, and what determines that we know about
79 Mikhail Bakhtin, "The Discourse in the Novel," The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, p. 348.
80 Mikhail Bakhtin, "The Discourse in the Novel," The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, p. 358.
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them at all are intersubjective human relations which are never complete. Therefore,
this internal dialogism is never subject to ultimate resolution or closure, but permits
languages to be used in ways that are indirect, conditional, distanced.
They all signify a relativizing of linguistic consciousness in the
perception of language borders -borders created by history and
society, and even the most fundamental borders (i.e., those between
languages as such) - and permit expression of a feeling for the
materiality of language that defines such a relativized
consciousness.81
Here, Bakhtin uses the idea of hybridisation to unmask the voice of the other within the
same utterance, through a language that is double-accented or double-voiced, because,
What we are calling a hybrid construction is an utterance that
belongs, by its grammatical (syntactic) and compositional markers,
to a single speaker, but that actually contains mixed within it two
utterances, two speech manners, two styles, two "languages," two
semantic and axiological belief system.82
Bakhtin uses the idea of multiplicity and openness to subvert the forces of stability and
closure. He rejects essentialism, because "the conscious subject is itself dialogically
constructed, and can therefore only exist through its materialisation in social or
0"2
#
mtersubjective signs." This means that utterance is already related to an immediate
81 Mikhail Bakhtin, "The Discourse in the Novel," The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, pp. 323-324.
82 Mikhail Bakhtin, "The Discourse in the Novel," The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, pp. 304-305.
83 Michael Gardiner, The Dialogics of Critique: MM. Bakhtin and the Theory of Ideology, p.87.
"Individual consciousness is not the architect of the ideological superstructure, but only a tenant lodging in
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social situation and wider socio-historical circumstances, so that the basis for actual
choices and decisions is made in the realm of everyday social existence. Bakhtin says
that when we seek to understand a word,
what matters is not the direct meaning the word gives to objects and
emotions - this is the false front of the word; what matters is the
actual and always self-interested use to which this meaning is put
and the way it is expressed by the speaker, a use determined by the
speaker's position and by the concrete situation. Who speaks and
under what conditions he speaks: this is what determines the word's
actual meaning.84
What Bakhtin is trying to emphasise is that every utterance comes into contact
and interacting with alien words, and must be an active participant in social dialogue.
Through interaction, the utterance's potentiality for multiplicity generates new
significances and meanings: "Contextual meaning is potentially infinite, but it can only
be actualised when accompanied by another (other's) meaning."85 Language can
generate new meaning that did not exist previously, through the interactions between
inter-texts or contexts, 'in a continuous chain of speech performances': "There can be no
such thing as an isolated utterance. It always supposes utterances that precede and
follow it. No one utterance can be either the first or the last. Each is only a link in the
or
chain, and none can be studied outside this chain." As this process is potentially
the social edifice of ideological signs." Voloshinov [Bakhtin], Marxism and the Philosophy ofLanguage,
p. 13.
84 Mikhail Bakhtin, "The Discourse in the Novel," The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, p. 401.
85 Mikhail Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 145.
86 Mikhail Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 136.
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infinite, Bakhtin stresses the need of a living and creative hermeneutics: "I live in a
world of other's words. And my entire life is an orientation in this world, a reaction to
others' words (an infinite diverse reaction)."87 What is important is our location within
interrelation or interactional polyphonic discourses in which we become aware of others
and ourselves.
Novelness is rooted in Bakhtin's understanding of reality, the novel is the
characteristic text that signifies the history of consciousness, not because it shows the
88
self-discovery of itself, but because it manifests the self-discovery of the other. For
Bakhtin,
Novelness is a means of charting changes that have come about as a
result of increasing sensitivity to the problem of non-identity.
Greater or lesser degrees of novelness can serve as an index of
greater or lesser awareness of otherness. The history of the novel
has its place in literary history, but the history of novelness is
situated in the history of human consciousness.89
The novel presents the creative memories of otherness (the centrifugal force of
otherness) across discursive contexts, and correlates these voices in dialogue, the
dialogue between characters, through metalinguistic relationships. It is "a diversity of
social speech types (sometimes even a diversity of languages) and a diversity of
87 Mikhail Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 143.
88 Michael Holquist, Dialogism: Mikhail Bakhtin and his World, p.75.
89 Michael Holquist, Dialogism: Mikhail Bakhtin and his World, pp. 72-73.
232
Chapter 4, Dialogue with the Other
individual voices, artistically organized."90 Bakhtin argues that novelness best presents
the undeniable fact of life, for it is multiform in style, speech and voice, and signifies
diversity of social speech types. This means that novelised work is driven by other
possibilities, struggles, and contingencies, and in this course, the past is dialogised,
contested, unresolved and open-ended. The novel is "the zone of maximal contact with
the present (with contemporary reality) in all its openendedness,"91 different voices
inhabit time differently, as in space,92 in a continuing struggle for meaning.
Consequently, novelness as the fact of reality, opposes monoglossia and its privileged
position, its official genre/discourse and its elite culture. As a liberating force, it
ruptures the hierarchical and mythological image of the past.
Novelness is "the expression of a language consciousness that has been
profoundly relativized by heteroglossia and polyphony. It is precisely thanks to the
novel that languages are able to illuminate each other mutually; literary language
qo
becomes a dialogue of languages that both know about and understand each other."
The novel demands a broadening of the language horizon, a sharpening in our
perception of socio-linguistic representations. Bakhtin indicates that the novel reveals
90 Mikhail Bakhtin, "The Discourse in the Novel," The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, p. 262.
91 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Epic and Novel," The Dialogical Imagination: Four Essays, p. 11.
92 Bakhtin's important concept of chronotope meaning "time space," is intrinsically related with "the
connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature." "What
counts for us is the fact that it expresses the inseparability of space and time." "In the literary artistic
chronotope, spatial and temporal indicators are fused into one carefully through-out, concrete whole.
Time, as it were, thickens on flesh, becomes artistically visible; likewise, space becomes charged and
responsive to the movement of time, plot and history. This intersection of axes and fusion of indicators
characterizes the artistic chronotope." Bakhtin "Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel" in Dialogic
Imagination, p. 84.
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the limits of the literary system as inadequate and opposes canonisation. As Clark and
Holquist point out, Bakhtin views the novel as "a kind of epistemological outlaw, a
Robin Hood of texts. Because the fundamental features of any culture are inscribed in
its texts, not only in its literary texts but in its legal and religious ones as well,
'novelness' can work to undermine the official or high culture of any society." 4
Therefore, the novel as a developing genre, characterises the idea of becoming or
unfmalizability, and celebrates the interrelation of genres and voices, displaying
otherness. As opposed to the official or high culture, this idea of novel (ness) has even
greater implications in real life, for the novel is a book about life, associating in the
living elements of unofficial language and thought, that go beyond the boundary of
tradition.
4. The Idea ofCarnival: Bakhtin and Rabelais' World.
Bakhtin sees the novel as being dialogised in the heteroglossia which bears many
voices, in the concrete and historical reality of time and space. He claims that, just as
the novel plays this role in literature, the carnival does the same in the real life of
cultures: carnival is "one of the most complex and most interesting problems in the
93 Mikhail Bakhtin, "The Discourse in the Novel," The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, p. 400.
94 Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, pp. 276-277.
234
Chapter 4, Dialogue with the Other
history of culture."95 Bakhtin in Rabelais and His World, focuses on the cultural
dynamics in a particular historic moment as reflected in the novels of Fran?ois Rabelais,
and uses Rabelais as a kind of sounding board, to relate Bakhtin himself to Rabelais in
the 1930s, as Rabelais did to Villon in the 1530s.
In his novel, and by means of his novel, Rabelais behaves exactly as
did Villon and the Lord of Basche. He acts according to their
methods. He uses the popular-festive system of images with its
charter of freedom consecrated by many centuries; and he uses them
to inflict a severe punishment upon his foe, the Gothic age. It is a
merry play and therefore immune, but a play without footlights. In
this setting of consecrated rights Rabelais attacks the fundamental
dogmas and sacraments, the holy of holies ofmedieval ideology.96
Rabelais was directly against the serious force of official language and ideology that
would deny the dynamic nature of human life. Rabelais presented the opposite,
manifesting the extreme act of body and the word that rejects all "ideologically negative
things" of the "transcendental ascetic world view" of the Middle age.97
Rabelais' task is "to purge the spatial and temporal world" of a transcendent
world view, "to clean away symbolic and hierarchical interpretations," and to re-create
"a spatially and temporally adequate world able to provide a new chronotope for a new,
95 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 122.
96 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, trans, by Helene Iswolsky (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1984), p.268.
97 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel," Dialogic Imagination, p. 185.
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whole and harmonious man, and for new forms of human communication." For this
task, Rabelais uses the images that oppose all finished and ready-made solutions, and at
the same time, he challenges entire ideological perceptions within it. He uses images
drawn from the traditional folk culture of humour, for example, carnivalesque
laughter, belonging to the culture of folk carnival humour - "A boundless world of
humorous forms and manifestations opposed the official and serious tone of medieval
ecclesiastical and feudal culture."99 Bakhtin sees this idea of carnival as a constellation
of rituals, games, plays, eating, and drinking, which constitutes an alternative social
space, where everything is permissible, and everyone is equal. He says that "carnival is
the people's second life, organised on the basis of laughter. It is festive life."100
In its opposition to official ideology, Bakhtin says, "carnival celebrated
temporary liberation from the prevailing truth and from the established order; it marked
the suspension of all hierarchical rank, privileges, norms, and prohibitions. Carnival
was the true feast of time, the feast of becoming, change, and renewal."101 According to
Bakhtin, one of the most significant elements in carnival is the suspension of all
hierarchical precedence during the carnival;
98 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel," Dialogic Imagination, p. 168.
Chronotope (literally time-space) is a mobile term which alludes to the way time and space are together
conceived and represented. Rabelais rediscovers the chronotope in response to the dissolution of medieval
society, and it serves as the basis for his extra-ordinary grotesque images, from Smith Denith, Bakhtinan
Thought (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 52-53.
99 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, p. 4.
100 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, p. 8.
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all were considered equal during carnival. Here, in the town square,
a special form of free and familiar contact reigned among people
who were usually divided by the barriers of caste, property,
profession, and age People were, so to speak, reborn for new,
purely human relations. These truly human relations were not only a
fruit of imagination or abstract thought; they were experienced. The
Utopian ideal and the realistic merged in this carnival experience,
unique of its kind. This temporal suspension, both ideal and real, of
hierarchical rank created during carnival time a special type of
communication impossible in everyday life. This led to the creation
of special forms of marketplace speech and gesture, frank and free,
permitting no distance between those who came in contact with each
other and liberating from norms of etiquette and decency imposed at
other times. A special carnivalesque, market place style of
expression was formed which we find abundantly represented in
Rabelais novel.102
Bakhtin uses this idea of carnival as a means to signify a new picture of the world,
because in carnival, "everyone participates," "there is no other life outside it," and "life
is subject only to its laws, that is, the laws of its own freedom."103 With this Utopian
vision, Bakhtin criticises the monologic tendencies within contemporary society (then,
Soviet regime) and suggests an alternative image. He defamiliarises the present system,
historicises what an elite projects as eternal, and relativises the abstract truth claiming, as
carnival "discloses the potentiality of an entirely different world, of another order,
another way of life. It leads men out of the confines of the apparent (false) unity, of the
indisputable and stable."104
101 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, p. 10.
102 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais andHis World, p. 10.
103 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais andHis World, p. 7.
104 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, p. 48.
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Bakhtin perceives carnival, as a function, not a substance, that "absolutizes
nothing, but rather proclaims the joyful relativity of everything,"105 since it relates
different things together, as the novel functions. In its interconnectedness, Bakhtin sets
out his vision, in terms of "grotesque body." The grotesque body is "a body in the act
of becoming. It is never finished, never completed; it is continually built, created, and
builds and creates another body. Moreover, the body swallows the world and is itself
swallowed by the world."106 It is the body that is interwoven and constantly generating
something new. In this body, the individual body loses its definition, but collectivises
at a transindividual (as in translinguistics) level, and he says,
the bodily element is deeply positive. It is presented not in a private,
egotistic form, severed from the other spheres of life, but as
something universal, representing all the people... this is not the
body and its physiology in the modem sense of these words, because
it is not individualised. The material bodily principle is contained
not in the biological individual, not in the bourgeois ego, but in the
people, a people who are constantly growing and renewed.107
In this collective body, what belongs to whom is irrelevant and impossible to detect,
because everything is combined and intercorporated.
105 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 125.
106 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, p. 317.
107 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais andHis World, p. 19.
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Moreover, for Bakhtin, there is no demarcation between the human body and the
realm of culture, because the individual body is not an autonomous object, but rather an
indivisible unity of a collective cosmic representation of the people. Carnival does not
recognise distinctions between actors and spectators, because "carnival is not a
spectacle seen by the people; they live in it and everyone participates because its very
idea embraces all the people."108 This means that carnival creates a different order of
human relations, and constitutes an alternative vision.109 Bakhtin's definition of the
grotesque body is positive and assertive in nature, but anti-classicist in its rejection of
the humanistic bodily ideal of the Renaissance. For example, death in the grotesque
body as the collective body of the people, is not an unmitigated disaster, but in this
blurring of boundaries, death and life become indistinguishable: "Death and health
throes, labor and childbirth are intimately interwoven,"110 for it "debases, destroys,
regenerates and renew simultaneously."111 For Bakhtin, the nature of the grotesque
body is crucial in reflecting cultural and artistic nature. As Clark and Holquist note, the
grotesque body "incorporates what are [Bakhtin's] primary values: incompleteness,
becoming, ambiguity, indefinability, non-canonicalism - indeed, all that jolts us out of
112
our normal expectations and epistemological complacency."
108 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais andHis World, p. 7.
109 Ann Jefferson, "Bodymatters," Bakhtin and Cultural Theory, p. 165.
110 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, p. 151; Ann Jefferson, "Bodymatters," Bakhtin and Cultural
Theory, p. 167.
111 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, p. 151
112 Clarke and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 312.
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Carnival is described as a clearing away of dogma so that new creation can take
place - a hybridity of high and low forms of culture. Carnival is not simply the
underside of the symbolic official culture, but rather it is an engagement of dialogical
relation in its becoming. It creates a space that permits the participants to escape social
distinctions temporally, and establishes the crossing ofborders and limits.
The popular-festive language of the market place abuses while
praising and praises while abusing. It is a two-faced Janus. It is
addressed to the dual-bodied object, to the dual-bodied world; it is
directed at once to the dying and to what is being generated, to the
past that gives birth to the future."3
For Bakhtin, the camivalesque has been the most important factor in the development of
culture, opening towards the future, as he says: "Nothing conclusive has yet taken place
in the world, the ultimate word of the world and about the world has not yet been
spoken, the world is open and free, everything is still in the future and will always be in
the future."114Hence, history must be understood as something that is becoming, rather
than something completely ordered or random. Bakhtin's idea of becoming as
historicity, opposes the thinking that reduces the present moment to a simple derivative
of what went before", but rather it emphasises "the 'eventness' of the event and the
necessity of responsibility here and now," as he insisted on "the presentness of each
113 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais andHis World, p. 415.
114 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 166.
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moment," and on the fact that "time is open and each moment has multiple
possibilities."115
Bakhtin calls this 'creative consciousness,' 'creative understanding,' or 're-
accenting,' that comes into being at the cross-roads of inter-relation, in its
unfinalizability. He sees this creativity as an active, living, on-going event, happening
everyday and everywhere, and for him, this creativity produces not a final word, but a
range of possibilities, for a unified word could be only theoretical, nothing to do with
real act of life. Bakhtin is "after aggregates of forces, suggestive metaphors, the
possibility of an artistic or real life action doing something not systematic and
predictable, but precisely new, unexpected."116 In this real life situation, full of the
unexpected and new, Bakhtin understands the self as unfinalizable, and history as
fundamentally open, in its intrinsic creativity. In this process, theories of language,
literature, culture, and the self can be understood in terms of creativity and openness
towards the future.
Bakhtin's determination to escape from fixed monological ideas, to an active,
incomplete, and open sphere, also emerges in the sphere of culture. He emphasises the
unity of human personality and of culture:
115
Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation ofa Prosaic, pp.45-46.
116
Caryl Emerson, "Review of Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle," Comparative Literature 38
(Fall, 1986), p.371.
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One must not, however, imagine the realm of culture as some sort of
spatial whole, having boundaries but also having internal territory.
The realm of culture has no internal territory: it is entirely distributed
along the boundaries, boundaries pass everywhere, through its very
aspect. ... Every cultural act lives essentially on the boundaries: in
this is its seriousness and significance; abstracted from boundaries it
loses its soil, it becomes empty, arrogant, it degenerates and dies.117
What Bakhtin requires is "new semantic depth"118 in other cultures and in our own
culture, rather than trying to collect artefacts and present the foreign cultural point of
view in its own language. The latter has been a very strong, but one-sided practice of
the West. So, in order to understand a foreign culture, Bakhtin suggests, "one must
enter into it, forgetting one's own, and view the world through the eyes of this foreign
culture."119 For him, entering into a foreign culture is an imperative part of the process
of understanding, but if this understanding becomes a goal, this process becomes merely
190 •
"duplication and would not entail anything new or enriching." Thus, Bakhtin says:
Creative understanding does not renounce itself, its own place in
time, its own culture; and it forgets nothing. In order to understand,
it is immensely important for the person who understands to be
located outside the object of his or her creative understanding - in
time, in space, in culture. For one cannot even really see one's own
117 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 301, note 7.
118 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Response to a Question from Novy Mir," Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p.
6.
119 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Response to a Question from NovyMir," Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, pp.
6-7.
120 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Response to a Question from Novy Mir," Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p.
7.
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exterior and comprehend it as a whole, and no mirrors or
photographs can help; our real exterior can be seen and understood
only by other people, because they are located outside us in space
and because they are others.121
Outsideness (the other) constitutes the possibility of dialogue, and through dialogue it
becomes possible to understand a culture in semantic depth, and reveals a potentiality
which creates new possibilities for the future activity and dialogue. This dialogical
encounter of two cultures "does not result in merging or mixing. Each retains its own
unity and open totality, but they are mutually enriched."122 This is a challenge to the
fetishization or reification of social relation, "the false tendency toward reducing
everything to a single consciousness, toward dissolving in it the other's
consciousness."123 Dialogical encounter helps create a liminal social space of
interaction and interrelation of cultures, as "[cjreative understanding continues
creativity, and multiplies the artistic wealth of humanity."124
Through the dialogic interaction between different languages and cultures, a new
world is born; the key to carnival is its function as the ultimate mediator of humanity.
Carnival periodically relieves human lives from alienation, the sense of separation,
division, and the loss of a sense of wholeness. Carnival has life-giving and
121 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Response to a Question from Novy Mir," Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p.
7.
122 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Response to a Question from Novy Mir," Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p.
7.
123 Mikhail Bakhtin, "From Notes Made in 1970-71," Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 141.
124 Mikhail Bakhtin, "From Notes Made in 1970-71," Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 142.
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transformative power, as it re-establishes the link between the individual, the
community, and the universe. Bakhtin characterises this participation in carnival as a
moment of transcendence out of the self, into a large fellowship. He defines carnival as
the second life of a people.
5. Bakhtin and Theological Implications
Mikhail Bakhtin's dialogic engagement and interaction defines our existence as
a shared event - we are in relation and dialogue with the other. He rejects the
theoretical categories of authoritative word or discourse, as counter-productive
communication. He insists on a "mutual answerability" between the boundaries of
culture and ordinary life human activities, and he considers the reality of life as an on¬
going dialogue, an unfinalizable process.
He reminds us of the dialogic nature of consciousness and the dialogic nature of
human life itself; it is an open-ended dialogue:
To live means to participate in dialogue: to ask questions, to heed, to
respond, to agree, and so forth. In this dialogue a person participates
wholly and throughout his whole life: with his eyes, lips, hands, soul,
spirit, with his whole body and deeds. He invests his entire self in
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discourse, and this discourse enters into the dialogue fabric of human
life, into the world symposium.125
This dialogical human nature requires a dialogic thinking of truth, as opposed to the
official monologism of ready-made truth. For Bakhtin, "Truth is not bom nor is it to be
found inside the head of an individual person, it is bom between people collectively
searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction."126 According to
Bakhtin, Socrates brought people together, and as a result, truth was bom (he called
himself a 'midwife') but, in Plato's dialogue, the genre of Socratic dialogue was
destroyed and made into ready-made irrefutable tmth, when this entered the service of
the established, dogmatic worldview of various philosophical and religious traditions;
for Bakhtin, Plato later turned this "completely into a question-and-answer form for
training neophytes (catechism)."127 He considers this thematisation or formulation as
intellectual or linguistic, political, even theological imperialism or colonialism.
This radical revision of knowledge echoes certain theological implications in the
concept of language, and of inter-relational dialogism. The significant theological
point is that Bakhtin sees Christ, not only as an event of human salvation, but also as a
decisive event in inter-human relationships. In Christ, the word was made flesh, and a
primary feature of Bakhtin's concept of language is his emphasis on the materiality of
the word: "Consciousness can arise and become a viable fact only in the material
125 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 239.
126 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 110.
127 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 110
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embodiment of signs."128 In other words, the word or sign has its meaning and purpose
when it is shared with the others. Discourse is a communal engagement as "Word is
two-sided act. It is determined equally by whose word it is and for whom it is meant."129
Bakhtin, who is influenced by the Russian Orthodox tradition, understands the passages
from Gospel of John 1:1 - 1: 14, as God's engagement to us with 'enfleshment and
embodiment,' then translates it into his own terms - the word becomes real and
substantial when people commit themselves to dialogic interaction with others. God's
kenotic act in Christ is the consciousness by which we are oriented, as we share the
1 TO
Word with the others for the development of the idea of God in humankind.
5.1. Theological Sense and Attitude
In contemporary pluralist society, Bakhtin's theological implications provide a
challenge for us to engage with many other voices, and offers rich resource for a
theology of dialogue, in the making of togetherness. In this relation to the others, the
consciousness Bakhtin is trying to establish is "not theory (transient content), but a
'sense of theory.'"131 It is the same in his theology: it is "not faith (in the sense of a
specific faith in orthodoxy, in progress, in man, in revolution, etc.), but a sense offaith,
128 Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 86.
129 Voloshinov/Bakhtin, Marxism and the Philosophy ofLanguage (New York: Seminar Press, 1973), p.
86.
130 Anton Ugolnik, "Tradition as Freedom from the Past: Eastern Orthodox and the Western Mind,"
Journal ofEcumenical Studies, 21:2, Spring 1984, p. 290.
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that is, an integral attitude (by means of the whole person) toward a higher and ultimate
132value." For Bakhtin, atheism is an indifferent attitude toward an ultimate value, and a
• • • 1
rejection of an ultimate possibility in the world. For Bakhtin, Christ is a result of the
inter-relation or encounter between the self and other: the enfleshment of God, the
Word; and Christ is the generator of 'sense and attitude' for everything and every
human relation.
Something that is new or creative, does not happen in the abstract, as shown in
the incarnation of God in Christ; God had to incarnate himself and descend from the
abstract standpoint of justice into a unique event, to have a relation with men (rather to
relate himself with men). As for human relations, creativity in the event is intrinsically
theological, because human creativity reflects or expresses the divinity of God, the
surplus of meaning, which is a necessary condition in carrying the life forward into the
future. For Bakhtin, a Russian Orthodox whose emphasis is on the relational aspect of
the Trinity and on the Incarnation, God is not to be understood as a static entity, but as
an active engendering energy being concretised in physicality. As mentioned
previously, God is like the air we breath, hence God is all-pervasive and life-giving and
sustaining; God is the absolute other who enables human creativity. As for the human
life situation, our activity in and through the everyday encounters with the others, creates
something new out of ourselves.
131 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 294.
132 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 294.
133 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 294.
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Having explored the inter-human relation in Bakhtin, it turns out to be
impossible to set a principle for an ethical theory. Because, on the issue ofwhat is right
and wrong, absolutist approaches are inadequate to particular situations, and sometimes,
contradict each other, while relativist approaches deny the meaningfulness of the
questions completely. For Bakhtin, rejection of absolutism does not mean accepting
relativism, because relativism (or subjectivism) is located in the realm of abstract theory,
and as such, relativism (subjectivism) and absolutism (dogmatism) are two sides of the
same coin.134 These two approaches are, in fact, attempting to generalise and systematise
morality into a general norm, as Kant argued - "ethics could be grounded on the
principle that moral agents should make judgements," "as if each judgement might effect
any person at any time."135 Bakhtin calls this "the universality of ought,"136 where
principle is a "philosophically defined, rationally motivated version of the golden rule,"
built into the theory of law.137 In the abstract theory, the 'oughtness' and 'eventness' are
removed or destroyed by its rules. Against this principle, Bakhtin tries to link ethics
with the everyday life in a particular situation as a living act performed and felt in the
real world. Holquist remarks,
He [Bakhtin] seeks the sheer quality of happening in life before the
magma of such experience cools, hardening into igneous theories, or
134
Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation ofa Prosaic, pp. 25-26.
135 Michael Holquist, "Foreword," in Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy ofthe Act, pp. xi-x.
136 Mikhail Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy ofthe Act, p. 25.
137 Michael Holquist, "Foreword," in Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. x.
248
Chapter 4, Dialogue with the Other
accounts of what has happened. And just as lava differs from the
rock it will become, so the two states of lived experience, on the
other hand, and systems for registering such experience on the other,
are fundamentally different from each other.138
An ethical system is destroyed by the assumption that ethics are activated by the rule,
attempting to totalise knowledge in itself - "the abstractly theoretical self-regulated
world (a world fundamentally and essentially alien to once-occurent, living
historicalness)"139. For Bakhtin, this is essentially an epistemological crisis, that is a
crisis of philosophy, because "any kind of practical orientation of my life within the
theoretical world is impossible: it is impossible to live in it, impossible to perform
answerable deeds. In that world I an unnecessary; I am essentially and fundamentally
non-existent in it."140
So, what is important for ethics, is physicality, a physical setting in which the
subject participates and interacts in the singularity of its unique place in existence; it is a
real experience, as the ethical dimension is generated in the act of reading, resulting
from the interaction between the reader and author. It is a "participating thinking" that
"seeks to overcome its own givenness for the sake of what-is-to-be-attained."141 For
138 Michael Holquist, "Foreword," in Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy ofthe Act, p. x.
139 Mikhail Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy ofthe Act, p. 7.
140 Mikhail Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy ofthe Act, p. 9.
141 Mikhail Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy ofthe Act, p. 11.
The idea of 'what -is-to-be-obtained' is equivalent of German Aufgegebenheit (something given as a task-
yet-to-be-accoplished, a problem-to-be-solved) as opposed to Geebenheit (something given, what is
given). In Bakhtin, this idea is used in terms of 'something-yet-to-be-achieved' or 'yet-to-be-
accomplished' or 'yet-to-be-determined.' Ibid., pp.87-88.
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Bakhtin, ethics are fundamentally dialogic, and he rejects and attacks the notion of
universal oughtness that becomes a rule or a system which is closed and static, because
for him, ethics are constituted by the axiological dimension of life, generating something
new through interaction. The way in which we act and speak is not just a product or a
reflection of what is given, rather "it always creates something that never existed before,
something absolutely new and unrepeatable, and, moreover, it always has some relation
to value (the true, the good, the beautiful, so forth) What is given is completely
transformed in what is created."142
Bakhtin's concept of creative understanding in an actual and concrete situation,
indicates four steps of a process: physical perception, recognition, significance, and
active-dialogic understanding.143 This process is much more than an acknowledgement
of an existing context; it is creative and generates new contexts constantly. He says,
My attitude toward Formalism: a different understanding of
specification; ignoring content leads to "material aesthetics"
(criticism of this in my article of 1924); not "making" but
creativity.... My attitude toward structuralism: I am against
enclosure in a text. Mechanical categories: "opposition," "change of
codes".... Sequential formalization and depersonalisation: all
relations are logical (in the broad sense of the word). But I hear
voices in everything and dialogic relations among them.144
142 Milhail Bakhtin, "The Problem of the Text," Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, pp. 119-120. [my
italic].
143 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Toward a Methodology for the Human Sciences," Speech Genres and Other Essays,
p. 159.
144 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Toward a Methodology for the Human Sciences," Speech Genres and Other Essays,
p. 169.
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For Bakhtin, in all human knowledge, everything begins as an interaction between at
least two points of views. Unlike natural science which assumes one subject, or the
researcher studying inanimate voiceless things, human science requires things that have
surrounding factors. The goal is not objective knowledge, but rather what Bakhtin calls
'event' which entails an evaluation that must in turn anticipate a counter-valuation, as
"the text lives only by coming into contact with another text (with context). Only at the
point of this contact between texts does a light flash, illuminating both the posterior and
anterior, joining a given text to a dialogue."145 In this event, "thought knows only
conditional points; thought erodes all previously established points,"146 and therefore,
its creative understanding
fusses about in the narrow space of small time, that is, in the space of
the present day and the recent past and the imaginable - desired or
frightening - future the trivially human attitude toward the future
(desire, hope, fear); there is no understanding of evaluative
nonpredetermination, unexpectedness, as it were, "surprisingness,"
absolute innovation, miracle, and so forth. The special nature of the
prophetic attitude toward the future. Abstraction from the self in
ideas about the future (the future without me).147
145 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Toward a Methodology for the Human Sciences," Speech Genres and Other Essays,
p. 162.
146 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Toward a Methodology for the Human Sciences," Speech Genres and Other Essays,
p. 162. Here, Bakhtin compares the 'event' as opposed to the idea of dogmatic thought being like a fish in
an aquarium, not being able to swim farther and deeper, but knocking against the bottom and the sides.
Ibid.
147 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Toward a Methodology for the Human Sciences," Speech Genres and Other Essays,
p. 167.
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Thus, in this event, "the limit here is not / but / in interrelationship with other
personalities, that is, / and other, I and thou," in its infinite dialogue in which "there is
neither a first nor a last word."148 What is significant is the fact that there is no cultural
text which could be understood merely on its own terms: "creative understanding does
not renounce itself, its own place in time, its own culture; and it forgets nothing. In
order to understand, it is immensely important for the person who understands to be
located outside the object of his or her creative understanding - in time, in space, in
culture."149 For Bakhtin, the Other, or the outsideness is a very important factor in
understanding inter-cultural discourse; it is only possible through the eyes of the other
culture, to see ourselves in depth, because its meaning reveals itself through this
encounter or contact with other or foreign culture. In the economy of inter-relationship
(I and other, or I and thou, or even inter-cultural relation), says Bakhtin, "Question and
answer are not logical relations (categories); they cannot be placed in one consciousness
(unified and closed in itself); any response gives to a new question. Question and
answer presuppose mutual outsideness. If an answer does not give rise to a new
question from itself, it falls out of the dialogue and enters systemic cognition which is
essentially impersonal."150 In other words, life as an event, is constituted by a living
consciousness of the others, through inter-relation.
148 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Toward a Methodology for the Human Sciences," Speech Genres and Other Essays,
pp. 167-168.
149 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Response to a Question from Novy Mir," Speech Genres and Other Essays, p. 7.
150 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Toward a Methodology for the Human Sciences," Speech Genres and Other Essays,
p. 168.
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Bakhtin's understanding of 'event' is intrinsically theological and ethical;
creativity is theological because God creates us and enables all humans to create;
creativity is ethical in this inter-personal relationship of daily life, requiring an answer
and a responsible relation with others; thus, creativity is also theological in its response
to the sphere of life. In relation to theological implication, Bakhtin writes the absolute
axiological dimension: "outside God, outside the bounds of trust in absolute otherness,
self-consciousness and self-utterance are impossible, and they are impossible not
because they would be senseless practically, but because trust in God is an immanent
constitutive moment of pure self-consciousness and self-expression."151 He does talk
about the awareness ofGod, in which,
one can live and gain consciousness of oneself neither under a
guarantee nor in a void (an axiological guarantee and an axiological
void), but only in faith. Life (and consciousness), from within itself,
is nothing else but the actualization of faith; the process of life's
gaining self consciousness is a process of gaining consciousness of
faith (that is, of need and of hope, of non-self-contentment and of
possibility).152
For Bakhtin, life becomes a naive life, when it doesn't know the air it breathes. God for
Bakhtin is actual and symbolic 'air,' since human beings are not self-sufficient in
themselves. God is not in a static system for human beings, but rather God is expressed
in human creativity.
151 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," Art and Answerability, p. 144.
152 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," Art and Answerability, p. 144.
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The outside or the other is therefore the most important factor in understanding
ourselves, as we engage in a dialogue which exposes the closedness and one-sidedness
of particular meanings in particular cultures. Bakhtin sees human existence in a way
which allows the other to play a significant and decisive role. The same applies to his
understanding of other cultures,
We raise new questions for a foreign culture, ones that it did not
raise itself; we seek answers to our own questions in it; and the
foreign culture responds to us by revealing to us its new aspects and
new semantic depths. Without one's own questions one cannot
creatively understand anything other or foreign (but, of course, the
questions must be taken seriously and sincere).153
Therefore, it is the other and its meaning that prevents us conceptualising a particular
question, and the other has "the role of commentary,"154revealing us, so that "there can
be a relative rationalisation of the contextual meaning or a deepening with the help of
other meanings. Deepening through expansion of the remote context."155 It is only
through the encounter with others, 'we' can discover 'our' meaning in its profoundity.
A dialogic encounter of cultures promotes unity that is mutually enriching and open to
infinity, "an infinity of symbolic contextual meanings and therefore it cannot be
scientific in the way precise sciences are scientific."156 In other words, understanding is
153 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Response to a Question from NovyMir," Speech Genres and Other Essays, p. 7.
154 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Methodology for the Human Science," Speech Genres and Other Essays, p. 160.
155 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Methodology for the Human Science," Speech Genres and Other Essays, p. 160.
156 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Methodology for the Human Science," Speech Genres and Other Essays, p. 160
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always a correlation with other texts, cultures or interpretations, which exceeds its
boundaries, as understanding correlates into a new and future context.
We participate in a communal mode of existence, in mankind, in God's world, as
we live our lives with axiological weight, in the other and for the other. Bakhtin likens
this existence to being 'in a chorus,' " I do not sing for myself; I am active only in
relation to the other and I am passive in the other's relationship to me I do not
create rhythm for myself: I join in it for the sake of the other... Not my own nature but
the human nature in me can be beautiful, and not my own soul but the human soul can
be harmonious."157 This chorus, the future ofmeaning, is not yet fulfilled, as something
not yet final, as I experience temporarily within myself. I am aware of myself being
illuminated with the yet-to-be meaning, as Bakhtin says,
This absolute future, the future of meaning that stands axiologically
over against me, over against my whole temporality (everything that
is already present in me), is not a future, but in the sense of being a
temporal continuation of the same life, but in the sense of being a
constant possibility, a constant need to transform my life formally, to
put new meaning into my life.158
The task of life is something to be achieved in the future, as something yet-to-be-
achieved, as a future yet-to-be, as a unity-yet-to-be, in relation to the others. It is an
acknowledgement ofmyself as someone yet-to-be, whose "axiological centre ofmy self-
157 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," Art and Answerability, pp. 120-121; 121.
158 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," Art and Answerability, p. 122.
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determination is displaced into the future;" it is also accepting 'my' inability to see "my
own pure givenness."159 What is important is the future, not here, not in the past and
present, since myselfwill continue to be someone other than the self-satisfied one.
In this process of becoming or to be toward the future, Bakhtin says, ultimately
"I turn to the outside ofmyself and surrender myself to the mercy of the other," because
"the position of outsideness makes possible (not only physically, but also morally) what
is impossible for me in myself, namely: the axiological affirmation and acceptance of
the whole present-on-hand givenness of another's interior being."160 My own idea can
only come from the perception of the other, not from my own perception, as I am
conscious of myself only through the other, so human consciousness is intrinsically
surrounded by the other's consciousness. This means that a human being cannot exist
simply in givenness (given being), and therefore, for Bakhtin, a single consciousness is
impossible, as he says:
I am conscious of myself and become myself only while revealing
myself for another, through another, and with the help of another.
The most important acts constituting self-consciousness are
determined by a relationship toward another consciousness (toward a
thou). Separation, dissociation, and enclosure within the self as the
main reason for the loss of one's self. Not that which takes place
within, but that which takes place on the boundary between one's
own and someone else's consciousness, on the threshold. And
everything internal gravitates not toward itself but it turned to the
outside and dialogized, every internal experience ends up on the
159 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," Art and Answerability, p. 127.
160 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," Art and Answerability, p. 128.
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boundary, encounters another, and in this tension filled encounter
lies its entire essence. This is the highest degree of sociality (not
external, not material, but internal). Thus does Dostoevsky confront
all decadent and idealistic (individualistic) culture, the culture of
essential and inescapable solitude. He asserts the impossibility of
solitude, the illusory nature of solitude. The very human being of
man (both external and internal) is the deepest communion. To be
means to communicate. Absolute death (non-being) is the state of
being unheard, unrecognized, unremembered (Ippolit). To be means
to be for another, and through the other, for oneself. A person has no
internal sovereign territory, he is wholly and always on the
boundary; looking inside himself, he looks into the eyes of another
or with the eyes of another I cannot manage without another, I
cannot become myself without another; I must find myself in another
by finding another in myself (in mutual reflection and mutual
acceptance). Justification cannot be se/f-justification, recognition
cannot be .?<?//-recognition. I receive my name from others, and it
exists for others (self-nomination is imposture). Even love toward
one's own self is impossible.161
Ultimately, in this event of inter-relation of consciousness, is a negating of myself, my
'own being-as-a-given,' as God incarnates himself and descends from the abstract
standpoint of justice, in Christ. The act of incarnation of God, as an event in Christ,
does indicate the fact that "the abstract standpoint does not know and does not see the
movement of being as an ongoing event, does not know and does not see being as a still
open process of axiological accomplishment."162 What is being implied here is that it is
impossible to live and perform answerable acts or deeds in the theoretical or abstract
world. Hence, these theories or abstract ideas need to be brought into communion with
the actually occurring event of being in an ethical sphere, where a human being accepts
161 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, pp.287-288.
162 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," Art and Answerability, p. 129.
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responsibility (or answerability) for the act of its cognition, that is my deed in actual
living.
5.2. Kenosis as Theological Space
Bakhtin sees the act of God in Christ, the incarnation, as "a great symbol of self-
activity," because "in self-renunciation I actualize with utmost activeness and in full the
uniqueness ofmy place in Being. The world in which I, from my own unique place,
renounce myself does not become a world in which I do not exist, a world which is
indifferent, in its meaning, to my existence: self-renunciation is a performance or
accomplishment that encompasses Being-as-event."163 The act of God in Christ, the
incarnation, is an inter-relationship and participation in the on-going event, as Bakhtin
puts the image of Christ as "the resolution of ideological quest"164; therefore, in this
sense, "non-incarnated action, non-incarnated thought, non-fortuitous life" are empty
possibilities.165 Our answerable action or deed should participate in the context of
Being as an event, where answerability is not for meaning in itself, but surpassing the
meaning of the past, into participative thinking. Individual uniqueness moves away
163 Mikhail Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy ofthe Act, p. 16.
164 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 97.
165 Mikhail Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy ofthe Act, p. 43.
258
Chapter 4, Dialogue with the Other
from theoretical unity, into the sphere of concrete reality and real life situation, as
Bakhtin insists:
the uniqueness of actually occurring Being-as-event, in immediate
proximity to which the answerable act or deed is set. Answerable
inclusion in the acknowledged once-occurrent uniqueness of Being-
as-event is precisely what constitutes the truth [pravda] of the
situation [polazhenie].... What underlies the unity of an answerable
consciousness is not a principle as a starting point, but the fact of an
actual Being-as-event, and this fact cannot be adequately expressed
in theoretical terms, but can only be described and participatively
experienced I, too, participate in Being in a once-occurent and
never repeatable manner: I occupy a place in once-occurent Being
that is unique and never-repeatable, a place that cannot be taken by
anyone else and is impenetrable for anyone else. In the given once-
occurent point where I am now located, no one else has ever been
located in the once-occurent time and once-occurent space of once-
occurent Being.166
This is what Bakhtin calls "my non-alibi in Being," to indicate the moral responsibility
in which there is no justification to bypass or escape from it, and to demand "the
answerably performed act,"167 in concrete real life situation. To live by an alibi means
that we refuse to relate to the world, and to have relationships in the world; it is to
become what Bakhtin calls a "pretender" by which he means "not someone who feigns
someone else's identity, but someone who avoids the project of selfhood and so tries to
live without an identity of his own."168 This is the fact that I exist in the participation of
once-occurent Being, therefore, "my uniqueness... always makes possible my own
166 Mikhail Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy ofthe Act, pp. 39-40.
167 Mikhail Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy ofthe Act, p. 40.
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unique and irreplaceable deed in relation to everything that is not 7."169 For Bakhtin, in
an actual participation, the most significant factor is the unique act or deed that is about
"to perform - in its totally unpredetermined, concrete, unique, and compellent
oughtness." What is implied here, in the actual participation, is that truth of the event is
"not the truth that is self-identical and self-equivalent in its content [istina],"
generalising human being as a whole, but "the rightful and unique position of every
170
participant - the truth [pravda] of each participant's actual, concrete ought," existing m
the uniqueness and in the concrete situation.
Therefore, in Bakhtin, the act of God in Christ - the incarnation, becomes the
ethical reality of human relationship, in which the fundamental difference between 7 and
the other makes an axiological act possible through the actual evaluation of the
fundamental value-categories of I and the other. The axiological world is only possible
in the relationship between I and the other, in which I cannot exist as a self-contented
consciousness of uniqueness; rather
I am situated on the frontier of the horizon ofmy seeing; the visible
world is disposed before me. By turning my head in all directions, I
can succeed in seeing all ofmyself from all sides of the surroundings
space in the center of which I am situated, but I shall never be able to
see myself as actually surrounded by this space.171
168 Emerson and Morson, Creation ofProsaic, p.31.
169 Mikhail Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p.42.
170 Mikhail Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy ofthe Act, p.46.
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In this relation with the world, another human being or other culture, my concrete
experience with others, never becomes consummated, but infinitely participates and acts
in its relationship. It is an ongoing process that cannot be experienced as complete, but
'yet-to-be.' For Bakhtin, meaning of one's life is governed by "the cognitive-ethical
tension of a lived life from within itself," that is not "in the potentially consummated
whole of what constitutes my present-on-hand life," but in "progression of my own
life."172 Because, in Bakhtin,
Such a temporal whole is not capable of determining and organizing
my thoughts and my acts from within me myself, for these thoughts
and acts possess cognitional and ethical validity -they are
extratemporal. One could say: I myself do not know how my soul
looks from outside - in the world, in being; and even if I knew, its
image would not be capable of founding and organising a single act
of my own life from within myself, for the axiological validity
(aesthetic validity) which such an image possesses is transgredient to
myself (recourse to feigning is possible here, but feigning, too,
exceeds the bounds of such an images, is not founded by it, and
destroys it). Any consummation represents a deus ex machina for a
life-sequence which, from within itself, is directed toward meaning
(toward the validity ofmeaning).173
In this axiological dimension, the concrete life of the other exists not in abstraction, nor
scientific time, but "in the emotionally and axiologically ponderable time of lived life
that is capable of becoming a musical-rhythmic time."174 It is to experience the chorus
171 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," Art andAnswerability, p. 37.
172 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," Art andAnswerability, p. 108.
173 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," Art andAnswerability, p. 108.
174 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," Art and Answerability, p. 110.
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of others a chorus I do not sing for myself, but participate in; "I feel in myself the body
and the soul of another.... a movement or an action is incarnated into the other or is
coordinated with the action of the other., my own action enters into rhythm.... But I do
not create rhythm for myself: I join in it for the sake of the other. Not my own nature
but the human nature in me can be beautiful, and not my own soul but the human soul
can be harmonious."175
This means rejecting the idealism and epistemology of the particular subject, for
the subject's idealism is "a phenomenology of my experience of myself, but not of my
experience of the other."176 This is to affirm the unity of existence and transform it into
the unity of consciousness, for epistemological reflection has nothing to do with the
individual form of experiencing an object, but with transcendent forms of object and
their ideal unity.177 In other words, no stable definition of the self is possible, for we
need the other, and the other needs us. It is only in the world of others that real life
experience is possible. The significance of Christ, therefore, is the fact that He has felt
at home in the world of other people given to Him; as Bakhtin says "the first and
foremost condition for an aesthetic approach to this world is to understand it as the
world of other people who have accomplished their lives in it."178 Our living in the
world is to participate and to join in the communal mode of existence and in God's
world, where I live in the other and for the other. The act of participating and
175 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," Art and Answerability, p. 121.
176 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," Art and Answerability, p. 110.
177 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," Art andAnswerability, p. 114.
262
Chapter 4, Dialogue with the Other
experiencing "derives its activeness, its weight, from that which confronts it
compellingly as a task (something-to-be-achieved)," and it is only the task that
179
"organizes a life's actualization-ffom-within (transforms possibility into actuality)."
The future (the absolute task) stands "axiologically against me," and "over my whole
55I8O
temporality," "transforms my life formally, to put new meaning into my life;"
through reflecting on lived experience from the perspective of its to-be-attained
meaning, and of a future-yet-to-be.
On the other hand, what is implied here is the fact that / is yet-to-be, and such as,
everything in my unity belongs to a future task. It is a realisation ofmyself as "the-one-
who-is-yet-to-be-achieved, govern myself actually from the infinite prospect of my
absolute future," consequently,
as soon as I release myself as the-one-who-is-yet-to-be-achieved
from the axiological field ofmy vision and stop being intensely with
myself in the future, my own givenness loses its yet-to-be unity for
me and disintegrates into factually existent, senseless fragments of
being. The only thing left for me to do is to find a refuge in the other
and to assemble - out of the other - the scattered pieces of my own
givenness, in order to produce from them a parasitically
consummated unity in the other's soul using the other's resources.181
178 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," Art and Answerability, p. 111.
179 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," Art and Answerability, pp. 121-122.
180 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," Art and Answerability, p. 122.
181 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," Art and Answerability, p. 126.
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For Bakhtin, the gravity and axiological centre ofmy own self-determination is located
solely in the future. What is important is not the pure givenness of I, but I as someone
yet-to-be. Then, from this perspective, the life already totalised or consummated in its
givenness, is one without hope ofmoving toward the future or the ultimate meaning of
life. Bakhtin says, "In the deepest part ofmyself, I live by eternal faith and hope in the
182 • •
constant possibility of the inner miracle of a new birth," in relation with the others.
In this sense, theology must be an ethical activity that is an open and evolving
discourse, for the ethics emerge only from the concrete and physical setting of
relationship. Theology is not a set of doctrines. Unlike traditional theologies that are
based on untenable presuppositions, interpreting the given creeds and doctrines, this
theology analyses what it is to be human in a real living situation with others; it analyses
God in Christ as an event, searching for its capacity to provide insight for the
contemporary real situation. As mentioned above, in Bakhtin, God, or the concept of
God brings one's particular meanings into question, and demands a kind of self-
criticism. For Bakhtin, the Johannine Word, in which paradoxically the new blends
with the old that preceded it, provides a new creative consciousness of humankind
toward more open and wider perspectives. This new creative consciousness is like
generating energy through a spark produced by the friction of various languages and
cultures; it is like mixing various chemical components, and producing something new.
From this perspective, all that was definite and completed within itself is revealed as
182 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," Art and Answerability, p. 127. Bakhtin
indicates that Dostoevsky depicts the heroes in his novel, not as finalized, but unfinalized and changing
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limited, and all that was determined and finite is about to die and open new possibilities
in the future.
Theology, therefore has the capacity to provide insight into the contemporary
human situation, as God in Christ has done by participating in the human situation and
not just revealing himself. In this sense, a theological approach to the world should be
formed as a question, rather than as an idea which states definitely what or who God is,
or setting a proper method of interpreting God's revelation. Traditionally, God or the
idea of God has been a kind of 'working hypothesis' that supposedly answers to human
needs, and a kind of function of our notions of the human and the world. The doctrine
of God has been regarded as the first and primary source of Christian theology, as in the
Summa Theologia of Thomas Aquinas or the Institute of the Christian Religion of John
Calvin. Those are directed toward interpreting, apprehending, and elaborating the
complex meaning of the word God.183 However, these are human constructions of God,
and a personification of human virtue. If people acknowledge human capacities,
theology must consist in continually asking questions, such as, where is God? who or
what is God? what was revealed in the life and death of Jesus? in a concrete human
situation. And, the ultimate question: "How are we to live?"184in the world. In this
continuous questioning, we can talk about God, faith, and the world as all
on the threshold of life (Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 73).
183 Gordon Kaufman, In Face ofMystery: A Constructive Theology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1993), p. 13.
184 Gordon Kaufman, In Face ofMystery: A Constructive Theology, pp. 14-15. Also, see Theology for a
Nuclear Age (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1985), p. 18.
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interconnected, in a way in which we discover our misconceptions and as a
consequence, become open enough to allow other meanings in our exploration. The idea
of God, or God, reveals our humanness and relativises our particular meaning, and
1RS • •
moreover creates a "unique and powerful internal dialectic." God in this manner must
be "the ultimate point of reference in terms of which the human and the world are to be
understood, not the human and the world the principal points of reference for
understanding God."186 Here, Kaufman says,
If God is to be the ultimate point of reference for understanding and
orienting us in the world in which we live, then our contemporary
experience and knowledge and problem must themselves function as
a criterion to be taken into account in criticizing conceptions of God
received from tradition and in formulating notions adequate for
today... That is, God must be understood as in meaningful
relationship to, and thus significantly relevant to, our contemporary
human life with its particular problems. This criterion will, of course,
be employed rather differently in different local situations, since
each such situation confronts men and women with its own unique
problems. In this respect theology is always heavily influenced by
contextual factors, and should acknowledge this openly.187
What this means is that the idea of God is a significant means for self-criticising and
self-understanding in the contemporary human situation; the idea of God poses the
question of value and meaning in a particular time and space, and opens towards a
creative future.
185 Gordon Kaufman, Theological Imagination, p. 34.
186 Gordon Kaufman, In Face ofMystery: A Constructive Theology, pp. 12-13.
187 Gordon Kaufman, In Face ofMystery: A Constructive Theology, p. 30.
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The idea of God as the ultimate point of reference, poses a great challenge to
the traditional theology of theoretism of the West and questions the ethical legitimacy of
its monologic and separate thought, in relation to other discourses. It also poses an
ethical challenge to western cultural history concerning the West's rejection of the other
and the West's manipulating attempt to develop and impose Western thinking on other
people from different cultures. Thus, theology as a form of cultural criticism sets out to
acknowledge and analyse the world and inherited reality critically in the light of the
ultimate point of reference, God.
Having accepted the idea of God in this manner, the event of incarnation is a
participating action of ultimate reality in the world. For Bakhtin, it is a degradation, as
he says "the essential principle of grotesque realism is degradation, that is the lowering
of all that is high, spiritual, ideal, abstract,"188and in other words, grotesque realism is a
way of refuting intellectualism. In this perspective, the Incarnation means not the
negation of the higher, but the participation of the higher in the lower. In fact, for
Bakhtin, degradation means,
coming down to earth, the contact with earth as an element that
swallows up and gives birth at the same time. To degrade is to bury,
to sow, and to kill simultaneously, in order to bring forth something
more and better. To degrade also means to concern oneself with the
lower stratum of the body, the life of the belly and the reproductive
organs; it therefore relates to acts of defecation and copulation,
188 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, pp. 19-20.
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conception, pregnancy, and birth. Degradation digs a bodily grave
for a new birth; it has not only a destructive, negative aspect, but also
a regenerating one. To degrade an object does not imply merely
hurling it into the void of nonexistence, into absolute destruction, but
to hurl it down to the reproductive lower stratum, the zone in which
conception and a new birth take place. Grotesque realism knows no
other lower level; it is the fruitful earth and the womb. It is always
• • 189
conceiving.
The grotesque body is "ambivalent. It is pregnant death, a death that gives birth;"190it is
a body that is becoming, and open to the world and the future through the death,
pregnant, and birth. In its ontological ambiguity, it rejects the isolated meaning and
value within the system and the modern picture of the world.
It is the degradation of God in Christ, the incarnation; the word became flesh and
dwelt among us, and finally anticipated death and descended into Hades, the
underground. In referring to degradation, Bakhtin quotes the words of the priestess,
from Rabelais, in introducing the downward movement:
Go, my good friends; may you depart under the protection of that
intellectual sphere, whose centre is everywhere, whose circumstance
is nowhere, and whom we call God. When you return to your world,
bear witness to your fellow men that the greatest treasure and most
189 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, p. 21.
190 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, p. 25. Bakhtin grotesquely stresses on the parts of body that
is open to the outside world, he says that it is "the parts through which the world enters the body or
emerges from it, or through which the body itself goes out to meet the world. This means that the
emphasis on the apertures or the convexities, or on various ramifications and offshoots: the open mouth,
the genital organs, the breasts, the phallus, the potbelly, the nose."
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wonderful things lie hidden underground - and not without reason.
(Book 5, Chapter 48)191
Into the earth, Bakhtin says, "they bury their victim. But at the same time they are
192
creative; they sow and harvest;" in this downward movement, creativity emerges, as
he continues to say that "The material bodily lower stratum is productive. It gives birth,
thus assuring mankind's immortality. All obsolete and vain illusions die in it, and the
real future comes to life,"193 in referring to the future ofmankind.
In Bakhtin, the idea of carnival, as indicated in the previous section, is
significant for theological thinking, as well. As the Word became man in Christ, this
idea of carnival provides the celebration of difference in unity, through the laughter and
gay time and festivity. It has a redemptive force, because it stresses its life-giving and
transformative power, as carnival is characterised as re-establishing the link between the
individual, the community, and the universe that surrounds them both. Its victorious
image cannot be separated from banquet images; "[i]n the act of eating, as we have said,
the confines between the body and the world are overstepped by the body; it triumphs
over the world, over its enemy, celebrates its victory, grows at the world's expense.... the
191 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, p. 369. Rabelais' world is directed toward the underworld -
earthly and bodily. Downward movement signifies forms of popular-festivity and grotesque realism.
Ibid., p.370.
192 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, p. 370.
193 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, p. 378. St. John Chrysostom takes Christ's descent into
Hell as a form of a parodic eucharist. In this sacrament, Christ is food. "Easter Homily of St. John
Chrysostom," translated by Paul Kachur, in Veselin Kesich, The First Day of the New Creation
(Crestwood, NY.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1982), pp. 183-184.
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victorious body receives the defeated world and is renewed."194 Bakhtin describes the
Utopian vision and hope in Christ as a function of carnival:
Carnival is a pageant without footlights and without a division into
performers and spectators. In carnival everyone is an active
participant, everyone communicates in the carnival act. Carnival is
not contemplated and, strictly speaking, not even performed; its
participants live in it, they live by its law as long as those laws are in
effect; that is, they live a carnivalistic life. Because carnivalistic life
is life drawn out of its usual rut, it is to some extent "life turned
inside out," "the reverse side of the world" ("monde a I'envers").195
Bakhtin characterises carnival as a moment of transcending the self into a larger
fellowship, as during carnival, "every hierarchical structure", "everything resulting from
socio-hierarchical inequality or any other form of inequality among people," is
suspended. "All distance between people is suspended, and a special carnival category
goes into effect: free and familiar contact among people."196 Carnival inverts hierarchies
and undermines boundaries. For Bakhtin, "carnival is the place of working out," and
carnival forms and functions as a "new mode of interrelationship between
individuals,"197 a different order of human relations. Thus, as in carnival, the
incarnational act of God in Christ was functional in bringing the individual
consciousness together and its connectedness into the ethical relation that requires an
answerable deed and a responsible relation to others in a concrete life situation. Here,
194 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, pp. 282-283.
195 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 122.
196 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 123.
197 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 123.
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theology is ultimately a function of discourse, a becoming real, taking flesh only when it
comes among people, as shown in the act of God in Christ, 'the Word became flesh and
dwelt among us.'
5.3. Theology towards the Great Time
From this perspective, theology must be functional, since it is the human's
creative and imaginative activity in the world, a limited world, calling temporally
consummated meaning into question, as Bakhtin asserts that wholeness and order are
never given, but set as a task-to-be-achieved. What is implied here, as far as theology is
concerned, is that meaning is specified through conversation or contact with the other.
Theological conversation must be self-critical and creative at the same time. There is no
room for monologic principles or monologic truth in this sphere, because as in Bakhtin,
monologic consciousness can be true or untrue only by itself and for itself. The dialogic
sense of truth, in contrast to monologism, involves the participation of more than one
consciousness; dialogic truth is ultimately unfmalised, because it exists on the threshold
or cutting edge of interacting consciousness in opening for the future and in creating the
new.
Theology as a form of discourse, in attempting to describe ultimate meaning, is a
creative activity that is based on a fundamental attitude of faith and belief in God.
Theology is a cultural discourse, but it breaks the cultural meaning in a particular society
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as open, and expresses it in terms of interconnectedness. Since ethics exist only in a
concrete setting and in relation with others, theology is ethically grounded and functions
as a cultural criticism in examining our claims, and in offering new and affirmative
vision for the future.
The future as the ultimate meaning in Bakhtin, "is hostile to the present and the
past as to that which is devoid of meaning; hostile in the way a task is hostile to non-
being-fulfilled-yet, or what-ought-to-be is hostile to what-is, or atonement is hostile to
sin." Therefore, "The demand is: live in such a way that every given moment of your life
would be both the consummating, final moment and, at the same time, the initial
moment of a new life."198 In the process of 'to-be-achieved, fulfilled or fulfilled,' what
we need is to engage into dialogue, the ongoing process of communication, toward the
ultimate meaning. What is important to realise here, is that dialogue is not a goal (or
destination) to achieve (arrive), but rather it is a starting point itself, as Bakhtin says,
To be means to communicate To be means to be for another, and
through the other, for oneself. A person has not internal sovereign
territory, he is wholly and always on the boundary; looking inside
himself, he looks into the eyes of another or with the eyes of
another.199
Theology is supposed to reveal what it is to be human, and what human ought to be;
then, if a theology is self-enclosed within itself within a particular system, it will lose
198 Mikhail Bakhtin, Art and Answerability, p. 122
199 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 287.
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itself, because "separation, dissociation, and enclosure within the self as the main reason
for the loss of one's self."200 Hence, monologic theology that pretends to be the ultimate
word, is self-defeating, self-destructive and unethical and moreover denies the ultimate
meaning of God. Theological monologism denies the "existence outside itself of
another consciousness with equal rights and equal responsibilities, another I with equal
rights (thou), and considering the other merely an object of consciousness, not another
consciousness." As such, "No response is expected from it that could change
everything in the world of my consciousness. Monologue is finalised and deaf to the
901
other's response."
As previously mentioned, in section 1, we have to begin with the dialogic nature
of consciousness, the dialogic nature of human life itself that is open-ended dialogue, in
our theologising. Theology is not to be separated from life, as
Life by its very nature is dialogic. To live means to participate in
dialogue: to ask questions, to heed, to respond, to agree, and so forth.
In this dialogue a person participates wholly and throughout his
whole life: with his eyes, lips, hands, soul, spirit, with his whole
body and deeds. He invests his entire self in discourse, and this
discourse enters into the dialogic fabric of human life, into the world
202
symposium.
200 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 287.
201 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, pp. 292-293.
202 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 293.
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This idea of dialogism rejects any attempt to interpret the reality of heteroglossia as just
one of many, the vision of pluralism. Rather, it is personal as the different voices
interact in conversation, taking place within intersubjective space. Bakhtin's goal is to
break the totalitarian desire of authorial perspective (self-reflective), and to challenge the
pretence of any one mode of representation to reflect reality. This is to bring the
heteroglossia into the relation of interrelation, interorientation, and interaction, not just
as an historical reality, but as an ethical force.
This means that we live entering into relation with others. Theology, in
relation to other perspectives, should renounce its own consciousness and engage in a
dialogical relation that does not come as a result of mixing, but rather mutually
enriching in openness. What is revealed in human relations and the study of theology
and culture is the fact that theory cannot provide the basis of responsible action and deed
in the world; rather it is the concrete act or deed which provides what is most
meaningful, answerable and responsible within human relations, indicating that,
The centre of gravity lies not in the meaning that has returned but in
the return of the activity of movement (the internal and external
movement ofbody and soul) that engendered this meaning.203
Theologically, it is revealed in an act of God in Christ, the kenotic Christ, which is the
centre of Russian Orthodox spirituality that influences Bakhtin's thought profoundly;
274
Chapter 4, Dialogue with the Other
God emptied himself to seek communion with the human , and in this process, Jesus was
an example of this kenotic way of relating to each other in creating communication.
God's incarnational act of self-emptying was "a choice made for the other, as an act of
selflessness to benefit the other, rather than as an act of filial obedience to fulfil a divine
ethical imperative."204 And this is translated in Bakhtinian ethics, "in all of Christ's
norms the I and the other are contraposed: for myself - absolute sacrifice, for the other -
loving mercy What I must be for the other, God is for me. What the other
surmounts and repudiates within myself as an unworthy given, I accept in him and that
with loving mercy as the other's cherished flesh."205 Then, what is important is our
concrete living experience of the other. The fact is that, as the kenotic Christ shows, in
creating communication and achieving the salvation of all creatures, the radical ethics of
discourse is required.
The ethical imperative of discourse is that all must respect open-endedness, and
that everything must be looked into in the light of the question of the future. In the light
of the meaning of the future, the hidden mechanism of control and totalitarian desire
might be exposed, as shown in the carnival bringing the question of the future into the
status quo or temporally consummated meaning. Influenced by the kenotic Christ,
Bakhtin, in theological terms, expects the eschatological time, saying,
203 Mikhail Bakhtin, Art andAnswerability, p. 310.
204 William D. Lindsey, '"The Problem of Great time': A Bakhtinian Ethics of Discourse," Journal of
Religion, 73, July 1993, p. 326.
205 Mikhail Bakhtin, Art and Answerability, p. 56. See also pp. 38-42.
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[t]here is neither a first nor a last word and there are no limits to the
dialogic context (it extends into the boundless past and the boundless
future). Even past meanings, that is, those born in the dialogue of
past centuries, can never be stable (finalised, ended once and for all)
- they will always change (be renewed) in the process of subsequent,
future development of the dialogue. At any moment in the
development of the dialogue there are immense, boundless masses of
forgotten contextual meanings, but at certain moments of the
dialogue's subsequent development along the way that are recalled
and invigorated in renewed form (in a new context). Nothing is
absolutely dead: every meaning will have its homecoming festival.
The problem ofgreat time."206
It is the great time that breaks through the boundaries of people's own time and their
lives within their own time, as in the sphere of culture, indicating that a particular
culture cannot be enclosed within itself as something already made and completely
finalised, but rather as something that is open and unfinalised, and existing and enacting
in the time and space of the other.
In dialogical interaction, with the reference of the great time, no voices are
ultimately dead, but rather silenced voices and manipulated voices speak and interact as
happening in a space of carnival that transcends temporal and spatial confinement and
creates something new that bears the seed ofhope within it, as Holquist indicates,
in so far as my "I" is dialogic, it insures that my existence is not a
lonely event but part of a larger whole. The thirdness of dialogue
frees my existence from the very circumscribed meaning it has in the
206 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Methodology for the Human Science," Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p.
170.
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limited configuration of self/other relations available in the
immediate time and particular place of my life. For in the later
times, and in other places, there will always be other configurations
of such relations, and in conduction with that other, my self will be
differently understood. This degree of thirdness outside the present
event insures the possibility of whatever transgredience I can achieve
toward myself..... Poets who feel misunderstood in their lifetimes,
martyrs for lost political causes, quite ordinary people caught in lives
of quiet desperation - all have been correct to hope that outside the
tyranny of the present there is a possible addressee who will
understand them.207
Our participation in the great time enables dialogical discourse to move forward to the
future - the ultimate meaning; the eschaton in theology. In this ethical/dialogical
discourse, what is most needed, is a radically different presupposition that would create
a space where other voices could be heard, where the future interrogates the
significances of the past and present, and moreover where 'surprise' can be manifested.
The important thing is to acknowledge the mystery of life and of God, in order to
understand the world as an ongoing event and in order to orient 'myself and live 'the
living' as a process toward open-ended dialogue with the others. Theology as a
discourse, is ultimately about becoming real when it participates among people.
207 Michael Holquist, Dialogism: Bakhtin and his World, p. 38.
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Chapter 5. Theological Solidarity with the Other
Communication with the other can be transcendent only as a dangerous
life, a fine risk to be run. ( Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise Than Being)
it is not the literal past, the 'facts' of history, that shape us, but images of
the past embodied in language.... we must never cease renewing those
images, because once we do, we fossilise." (Brian Friel, Translations)
The main issue, in this chapter, is how to participate in a living discourse
concerning national and cultural boundaries within the global context, especially in
relation to theology and its implications. What has been most criticised is the mode
of representation, the systematic appropriation of the Other(ness), as western culture
has shown in its radical distinction between us and the rest. Instead, what is
proposed is a living discourse that goes beyond traditional theological boundaries
and classifications done and defined by me and my truth in the controlled space; this
is a dialogical space that is shared, mutually experienced and mutually constructed.
One standing not on foundationalism or essentialism, but rather on what Paul
Rabinow calls 'shaky ground,' or living in 'holy insecurity' in Nicholas Lash.1 It is
not a 'common ground' that is being proposed, but rather a common
acknowledgement of one's own Timitedness,' that breaks the totality.
' See Paul Rabinow, Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco (Berkeley: University of California, 1977)
and Nicholas Lash, Easter in Ordinary: Reflections on Human Experiences and the Knowledge of
God (Charlottesville, VA: The University Press ofVirginia, 1988).
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Then, in the realities of cultural and religious plurality, what is the function of
theology (or religion)? and what are Christian obligations to the world? Developing
a new relationship and attitude towards the Other, states Mark Kline Taylor,
the Christ symbol expresses and creates Christian existence lived
within, but at the margins of, at the limen of, its own cultural and
linguistic worlds. The Christian's liminal existence involves an
affirmation of the culturally other and, ultimately, an affirmation
of all those who are most severely marginalized, "made other" by
the dynamics and structures of oppression.2
It is how to live 'the living' in communion or dialogical relation with the other, and
ultimately with God, as revealed in the person and work of Christ, who enables us to
be redeemed into relationship. Then, the function of theology should be a discourse
that rejects a monologic view (of oppression and manipulation), but recognises
heterogeneity and diversity and brings them into a dialogic relationship, but not a
common ground. Bakhtin articulates this attitude in characterising Dostoevesky,
His [Dostoevsky] entire material unfolds before him as a series
of human orientations. His path leads not from idea to idea, but
from orientation to orientation. To think, for him, means to
question and to listen, to try out orientations, to combine some
and expose others. For it must be emphasised that in
Dostoevsky's world even agreement retains its dialogic
character, that is, it never leads to a merging of voices and truths
in a single impersonal truth, as occurs in the monologic world.3
2 Mark Kline Taylor, "In Praise of Shaky Ground: the Liminal Christ and Cultural Pluralism"
Theology Today, vol.43, no.l 1986, p.37.
3 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 95.
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Hence, the discourse in which we intend to engage, is not a fusion, nor
dialectics, in which two speakers must understand each other perfectly, but rather a
communication that is "dependent upon the preservation of a gap" in which "they
must remain only partially satisfied with each other's replies, because the
continuation of dialogue is in large part dependent on neither party knowing exactly
what the other means."4 What is implied here is that discourses must not be static,
and each discourse must be beginning of a new kind of discourse towards the other's
voice and the other's world. It is a constant decentering of the subject, which has
been instrumental for one's own rationality and particularity.
1. Transformation of the Theological Task
What is being attempted is not the discovery of another academic theology to
substitute for an out-dated one, but the transformation of its structure, so that
theology can become a reference for the everyday practice of people living in a
contemporary reality of plurality, and theological pluralism. The basic proposition
of this study is the fact that all meaning depends on the presence of the other. In
other words, meaning is made through the (active) participation of subjects or terms,
as expressed in Bakhtin's thought,
4
Caryl Emerson, "Editor's Preface," in Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. xxxii.
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But what is essential for Bakhtin is not only the categories as
such that get paired in author/hero, space/time, self/other, and so
forth, but in addition the architectonics governing relations
between them. What counts is the simultaneity that makes it
logical to treat these concepts together. The point is that Bakhtin
honours both things and the relations between them - one cannot
be understood without the other. The resulting simultaneity is
not a private either/or, but an inclusive also/and.5
Thus, what is important is the relationship, a dialogical relationship with the other, in
which "nothing conclusive has yet taken place in the world, the ultimate word of the
world and about the world has not yet been spoken, the world is open and free,
everything is still in the future and will always be in the future."6 What is significant
is the idea of 'surplus of humanness' that is directed and open toward the unspoken
and unpredetermined new word in the future. This is to position the / before future
meaning, and it is, as Bakhtin said, "a moment where that which is in me must
overcome itself for the sake of that which ought to be."8 It is a moral obligation (of
ought-to-be) to be open to the Other; it is like the anarchic work of moral
consciousness in Levinas, which originates in a sense of responsibility to the call or
command of the Other ( the ethics "of responsibility, that is, of sociality"9) and in
Bakhtin, the dialogism of ethical responsiveness or answerability.
5 Michael Holquist, "introduction: the Architectonics of Answerability," in Art and Answerability:
Early Philosophical Essays by M.M. Bakhtin, p.xxiii.
6 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 166.
7 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 166. This is "into the absolute future, the
future of meaning. That is, not into the future which will leave everything in its place, but into the
future which must finally fulfil, accomplish everything, the future which we oppose to the present and
the past as a salvation, transfiguration, and redemption." Art and Answerability, Notes, p. 118.
8 Mikhail Bakhtin, Art andAnswerability, p. 118.
9 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, or Beyond Essence, p. 26.
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Theology is seeking a social space where one must learn to find one's own
voice and to hear the voice of the other within a common social context. But, this
does not mean that one should become the other through taking on the identity of the
other, but rather "one enters another's place while still maintaining one's own place,
one's 'outsideness' with respect to the other."10
1.1 Creating a Space: Liminal and Ethical Space
What, then, is the theological ground for us to stand or live in the world, the
world of plurality in culture and religion? As far as Christian theology is
concerned, it should be the person and life of Jesus Christ who should become the
symbol of cultural affirmation and the dialogical open-ended-process of our life in
the world. But, one of the pitfalls of interpreting Christ's symbol in different cultural
and linguistic settings, is to reduce the Christ event to individualistic and existential
concerns only, rather than the Christ event as a cultural-linguistic system.11 In other
words, the Christ event should be a 'reference' to the reality of cultural plurality, the
ultimate meaning by which present meaning is 'limited' or 'bounded.' And,
moreover, the Christ event as a cultural-linguistic system, should be a place for a
cross-cultural-boundary communication, that rejects cultural relativism and one's
10 Morson and Emerson, "Toward a philosophy of the act," in Rethinking Bakhtin: Extension and
Challenges (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1989), p. 21.
11 Mark Kline Taylor, "In Praise of Shaky Ground: the Liminal Christ and Cultural Pluralism," p.39.
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own cultural ethnocentrism, in favour of contemporary experience of cultural
plurality.
The significance of Jesus in a contemporary pluralistic reality is as a limit
breaker, who preached to and shared table with other people on the edges of Jewish
society; he remained on the edges as a physician to the sick and sinners (Luke 5:30-
32). He broke the code of food by the meal and table-fellowship enjoyed by himself
together with disciples and the sinners. Which means that he broke the pattern of
social relations and social rank set by Jewish tradition, as Mary Douglas said,
If food is treated as a code, the message it encodes will be found
in the pattern of social relations being expressed. The message is
about different degrees of hierarchy, inclusion and exclusion,
boundaries and transactions across the boundaries... Food
categories encodes social event.12
By breaking the code of the ceremonial meal, Jesus crossed the social boundaries and
created a new social map indicating 'all foods are clean and may be eaten.' Here,
Jesus as an event, signifies persons on the border and activities in the liminal space.
He then enables us to cross the border.
12
Mary Douglas, "Deciphering a Meal," in Implicit Meanings (London: Routlege & Kegan Paul,
1975), p. 249. This idea ofmeal or food signifies the social map instructing how to relate people with
others, in order to keep the purity of society. And the human body is a model of the social body,
therefore, as Mary Douglas indicates, the physical body is a model which can stand for any bounded
system. Its boundaries can represent any boundaries which are threatened or precarious. See Mary
Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (London: Routledge
&KeganPaul, 1966), p. 115ff.
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In explaining inter-cultural space, Paul Rabinow, in Reflections on Fieldwork
in Morocco, comments on his relationship to his informant, Ali, that there has been a
terrain of inter-cultural liminality created. He explains,
Under my systematic questioning, Ali was taking realms of his
own world and interpreting them for an outsider. This meant that
he, too, was spending more time in this liminal, self-conscious
world between cultures. This is a difficult and trying experience
- one could almost say it is "unnatural" - and not everyone will
tolerate its ambiguities and strains. This was the beginning of
the dialectic process of fieldwork. I say dialectic because neither
the subject nor the object remain static With Ali there began
to emerge a mutually constructed ground of experience and
understanding, a realm of tenuous common sense which was
constantly breaking down, being patched up, and re-examined,
first here, then there. As time wears on, anthropologist and
informant share a stock of experiences upon which they hope to
rely with less self-reflection in the future. The common
understanding they construct is fragile and thin, but it is upon
this shaky ground that anthropological inquiry proceeds.13
This space is 'fragile and thin,' it can be 'breaking down, being patched up, and re¬
examined, first here, then, there,' as Rabinow said. This inter-cultural liminal space
is a dialogical space (although Rabinow calls it dialectic) so fragile, that it can only
exist as an ethical sphere, where 'ethics' comes first before anything else (ontology,
epistemology, and etc.). It is like the 'Christ-event' that was explained previously a
symbol of theological studies in a culturally plural context.
The liminal world between cultures is a dialogical space where all
participants do not remain static, but are in the process of engaging something new;
13 Paul Rabinow, Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco, p. 39
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this space is a mutually constructed and shared experience, in which neither
absolutism nor utter relativism exist.14 This is what Rabinow calls "doubling of
consciousness" in which Rabinow and Ali become conscious not only of their own
cultural and linguistic worlds but also of the liminal world that is born between them
through encounter with each other's self reflection.15 In this inter-cultural liminal
space, what is broken is one's totality and what occurs is a kind of self-loss, a
sacrifice in the quest for participant-observation of 'the other.'16 Thus, the symbol of
Christ should be related to our concern of the inter-cultural liminality in which we
can understand the intrinsic Christian faith and praxis in relation to the other. As
Mark Kline Taylor argues that "Christian liminal existence orients one toward
affirmation of the other that is necessary.... for living in the uncertainty and
discomfort that often attend the disclaiming of any privileged, imposed common
ground existing outside of dialogical encounter."17 The dialogical encounter
between Moroccan Ali and American Rabinow, signifies the intrinsic Christian
liminal existence "to accent those differences, to highlights one's own particularity
1 8
and the other's, and only then to talk about unity" by standing on the 'shaky
ground.'
On this shaky ground, the dialogical event stands. It is the space in-between
cultures that creates a new meaning, apart from and together with cultures involved.
14 Mark Kline Taylor, "In Conversation with Gilkey," The Journal ofReligion, Vol. 11, no. 2, April
1991, pp. 162-163.
15 Paul Rabinow, Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco, p. 119; Mark Kline Taylor, "In Conversation
with Gilkey,"pp.. 154-155.
16 Mark Kline Taylor, "In Praise of Shaky Ground: the Liminal Christ and Cultural Pluralism" p.43.
17 Mark Kline Taylor, "In Praise of Shaky Ground: the Liminal Christ and Cultural Pluralism" p.46.
18 Mark Kline Taylor, "In Praise of Shaky Ground: the Liminal Christ and Cultural Pluralism" p.46.
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In this respect, Homi Bhabha indicates in relation to the new meaning that "the
production ofmeaning requires that these two places be mobilised in the passage to a
Third Space."19 The readiness to accept a new reality means,
a willingness to descend into that alien territory... may reveal that
the theoretical recognition of the split-space of enunciation may
open the way to conceptualising an international culture, based
not on the exoticism or multi-culturalism of the diversity of
cultures, but on the inscription and articulation of culture's
hybridity.20
Bakhtin also indicates its new cultural productive effect:
It must be pointed out... that while it is true the mixture of
linguistic world views in organic hybrids remains mute and
opaque, such unconscious hybrids have been at the same time
profoundly productive historically: they are pregnant with
potential for new world view.21
This 'third' space, a space 'in-between' is uncertain, ambivalent, undecidable in its
character, and moreover, it is always a dangerous space that is separated from the
familiar world. Victor Turner in explaining the ritual space of 'in-between,'
The attributes of liminality or of liminal personae are necessarily
ambiguous since these persons elude or slip through the network
of classifications that normally locate states and positions
assigned and arraigned by law, custom, convention, and
ceremony... Liminal entities, such as neophytes in initiation
rites, demonstrate that as liminal beings they have no status.
19 Homi Bhabha, The Location ofCulture, p. 36.
20 Homi Bhabha, "The commitment to theory," New Formations, no. 5, 1988, p. 22.
21 Mikhail Bakhtin, Dialogic Imagination, p. 360.
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Their behaviour is normally passive or humble. It is as though
they are being ground down or reduced to a uniform condition to
be fashioned a new and endowed with additional powers to
enable them to cope with their new station in life.22
Hence, going through the 'third' space is like a ritual process in which the old role
and status are rooted out, and something new is created; this is to say that a radical
99 . . •
transformation is happening by the experience of undergoing the ritual. Liminahty
presents a border zone encounter between cultures, races, or nations, the area of
"blurring and merging of distinctions."24 In the border zone, the subject may
experience freedom from the constraints of normative or oppressive social structures,
because, for Turner, liminality represents "the possibility... of standing aside not only
from one's own social position but from all social positions and of formulating a
potential unlimited series of alternative social arrangement." Turner reiterates the
power of liminality to effect a radical change of consciousness:
The knowledge obtained in the liminal period is thought to
change the inmost nature of the neophyte, impressing him, as a
seal impresses wax, with the characteristics of his new state. It is
not a mere acquisition of knowledge, but a change in being.26
22 Victor Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1969), p. 95.
23 Victor Turner, The Forest of Symbols: Aspects ofNdembu Ritual (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1967), p. 102.
24 Victor Turner, From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of Play (New York: PAJ
Publications, 1982), p. 26, Cited from Mae G. Henderson, "Introduction: Border, Boundaries, and
Frame(work)s," in Borders, Boundaries, and Frames: Cultural Criticism and Cultural Studies, ed by
Mae Henderson (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 5.
25 Victor Turner, Drama, Fields, and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society (Ithaca. NY.:
Cornell University, 1974), p. 13-14.
26 Victor Turner, The Forest ofSymbols: Aspects ofNdembu Ritual (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1967), p. 102.
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Therefore, 'being in dialogue' means to be in a 'third' space for 'the I and the Other'
together in conversation (as shown in the idea of Franz Rosenzweig, in ch. 3.) This
is a space where common presence has to be shared, where partners are
acknowledged, and where new possibility can be contemplated. And in this space,
dialogical event occurs. This dialogical event of togetherness is not the same as the
understanding that comes out of it, but rather it is an event that limits oneself and
places oneself in relation to the other event, in conferring the meaning of the event
in a particular situation; in a way, this is to see ourselves constantly through the eyes
of others. Meaning in this space, is always experienced in relation with others, in
physical settings. Meaning is therefore an ethical product.
This is our relationship together living in the unfinished/ongoing world,
where we have an ethical obligation to bring people together into human solidarity.
It is only in ethical solidarity that (the infinity of) the Other can prevent the I being
manipulative and totalising for myself,27 for, as Levinas says, "subjectivity is being a
hostage" of the relation to the other.28 And, as Derrida writes, "Without that
[ethical] responsibility there would be no language,"29 the response that one offers to
the other in dialogue always carries this ethical responsibility prior to response. This
human solidarity and ethical responsibility for the Other are a structural necessity
and should be the consciousness of human activity and, moreover, of theological
discourse.
27 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 80.
28 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence, p. 127.
29
Jacques Derrida, "At This Very Moment in This Work Here I Am," trans. Ruben Berezdivin, Re-
Reading Levinas, ed by Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley (Bloomington: Indian University
Press, 1991), p. 23.
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1.2. Inter-Cultural Dialogue as Theological Discourse.
In this global and culturally pluralistic context we are in, what is being
proposed here is that our theological focal point should be on humanity as a relation
of beings in dialogue, attempting to be open toward the future and to overcome the
limits of each other. In this sphere, what is important is the necessity of how to
think and to act truthfully and faithfully in the continuation and the development of
dialogical relations. The partners in dialogue or interlocutors in dialogue should
accept each other as those who have an inalienable right and an unconditional
obligation, and learn from each other in developing 'togetherness.' In a way,
togetherness is the beginning and end of dialogical relation, even in ever changing
situations, which means that the temporal togetherness is also to be open and
dialogised in the future dialogue. This is a dialogical event in which the meaning of
truth defines and confirms itself, because the truth of being is actualised in the figure
of dialogical relation.
From this perspective, dialogue is a principle force in the formation of
cultural history. Inter-cultural correlatives come in connection with the actual
development of dialogical relations, as the dialogical principle is aimed at the
integrity and solidarity of humanity, against totalisation, domination or
systematisation. This inter-cultural dialogue is a dialogical event of cultures and
traditions, creating or conditioning a third space in which people from various
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origins speak with each other. Therefore, this event is a necessary condition before
one can talk about its effects.
But, this dialogical event occurs when people from different cultures come to
talk with each other; it occurs in the commitment of human solidarity. It desires to
create a new situation "to overcome fragmentation and to find a new system offering
30
a unified world view and simple and strict rules for human conduct." However,
what is created internally in the dialogical event, is 'double-voiced discourse' or
'double-consciousness,' in which participants view things from each other's
perspective. Bakhtin explains this discourse in terms of the discourse of the
novelist:
It serves two speakers at the same time and expresses
simultaneously two different intentions: the direct intention of
the character who is speaking, and the refracted intention of the
author. In such discourse there are two voices, two meanings
and two expressions. And all the while these two voices are
dialogically interrelated, they - as it were - know about each
other (just as two exchanges in a dialogue know of each other
and are structured in this mutual knowledge of each other); it is
as if they actually hold a conversation with each other. Double-
voiced discourse is always internally dialogized.31
Consequently, what is important in cultural history, is the fact that its centre is
nowhere but at the in-between of cultures and traditions. The central point of
30 Thomas M. Seebohm, "Literary Tradition, Intercultural Transfer and Cross-Cultural Conversation,"
in Cross-Cultural Conversation (Initiation), ed by Anindita Niyogi Balslev (Atlanta, GA.: Scholars
Press, 1996), p. 164.
31 Mikhail Bakhtin, Dialogic Imagination, p. 324.
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reference is neither certain subjects nor communities, but universal meaning. The
task of inter-cultural dialogue is to discover particular meanings, through the
dialogical event, in connection with ultimate meaning. The desire is to go beyond
the provisionality of a particular cultural meaning.
In the same way, the theological discourse means to go beyond a particular
understanding of the God-man relationship. Dialogical discourse between different
theologies from different cultures is a condition for discovering the universal
meaning of that relation. This inter-cultural theological discourse brings a particular
cultural meaning into question, and makes possible a kind of self-criticism and self-
transcendence. However, we must acknowledge that conversation within theology
has been going on for a long time in a way which voices from remote pasts are
available to us through historical evidences (such as scriptures, creeds, texts, etc.),
and through historical exchange, it has continually developed. But, what is
radically different from the historical development of Christian theology, is the fact
that today there are many new voices from radically different historical backgrounds
and milieu desiring (or demanding) to participate in this on-going theological
conversation. Again, the most significant realisation is from the fact that the inter-
cultural theological dialogue demands the ethical (moral) responsibility of T in
relation to the meaning of'others.'
32 See Walter E. Wyman, Jr. "The Historical Consciousness and the Study of Theology," in Shifting
Boundaries: Contextual Approaches to the Structure of Theological Education, ed by Barbara G.
Wheeler and Edward Farley (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1991), pp. 91-117.
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Therefore, what constitutes the space for theological discourse within
differences, is firstly the realisation of the limitedness of a particular meaning;
secondly, dialogical engagement; thirdly, the effects of dialogue between different
meanings, that form new meanings apart from, and together with meanings involved:
in other words, a 'third space.' This space 'in-between' is not an expression of
dogmatic considerations, but rather an actual situation or reality in which we live .
Homi Bhabha indicates that "the production of meaning requires that these two
places be mobilised in the passage through a Third Space," and furthermore, the
meaning of the third space "makes the structure of meaning and reference an
ambivalent process." This brings a challenge to the traditional "sense of the
historical identity of culture as a homogenising, unifying force, authenticated by the
original Past," and constitutes "the discursive conditions of enunciation that ensure
that the meaning and symbols of culture have no primordial unity or fixity; that even
the same signs can be appropriated, translated, rehistoricised, and read anew."33 In
the same way, theological discourse should be articulated in the third space, if it
desires to be faithful to the possibility of the true God who is infinite. Standing in
the third space always, means, as Bhabha says, "a willingness to descend into that
alien territory" and an "articulation of cultural hybridity,"34- or ambivalence.
Thus, inter-cultural dialogue becomes a significant discourse for theology in
recognising or promoting the creativity of human relations, and offers itself as an
opportunity - a place where one's cultural and theological understanding becomes
33 Homi K. Bhabha, "Commitment to Theory," New Formations 5, 1988, pp. 18-21
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possible in the experience of different others, in realisation of the human
togetherness or solidarity. Inter-cultural discourse promotes a self-criticism of one's
own meaning in accepting structural limitation. It seeks the possibility of the
development of human reality, beyond the confines of a particular culture. In this
space of 'inter,' "we will find those words with which we can speak of Ourselves
and Others," and "we may elude the politics of polarity and emerge as the others of
ourselves."35 Inter-cultural dialogue promotes and enforces the meaning of
humanity, as the theological discourse brings anthropocentrically consummated
meanings into question and demands a self-criticism in the light of future meaning.
For theological discourse, inter-religious dialogue is possible within the
context of inter-cultural dialogue, because the meaning of the inter-cultural
correlative signifies the ultimate meaning or quest of religion. As shown in inter-
cultural discourse and its effect in the above, Raimundo Panikkar says,
Dialogue is, fundamentally, opening myself to another so that he
might speak and reveal my myth that I cannot know by myself
because it is transparent to me, self-evident. Dialogue is a way
of knowing myself and of disentangling my own point of view
from other viewpoints and from me, because it is grounded so
deeply in my own roots as to be utterly hidden from me. It is the
other who through our encounter awakens this human depth
latent in me in an endeavour that surpasses both of us. Dialogue
sees the other not as an extrinsic, accident aid, but as the
indispensable, personal element in our search for truth, because I
am not a self-sufficient, autonomous individual. In this sense,
dialogue is a religious act par excellence because it recognises
34Homi K. Bhabha, "Commitment to Theory," p. 22.
35Homi K. Bhabha, "Commitment to Theory," p. 22
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my religatio to another, my individual poverty, the need to get
out ofmyself, transcend myself, in order to save myself.36
Inter-religious theological discourse makes us become aware of the multi-religious
milieu, as does inter-cultural dialogue. And the important point is that inter-religious
theological discourse also requires the dialogical space of 'in-between' always.
Panikkar calls this situation "existential risk" in the inter-religious dialogue,
It is not that I wilfully consider myself both an Indian and a
European, a Hindu and a Christian, or that I am by birth,
education, initiation and actual life a man living from and sharing
in the original experiences of the Western tradition, both
Christian and Secular, and the Indian tradition, both Hindu and
Buddhist... The mutual understanding and foundation of the
different traditions of the world may be accomplished only by
sacrificing one's life in the attempt to sustain first the existing
tensions without becoming schizophrenia and to maintain the
polarities without personal or cultural paranoia.37
In this respect, inter-religious dialogue is structurally similar to the inter-personal
dialogue of utterance, in a way in which religion allows the actual inter-religious
combination, but at the same time, acknowledges human togetherness as an event in
which we evaluate each other. This is seeing one's 'own' religion through the eyes
of the others. In this inter-religious dialogical event, we see ourselves in the light of
the ultimate point of reference, that I call God in this sense, and that poses the
question of value. In other words, through reflection of the ultimate value, one can
36 Raimundo Panikkar, Myth, Faith and Hermeneutics (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), pp.242-243.
37 Raimundo Panikkar, "Philosophy as Life-Style," in Philosophers on Their Own Work (Frankfurt:
Peter Lang, 1978), p. 201. quoted from David J. Krieger, The New Universalism: Foundation for a
Global Theology (Maryknoll, NY.: Orbis Books, 1991), p. 45.
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break away from the limitedness of the self and deepen one's own meaning in
relation to the world and others, so that we can find ourselves in new possibilities.
Since all religious ideas and systems are human constructions in order to further our
humanisation, theology is the human creative and imaginary activity that seeks
38
possible adequate orientation in our provisional life and our contingent world.
Thus, theologically, the ultimate point of reference poses the question ofwhat it is to
be human, as theology is for humans and not for God, by calling our anthropocentric
values into question, and through and by the ultimate point of reference, everything
is understood. God, the ultimate point of reference, presents the reality that
relativises and humanises us, as the tension between relativisation and humanisation
"3 Q
creates a "unique and powerful internal dialect."
What has been focused on is the possibility of inter-religious dialogue in the
context of inter-cultural dialogue, since the inter-cultural co-relative allows religious
traditions to exist next to each other. What, then, is required for this inter co-relative
is an attitude toward the border, not coming into the centre - a willingness to become
wise and have a sense of faith. In fact, the idea of a cultural space in between cultures
and traditions is no longer a theoretical possibility, but an actual reality we have to
cope with. In this respect, the ideal environment of this inter-relatedness is the post¬
modern city, as Michael Fischer describes Houston:
38 Gorden Kaufman, An Essay on theological Method (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1979), p.
32. Also see Clifford Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures, p. 127: Geertz indicates that theology
attempts to develop a coherent world vies and ethos, as he says "it is the underlying attitude toward
themselves and their world that life reflects."
39 Gorden Kaufman, Theological Imagination, p. 34.
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Multiculturalism takes on a new form in these spaces, both like
and unlike the older urban immigrant entrepots ofNew York and
Chicago. What fascinates me in these spaces, places and
passages are the cultural translations. We need a new map of
America that begins to envision the pilgrimage sites that Indians
are establishing among the Hindu temples of North America, the
establishment of a little Tehran in Los Angeles.... Above all, we
need attention to the discourses immigrants use in making sense
of their own lives, in comparing their own value system with
their new setting, or in forging philosophically resonant frames
that draw on the genres, tropes, metaphors and imagery of both
old and new cultural settings... Descendants in the future may
retell these stories differently and in more seamless, less
discordant form; for the moment they serve as birth pangs of
something new.40
This is the contemporary urban reality of 'borderland,' the space between cultures
where diverse cultural influences produce ambivalences and 'undecidables'.
Although, as history shows, there has been a consistent exercise of "rational social
engineering, in bringing about, by artificial means, that ambivalence-free
homogeneity," in the past, failed to produce it.41 As shown in Rene Girard's idea of
Sacred Violence and in modern genocides in relation to ethnic-religious-cultural
others, this act of violence has been traditionally justified and legitimised, for
violence or genocide is "rationally instrumental to their ends."42 In this respect,
Bauman uses Rorty to explain violence: "the language of necessity, certainty and
absolute truth cannot but articulate humiliation - humiliation of the other, of
40
Michael M.J. Fischer, "Orientalizing America: Beginning and Middle Passages," Middle East
Report, Sept-Oct, p. 32f. cited from Joel S. Kahn, Culture, Multiculture, Postculture (London: Sage
Pub., 1995), p. 103.
41
Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1991), p.
38.
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different, of the not-up-to-the-standard."43 Therefore, accepting the other as the
other who has equal justification, means ending fear of the other and resisting the
temptation of the cultural crusade. The most significant contributing factor to
cultural plurality is to bring ethics or moral responsibility into the public discourse of
human inter-relation as ambivalence44 or proximity in Levinas' ethical relation to the
Other.
In addition to our relationality with the others, this inter-cultural dialogue
offers an opportunity to actualise the potential of being human, in self-understanding
and developing this understanding through the experience of others. It is a
realisation of the same humanity that we ought to live in a world where inter-cultural
relationality is the key to evaluating one's own culture. Common existence signals
the enhancement of the human being beyond particular culture and its confined
understanding. Having realised the limitedness of particularity, it confirms the
reality of in-between cultures and traditions. These dialogical relations are necessary
conditions for humanity, inter-cultural dialogues which enable human beings to enter
and share the space in-between cultures.
Therefore, since religious traditions are answers to the fundamental questions
of being human and dialogical relations are a necessary condition for a realisation of
cultural existence and the constitution of humanity, the theological task is to
42 Helen Fein, Accounting for Genocide (New York : Free Press, 1979), p. 8. Cited from Zygmunt
Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence, p. 38.
43
Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1991), p.
235.
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articulate the meaning of dialogical relation and its significance, and to participate in
dialogical relation.
2. Inter-Orientation
In a multi-cultural society, inter-cultural and religious dialogue bring an
('my') ethical responsibility for the Other, not scapegoating the Other, into public
theological discourse. This uncovers 'sacred violence' and its mechanisms in
religious institutions and the world. The inter-cultural dialogical event, therefore,
created from the encounters between cultures has great implications for theological
studies. This dialogical doubling, double-consciousness, or hybridity, as an event
challenges traditional Western theology that has been placing itself in a flexible
position, and re-evaluates its position as being unjustifiable due to its ethnocentric
and patriarchal character.
What is needed today, especially in the setting of a 'post-modern'
muticultural urban life, is "an affirmation and a genuine recognition of the integrity
and worth of radically different cultures" and a fight against "all forms of demeaning
stereotypes."45 Moreover, what is needed is not just a conceptual recognition, but a
politics of cultural difference and identity that can promote an ethical and political
involvement in human solidarity. In this respect, what emerges here are the political-
44
Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp.
234-235.
45 Richard Bernstein, "The Hermeneutics of Cross-Cultural Understanding," in Cross-Cultural
Conversation, p. 30.
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ethical implications that come from the hybridity which undermines the authoritative
discourse of a single voice.46 As for Bhabha in relation to the post-colonial discourse,
this hybridity situation reveals the ambivalence at the source of traditional discourse
on authority and "hybridity becomes the moment in which the discourse of colonial
authority loses its univocal grip on meaning and finds itself open to the trace of the
language of the other."47 He indicates that it is "the moment of political change for
. . . 48 .
its transformational value of change lies in the re-articulation, or translation;" it
also denies the monolithic model of division between the West and its other.49
Bakhtin emphasises the crossing of borders and limits and the blurring of
boundaries. Here, the traditional boundary is rejected as he says, "two discourses
equally and directly oriented toward a referential object within the limits of single
context cannot exist side by side without intersecting dialogically," and "two
embodied meanings cannot lie side by side like two objects - they must come into
inner contact; that is, they must enter into a semantic bond."50 The significant point
is the consciousness that is born out of dialogical intersecting or mixing, and in other
words, it is a creative consciousness on the borders or at the cross-roads. In this
dialogical space, subjects meet, participate and answer one another in this ongoing
event, otherwise, we lose our own self. This creative consciousness takes place not
within self-consciousness, but "on the boundary of one's own and someone else's
46 Mikhail Bakhtin, Dialogic Imagination, p. 344.
47
Homi K. Bhabha, "Signs taken for wonders" p. 154, quoted from Robert J.C. Young, Colonial
Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 22.
48 Homi K. Bhabha, "The Commitment to Theory," New Formations, 5, p. 13.
49 See Homi Bhabha, "The Commitment to Theory," New Formations, 5. pp. 5-23.
50 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problem ofDostoevsky's Poetics, pp. 188-189.
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consciousness, on the threshold," encountering one another in tension. This is what
Bakhtin call "the highest degree of sociality."51
It is like metalinguistics that studies the word "within the sphere of dialogic
52interaction itself, that is, in the sphere where discourse lives an authentic life," , as
Bakhtin says,
The life of the word is contained in its transfer from one mouth
to another, from one context to another context, from one social
collective to another, from one generation to another generation.
In this process the word does not forget its own path and cannot
completely free itself from the power of these concrete contexts
into which it has entered.53
Here, Bakhtin indicates that the living word is already transcultural. It is the kind of
living that people experienced on the Day of Pentecost in Acts 2; it is not just a
translingual perception, but it brings and binds people into community. This event
calls for critical dialogue among the many other tongues, indicating that there is no
master narrative but many narratives in dialogue. It indicates the world where there
is no Jerusalem but many Jerusalems; "a world in which the fundamental problem
lies not in the translation and dissemination of a centralized and hegemonic message
into other languages but rather in having different tongues engage in critical dialogue
with one another."54
51 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problem ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 287.
52 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problem ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 202.
53 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problem ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 202.
54 Fernando F. Segovia, '"And They Began to Speak in Other Tongues': Competing Mode of
Discourse in Contemporary Biblical Criticism," in Reading from this Place: Social Location and
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Bakhtin's significant contribution is a dialogism that is not just perceived
within the epistemological and aesthetic sphere, but is resolutely included in the
political and semiotic sphere.55 Therefore, "to be means to communicate" and "to be
means to be for another, and through the other, for oneself,"56in human living
together. Bakhtin also views cultures in terms of 'to be means to communicate';
The realm of culture has no internal territory: it is entirely
distributed along the boundaries, boundaries pass everywhere,
through its every aspect, the systematic unity of culture extends
into the very atoms of cultural life, it reflects like the sun in each
drop of that life. Every cultural act lives essentially on the
boundaries: in this is its seriousness and its significance;
abstracted from boundaries, it loses its soil, it becomes empty,
arrogant, it degenerates and dies.57
According to Bakhtin, this is an existential question of becoming in dialogue with the
others. As he says, to live means to participate in dialogue and to enter into the
world of symposium. Through the crossing of cultural boundaries or the dialogical
event, what is created is some kind of transculturalism in which different cultures
come into contact in a transcultural ethics that conditions the dialogical discourse.
Trans-cultural effort opposes essentialism and monologism; it is me-ontological
praxis that reorients discourses by bringing 'ethics' in. It means ethical participation
Biblical Interpretation in the United States, ed by Fernando F. Segovia and Mary Ann Tolbert
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), p. 32.
55 Graham Pechey, "On the border of Bakhtin: dialogisation, decolonisation," in Bakhtin and Cultural
Theory, ed by Ken Hirschkop and David Shepeherd (Manchester; Manchester University Press, 1989),
pp. 55-56.
56 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problem ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 287.
57 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problem ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 301.
58 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problem ofDostoevsky's Poetics, p. 293.
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in dialogue that requires a willingness and ability to move beyond 'limited'
situations.
What we now have to establish is a 'transcultural ethics' and then bring this
into public discourse, especially into theological discourse. What I am suggesting is
that a dialogic space is provided or created for an ethical discourse that can create
hybrids through dialogue, and that is open to the future meaning-yet-to-be-achieved.
2.1. "Oughtness" over "Pre-Given"
Multi-culturalism is an unavoidable social fact. People who belong to
different cultural traditions have to live together in the same society, or the same
world. But, multi-culturalism presents not only an opportunity, but also a great
potential for conflict, as mentioned before, Bernstein says,
There are all too real dangers of fragmentation, the break-up of
societies, and bizarre forms of separatist doctrines and practices.
There is a danger that a politics of cultural difference slides into
a politics of cultural animosity where no serious mutual
understanding is even ventured. There is a danger of a "clash of
absolutes" where cultural and ethnic groups treat each other as
threatening enemies.59
Therefore, assuming the responsibility for the Other means that 'I' am no longer the
measure of all things, but rather measured by the Other. The Other questions 'my'
59 Richard Bernstein, "The Hermeneutics of Cross-Cultural Understanding," in Cross-Cultural
Conversation, p. 32.
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narcissistic imperialism, and as Levinas says, cuts to the very marrow of my
existence and my freedom, and then reveals the shame of 'my' guilt. So, what is
being suggested to both the West and the non-West, or the colonised and the
coloniser, is to abandon 'my' privileged position for the Other and to respect others
as other.
In recent decades, the non-Western cultures have demanded that the Western
philosophical tradition break its eurocentric egoism and its total manipulation over
the others. But, while demanding it of the West, non-Western intellectuals have
often fallen into the same cultural nationalism, in their insistence on cultural
difference that derived from the past. Conventionally, in the process of
decolonisation, the colonised tended to restore their subjectivity by the simple
inversion of the colonised/coloniser opposition, not realising that they were working
within the same mechanism of differentiation and incommensurability of the
hegemonic practice of the West or the coloniser. Post-colonial discourse is designed
to deconstruct and displace the Eurocentric premises that constructed the Third
World, and at the same time, the culture this discourse represents.60 Therefore, the
post-colonial discourse exposes the danger of cultural nationalism, although cultural
nationalism is a necessary step toward decolonisation, because there is a danger of
false consciousness, as Fanon says,
The historical necessity in which the men of African culture find
themselves to radicalise their claims and to speak more of
60 Benita Parry, "Resistance theory / theorising resistance or two cheers for nativism," in Colonial
discourse /postcolonial theory, pp. 172-173.
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African culture than of national culture tend to lead them to a
blind alley.61
In this respect, Fanon's articulation of cultural nationalism or discourse reminds us
of the danger that it can become an ideological project of romanticism toward the
mythic or magic beginning or origin of the past and the so called 'authenticity of a
particular culture.'
What is important is not 'pre-given' cultural identity or authenticity, but
rather our ethical response which attempts to find 'ethical significance,' in a
changing situation of encountering other cultures. This means, the tendency to fix
one's 'own' tradition should be changed, because "to be hostile to changes within
one's own tradition implies a potential hostility to other cultures." In this cultural
engagement, Bhabha argues that cultural identities cannot be ascribed to be 'pre-
given,':
The representation of difference must not be hastily read as the
reflection of pre-given ethnic or cultural traits set in the fixed
tablet of tradition. The social articulation of difference, from the
minority perspective, is a complex, on-going negotiation that
seeks to authorise cultural hybridities that emerge in moments of
historical transformation.63
In the on-going process, the significant point is social transformation by bringing
ethics into the public discourse of sociality for all the others. Living on the border
61 Franz Fanon, Toward the African Revolution, p. 172.
62 Thomas M. Seebohm, "Literary Tradition, Intercultural Transfer and Cross-Cultural
Conversations," p. 149
63 Homi Bhabha, The Location ofCulture, p. 2.
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means more than self-serving; it offers an ethical space in which to break the
mechanism - the inside and outside, the static division ofmargin and centre, and the
pure and contaminated, and create the liminality between identities. Holquist says,
"dialogue bears the seed of hope" of human solidarity: "in so far as my 'I' is
dialogic, it ensures that my existence is not a lonely event but part of a large
whole."64 This ethical space of dialogue "frees my existence from the very
circumscribed meaning it has in the limited configuration of self/other relations
available in the immediate time and particular place ofmy life."65 This means the
crisis of self-identity, and therefore, it requires one to re-evaluate everything that is
'inward-looking-from-within.' As Bakhtin says on this defamiliarization process
the immanent criteria of a given domain of culture are not
accepted any longer, nor are the domains of culture as
determinate cultural domains.... One strives to act and create
directly in the unitary event of being as its sole participant; one is
unable to humble oneself to the status of a toiler, unable to
determine one's own place in the event of being through others,
to place oneself on a par with others.66
Therefore, the self needs to look for something from the outside; in this process, as
Bakhtin says, "the culture of boundaries becomes impossible, of course; boundaries
are just what life has nothing to do with; all creative energies withdraw from the
boundaries, leaving them to the mercy of fate."67 This realisation of the
impossibility of stable boundaries and the necessity of looking for something other
64
Michael Holquist, Dialogism: Bakhtin and His World, p. 38.
65 Michael Holquist, Dialogism: Bakhtin and His World, p. 38.
66 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," in Art and Answerability, pp. 202-203.
67
Mikhail Bakhtin, "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," in Art andAnswerability, p. 203.
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than one's own, renders a world view of a future, that is not the absolute future, but
"the proximate, social (and even political) future - the proximate morally imperative
plan of the future," 68 that comes from an ethical position which arises in
participating in the event of ultimate meaning-yet-to-be-actualised. The provocation
of border life and of cultural hybridity, provides an ethical condition which resists
stagnation, control and manipulation, the desire to fix-the-identity-within, and opens
up the possibility of new forms of human solidarity in the future, by participating in
the dialogical process. This is an obligation, the 'oughtness of responsibility' that
responds to each situation; an ethical 'saying' of dialogue over the 'said' of tradition
in discovering the significant meaning of humanity for all, in the hope of "a
tranquillity as a founded axiological posture of consciousness" and "an expression of
trust, or faith."69
As for Christian theology, dialogue invites us to join with non-Western
Christian traditions and other religions to explore the riches of religious pluralism.
Dialogue is not essentially a search for agreement. It is a method of arriving at a
better understanding of each other. We need the perspectives of others to give us
fresh insight into the creative possibilities of our own faith. We need the perspective
of others to help us to teach the faith more effectively. In religious dialogue, the
significance of other religions must become part of the Christian tradition, for
religious pluralism is part of the context in which the church exists. As for the non-
Western Christian traditions, this plurality of traditions is a necessary condition in
keeping theology on the dialogical path of becoming towards ultimate meaning-yet-
68 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," in Art and Answerability, p. 205.
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to-be. The recognition of outsideness or the Other should not result in our apathy,
but rather in mutual necessity as we need others and others need us. In this relation
of interaction, the constituting and conditioning factor is the ethical responsibility of
necessity, not of occasional choice. In the ethical space, there is no 'moral
relativism':
the multitude of value centres should lead us to doubt our values
and to make our commitment to them provisional. But we do not
end up with moral relativism. On the contrary, we arrive at a
view that makes us continually and personally responsible for
our actions and for assessing our moral responses.70
In a way, dialogue makes these theologies of dialogue the significant theology in
deepening, creating, criticising, and sustaining hope. This is a fundamental attitude
of faith and trust in God, in this process of becoming towards ultimate time and
meaning.
What then is the role and function of intellectuals or theologians in bringing
ethics into public discourse and education? How do we bring public discourse into
the ethical space of dialogue and promote the human solidarity and justice for all ?
2.2. Pedagogy of the Victim.
Turner argues that education is a ritual process in which, when the ritual
process is completed, the initiands return to society with new roles and status, and
69 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," in Art andAnswerability, p. 205.
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new rights and obligations. And their status in the community has been redefined. In
fact, after the ritual, they become useful again to society as they take up the roles for
which the ritual has prepared them.71 But, as Edward Said points out in Orientalism,
in the West, the institution and the individual become professionalised, as the
imaginable and static East became the object ofWestern pursuit and the intellectual
became 'expert.' In what is happening today the same mechanism of Orientalism,
still operates in contemporary academia. As Bruce Robbins reminds us what is now
called the 'Third World' becomes the career of the professionalised intellectual
interpreting and debating from the metropolitan academic perspective.72 However,
what is revealed through 'post-colonial discourse' is the political benefit of this
particular professional logic, and as Edward Said says, its neglect of religious duties
or spiritual needs.73
It is similar with the Third World intellectuals; if the profession is based on
'culture,' then it "restricts its oppositionality to what ever political value the
resupplying of this object might have." Because, as Robbins says, "if the past
proximates of culture are the foundation of the humanities in a time of inhuman
distances, then the criticism remains a stay-at-home."74 Edward Said in "Third World
70 Morson and Emerson, "Introduction," in Rethinking Bakhtin, p. 20.
71 Victor Turner, The Forest of Symbols: Aspects ofNdembu Ritual (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1967), pp. 251-60.
72 Bruce Robbins, "The East is a career: Edward Said and the logics of professionalism," in Edward
Said: A Critical Reader, p. 48.
73 Edward Said, The World, the Text, and the Critic, p. 34. cited from Bruce Robins, , "The East is a
career: Edward Said and the logics ofprofessionalism," p. 62.
74
Bruce Robbins,, "The East is a career: Edward Said and the logics of professionalism," p. 68.
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Intellectuals and Metropolitan Culture" points to the irony of the fact that 'the East'
is a career of its own for intellectuals of the Third World, as he pointed out:
the work of intellectuals from the colonial or peripheral regions
of the world, intellectuals who wrote not in a native language but
in an "imperial" language, who felt themselves to be organically
tied to a mass effort at resisting imperial rule.... These figures
address the metropolis using the techniques, the discourses, the
very weapons of scholarship and criticism once reserved
exclusively for the European.75
Here, the intellectuals of the Third World are professionalised in the same way the
Western metropolitan intellectuals are confined within the academic-elite group, and
sometimes create for themselves the bourgeois-elite intellectualism and nationalism
that ignores and marginalises the mass. Spivak warns of "the continuing
lf\
construction of the subaltern," in the presence of Third World nationalist
discourse, and warns against professionalised intellectualism as a form of social
practice.77 Professionalism and elitism are as dangerous in Third World discourse as
in Western discourse, because they cease to speak for or with the mass, but begun to
speak to the mass.78 Therefore, a significant break with the discourse of intellectuals
of both 'West' and "non-West,' revealed in the post-colonial discourse of border, is
the resistance to professionalisation as a social practice, and the initiation of a
counter 'anti-intellectual intellectual movement' to fight monologic and oppressive
75 Edward Said, "Third World Intellectuals and Metropolitian Culture," Raritan, vol. 9, no. 3. (Winter
1990), p. 29.
76
Gayatri Spivak, "Can the subaltern speak," in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, ed by
Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana, II.: University of Illinois Press, 1988), p. 295.
77
Gayatri Spivak, "Can the subaltern speak," in Marxism and the Interpretation ofCulture, p. 308.
78 Neil Lazarus, "National Consciousness and intellectualism," p. 215.
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discourse or social policy, in favour of justice and human solidarity based on ethical
responsibility for the Other.
A Sri Lankan theologian Sugirtharajah indicates in the introduction of Voices
from the Margin, that the term 'Third World' has another meaning which designates
"a people who have been excluded from power, from the authority to mould and
shape their own future - racial minorities, the poor, women, and the marginalized
people of the world."79 And he quotes from Aloysius Pieris, an other Sri Lankan
theologian saying that 'Third World' is "something that happens wherever and
whenever socio-economic dependence in terms of race, class, or sex generates
80
political and cultural slavery, fermenting thereby a new personhood." This clearly
signifies the relation of culture and power, being centrally located in the socio¬
political struggle of human reality. The other meaning of 'Third World' indicates the
universal desire of the 'oppressed' or 'victim' to question hegemonic discourses and
take them into the public discourse of ethics -social responsibility, justice and
human solidarity.
The ethics of the oppressed or victim challenges the contemporary discourse
ofprofessionalised pursuit, especially in education, since, in many cases, it has been
the most useful instrument of a mechanism for social and cultural reproduction and a
repository for transmitting both the knowledge and ideas of the culture of capitalism
and the high cultural value and ideals of the dominant society and of the official
79 R.S. Sugirtharajah, "Introduction," in Voices from the Margin, p. 3.
80
Aloysius Pieris, An Asian Theology ofLiberation (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), p. 87, cited from
Sugirtharajah, "Introduction," in Voices from theMargin, p. 3.
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discourse. This indicates the gap between the public or popular discourse and the
official or dominant discourse, and reveals the fact that the gap is filled by the
'power-knowledge' relation of the privileged position. From this perspective, the
most important element in contemporary education is the intellectual. Cornel West
comments:
The fundamental role of the public intellectual - distinct from,
yet building on, the indispensable work of academics, experts,
analysis, and pundits - is to create and sustain high-quality public
discourse addressing urgent public problems which enlightens
and energises fellow citizens, promoting them to take public
action. This role requires a deep commitment to the life of the
mind - a perennial attempt to clear our minds of cant - which
serves to shape the public destiny of a people. Intellectual and
political leadership is neither elitist nor populist; rather it is
democratic, in that each of us stands in public space.81
Thus, the significant role of the intellectual is to contest professional expertise and
its hierarchical and dominant role, and to create institutional spaces on the border, the
hybridised space creating the conditions for new forms of human solidarity. As
Bhabha indicates, border subjects are able to negotiate difference, while opening or
creating possibilities for the new: "Communities negotiate 'difference' through a
borderline process that reveals the hybridity of cultural identity: they create a sense
of themselves to and through an other."82
81 Cornel West cited in Henry Gates, Jr. and Cornell West, The Future of the Race (New York:
Knopf, 1996), p. 71. cited from http://www.peterlang,com/taboo/giroux,htm\
82 Homi Bhabha, "Black and White and Read All Over," in Artforum (October, 1995), p. 17. cited
from http://www.peterlang,com/taboo/giroux,htm\
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The role of educator or intellectual, is similar to that of the 'cultural worker,'
in inter-cultural studies, since inter-cultural studies "challenges the alleged
ideological and institutional innocence of mainstream educators by arguing that
teachers always speak within historical and socially constructed relations of
power."83 Inter-cultural discourse, then, offers some possibilities for education
system and educators to provide institutional spaces so that a critical interrogation of
the relationship between knowledge and power or authority can be articulated.
Education as a space on the border-crossing, offers the means to examine one's own
historical location and to construct an ethical language. It calls for the intellectuals
"to assume responsibility with regard to the task of translating theory back to a
constmctive practice that transforms the everyday terrain of cultural and political
power."84 The intellectual or educator engaging in dialogue on the border, unlike the
elitist intellectual, advocates that the vocation "be rooted in pedagogical and political
work tempered by humility, a moral focus on suffering, and the need to produce
alternative visions and policies that go beyond a language of critique."85
What is important is not the question of 'where are you coming from?' but of
'what are you standing between ( or in-between)?' as James Clifford suggests of "a
subject who travels cultures," in dynamic shifts and translations. The challenge is
to articulate the space of 'in-between' that takes us outside the familiar boundary.
83
Henry A. Giroux, "Is there a place for cultural studies in college of education?" in
Counternarratives: Cultural Studies and Critical Pedagogies in Postmodern Spaces, ed by Henry
Giroux and Colin Lankshear, Peter McLaren and Michael Peters (New York: Routledge, 1996), pp.
42-43.
84
Henry A. Giroux, "Is there a place for cultural studies in college of education?" p. 54.
85
Henry A. Giroux, "Is there a place for cultural studies in college of education?" p. 54
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This is an act of positioning of the subject who sees himself or herself as a site of
contradiction and ambivalence, and who refuses to become a detached observer, but
a participant in the process. This indicates a de-centring of the subject; an ethically
motivated intellectual critique both in its pedagogical practice and in its institutional
formation. This is a decolonisation in which the Third World comes into dialogue
with the First World, and the recognition of the First World being constituted by
relations beyond its borders - the otherness in the subject of 'I,'
One of the difficulties, however, that we are facing in the institutional
formation of the West and the challenges of internationalism or globalisation, is the
issue of curriculum, as Aronowitz and Giroux point out:
Few efforts are being made to rethink the entire curriculum in the
light of the new migration and immigration, much less develop
entirely different pedagogies.... Some schools have "added"
courses in the history and culture of Asian, Latin American and
Caribbean societies, but have little thought of transforming the
entire humanities and social studies curricula in the light of the
cultural transformations of the school.87
As a consequence, the important condition for a 'new pedagogy' is to open up new
institutional spaces, a hybridised cultural space, in which "students can experience
and define what it means to be cultural producers capable of both reading different
86 James Clifford, "Travelling Cultures," in Cultural Studies, ed by Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson,
and Paula Treicher (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 109.
87
Stanley Aronowitz and Henry Giroux, Postmodern Education (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1991), p. 6, quoted from Henry Giroux, "Slacking Off: Border Youth and
Postmoden Education," in Counternarratives: Cultural Studies and Critical Pedagogies in
Postmodern Spaces, ed by Henry Giroux , Colin Lankshear, Peter McLaren and Michael Peters (New
York: Routledge, 1996), p. 67.
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texts and producing them,"88 against the institutionalised ideology that attempts to
maintain the status quo. On the border-crossing, 'new pedagogy' offers a new
vision of human solidarity and at the same time, initiates the critical mind and
attitude from this new perspective, in resisting the totalising and systematising
discourse of violence and representation, and in looking for the transcultural ethics
that suggests a new way ofbeing and becoming human for all.
What is being proposed here is an ethical responsibility within the
educational system which questions how historical events position Western
intellectuals as authoritative and empowered speakers. This seeks a dialogue with
the Other allowing "for the possibility that the oppressed will produce a 'counter-
OQ <
sentence' that can then suggest a new historical narrative." Therefore, intellectuals
should accept the voices of the Other in questioning the truth, and also find "ways of
putting fragments of knowledge, partial views, and separate disciplines in contact
with questions" so that the world we live in can be seen for what it is.90 Merod
insists on political engagement of intellectuals on the issues of social injustice and
the oppressed, when he talks about the North American academy:
North American intellectuals need to move beyond theory,
tactics, and great dignified moral sentiments to support, in the
most concrete ways possible, people harmed or endangered by
the guiltless counter-revolutionary violence of state power... The
major intellectual task today is to build a political community
where ideas can be argued and sent into the world of news and
88
Henry Giroux, "Slacking Off: Border Youth and Postmoden Education ,"p. 75.
89 Linda Alcoff, "The problem of speaking for others," Cultural Critique, no. 20 (1991-1992), p. 23.
90 Jim Merod, The Political Responsibility of the Critic (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987),
p. 188.
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information as a force with a collective voice, a voice that names
cultural distortions and the unused possibilities of human
intelligence.91
Q9
In achieving this task, Bhabha insists on "a borderline moment," the ritual moment
in Victor Turner, "to perform the act of cultural translation,"93 that creates hybridity
which is "the perplexity of the living as it interrupts the representation of the fullness
of life; it is an instance of iteration, in the minority discourse, of the time of the
arbitrary sign - 'the minus in the origin' - through which all forms of cultural
meaning are open to translation because their enunciation resists totalisation."94
Thus, 'moving into liminality' is what we are calling 'border crossing.' This is a site
in which the border subject discovers the cultural creativity and cultural authority to
formulate "new model, symbols, and paradigms."95 Education becomes the site of
translation, and critical educators are translators, like performing priests and their
rituals, therefore, the educators in both the First and Third World, must assume a
transformative role by dialogising the Other rather than trying to represent the Other.
The aim of critical education as a ritual process, is to cross the boundary of
one's identity into the new; here, the traditional boundaries and barriers are broken
and become transcultural or translinguistical space for dialogue. Like the idea of
Carnival in Bakhtin in this self-other relation, it is not 'I' representing the others, but
as an alternative, it is 'I' participating in relation, as carnival "does not acknowledge
91 Jim Merod, The Political Responsibility ofthe Critic, p. 191.
92 Homi Bhabha, Nation andNarration (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 314.
93 Homi Bhabha, Nation andNarration, p. 314.
94 Homi Bhabha, Nation and Narration, p. 314.
95 Victor Turner, From Ritual to Treatre, p. 28.
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any distinction between actors and spectators... Carnival is not a spectacle seen by
the people; they live in it and everyone participates because its very idea embraces
all the people."96 Therefore, critical education is a theological moment in which the
third meaning is realised, a universal spirit that is "a special condition of the entire
Q7
world, of the world's revival and renewal, in which all take part," in creating a
different order of human relations. Hence, as this carnival moment is the moment of
escaping from systematic and official high culture, and from the ideology that limits
QO
what can be known, felt and thought, critical education as "creative destruction"
should challenge the status quo or the unsaid underlying assumptions that makes the
status quo possible, and suggest an alternative way of concrete life of renewal.
Bakhtin's "carnival sense of world" is the dialogic sense of truth in generating
"genre-shaping significance,"99 - "a new mode of interrelationship between
individuals, counterpoised to the all-powerful socio-hierarchical relationships of
noncarnival life."100 Education as a function, like carnival, is value generating, and
offers a vision of hope, and it is also the site of working towards a new world.
Accordingly education should be worked out from an ethics that is a matter not of
knowledge but of wisdom, in a continuing process of becoming-as-open-ended-
dialogue. As Bakhtin expresses it,
Nothing conclusive has yet taken place in the world, the ultimate
word of the world and about the world has not yet been spoken,
96 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, p. 7.
97 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, p. 7.
98 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, p. 121.
99 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevesky's Poetics, p. 131.
100 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevesky's Poetics, p. 123.
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the world is open and free, everything is still in the future and
will always be in the future.101
Hence, pedagogy or education intrinsically presupposes a sense of faith, an attitude
toward an ultimate value, the divine outsideness. It is only through the dialogical-
critical structure, that theological education can ensure its critical character in
promoting human solidarity as an act of faith, desiring the transformative presence of
God and hoping for a new humanity in resisting violence and oppression.
2.3. Theology on the Border or a Hermeneutics ofthe Diaspora
Traditionally, theological education in Western academia, has locked itself
within the boundary of its own authority in an attempt to preserve and protect the
102
status quo. In a sense, theologising and theological practice is idolatrous. There
is a tendency to absolutise what is only culturally and politically relevant in a
particular situation What is needed is a critical theological pedagogy to resist
systematising and totalising discourse, and to rethink the role of the intellectual in a
contemporary condition, as Cornel West says:
No longer should intellectuals deceive themselves by believing -
as do humanist and Marxist intellectuals - that they are struggling
101 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevesky's Poetics, p. 166.
102 Paul Knitter, "Beyond a Mono-religious Theological Education," in Shifting Boundaries:
Contextual Approaches to the Structure of Theological Education, ed by Barbara G. Wheeler and
Edward Farley (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1991), p. 153
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"on behalf' of the truth; rather the problem is the struggle over
the very status of truth and the vast institutional mechanism
which accounts for this status.103
This Foucaultian idea can be an instrument in interrogating and destablising
totalising tendencies and privileged positions within theological discourse so that
they can engage in discourse with others, so called 'minority' discourses. The
important thing is to acknowledge that our models of interpretation, perspective and
ideology are constructed, and we need to break down the traditional and Eurocentric
boundaries of the discipline. Paul Knitter says that "one effective way of unlocking
the door of the house of authority is to recognize that there are other traditions that
also claim us,"104 indicating the awareness of pluralism and the resistance to
domination as important elements in theological education. In order to achieve this,
as bell hooks describes the role of an intellectual, we need "somebody who trades in
ideas by transgressing discursive frontiers... who trades in ideas in their vital bearing
on a wider political culture."105 We need intellectuals who refuse to occupy a single
territory and who cross geographical, cultural, national, and disciplinary borders.
In developing the border intellectual as one who stands at the border of two
cultures, the task of theological education is to break familiar boundaries and create
a mode of translation resistance. In this sense, theology should be, as Farley says,
"wisdom and critical reflection attending faith,"106 as we engage in discourses with
103 bell hooks and Cornel West, Breaking Bread: Insurgent Black Intellectual Life (Boston, MA:
South End Press, 1991), p. 142.
104 Paul Knitter, "Beyond a Mono-religious Theological Education," p. 156.
105 Paul Knitter, "Beyond a Mono-religious Theological Education," p. 152.
106 Edward Farley, The Fragility ofKnowledge, p. 133, quoted from Thomas W. Ogletree, "Christian
Ethics as a Theological Discipline," in Shifting Boundaries, op cit, p. 204.
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different others, on the journey. Having witnessed the post-colonial and global inter-
cultural reality, the significance of diaspora in theological discussion has emerged as
a new way forward to the future. There has emerged a new theological discourse.
Fernando F. Segovia calls it "the hermeneutics of diaspora,"107 and it is relevant to
our discussion for it is comparable to the 'Abrahamic journey' of Levinas as opposed
to Ulysses' journey home. This diasporaic journey or life is extensively mentioned
in the Bible; ever since Abraham's call, foreignness was stressed in the Biblical
narrative. Abraham described himself as "a stranger and a sojourner" (Gen. 23:4).
Lev. 25:23, "For the land is mine, and you are strangers and sojourners with me"
indicates that the land is given, and not disposable to anyone. This also reminds us
that we are all strangers and that this estrangement frees us from the immediate
environment, dominant ideology and value systems, and opens a future possibility.
This diasporaic theological discourse rejects a rigid perspectivalism and
militant particularism in their emphasis on a unified self with a single and essential
identity.108 Rather, this diasporic discourse operates "in an endless exercise of
human and social translation"109 and attempts to overcome binary oppositions and
biculturalism, "resulting in a very paradoxical and alienating situation involving a
continuous twofold existence as permanent strangers or aliens, as permanent
107 Fernando F. Segovia, "Toward a Hermeneutics of the Diaspora: A Hermeneutics of Otherness and
Engagement," in Reading from this Place: Social Location and Biblical Interpretation in the United
States, ed by Fernando F. Segovia and Mary Ann Tolbert (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), pp. 57-
73.
108
Mary Ann Tolbert, "Reading for Liberation," in Reading from this Place: Social Location and
Biblical Interpretation in the United States, p. 274.
109 Fernando F. Segovia, "Toward a Hermeneutics of the Diaspora: A Hermeneutics of Otherness and
Engagement," p. 61.
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'others.'"110 In this existence, as Segovia says of himself, "it is this diaspora in
which I find myself 'thrown' (arrajado) as a human being, as a critic, and as a
theologian; it is this diaspora, therefore, that serves not only as a fundamental
constitutive factor for my social location but also as a point of departure for my
critical and theological voice."111
Life in the diaspora as permanent stranger and alien in a process of constant
translation, reminds us of the existence of other human beings, as 'they' struggle for
life and betterness of life against sustained discrimination and rejection,
dehumanisation and socio-political and cultural devastation. The diaspora provides a
model that defamiliarises one's own tradition and generates a new experience of a
112 • • •"liminal self-conscious world between cultures," where difference and critique
dwell together. Thus, Fernando F. Segovia emphasises,
the voice of our otherness becomes a voice of and for liberation:
not afraid to expose, critique, and provide an alternative vision
and narrative; grounded in mixture as something not to be
eschewed and marginalized but valued and engaged; and
committed to the fundamental principles of freedom and
justice.113
Here, emphasising freedom and justice is not an individualistic act but a communal
act. In this new communal perspective, the communal act is to create a community
110 Fernando F. Segovia, "Toward a Hermeneutics of the Diaspora: A Hermeneutics of Otherness and
Engagement," p. 62.
111 Fernando F. Segovia, "Toward a Hermeneutics of the Diaspora: A Hermeneutics of Otherness and
Engagement," p. 61.
112 Paul Rabinow, Reflections ofFieldwork in Morocco, p. 39.
113 Paul Rabinow, Reflections ofFieldwork in Morocco , p. 67.
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that is interdependent and muti-cultural in dialogue, in an effort to promote freedom
and justice for humanity. For this vision, we need a new identity that is, as Boyarin
says, "ethically appropriate only when the cultural identity is that of a minority,
embattled or, at any rate, non-hegemonic,"114 for the absolutisation of any particular
group leads to the denial of the ethical constraint on the others.
In this sense, the diaspora is characterised as a model; as Boyarin says
"Diaspora provides the model, and only in conditions of Diaspora can such a
resolution be attempted."115 In Christian Theology, this condition is the event of
Christ who is on the border between God and humans, and between humans: kenosis
enables us to realise the border condition as a way of doing theology, and of escaping
territorialising tendencies. This means breaking one's own totality, solitude, and
particularity. Thus, cultural and nationalistic conflicts and differences can be
resolved through diasporaic identity and the life of being a stranger and sojourner.
This condition provides us with an instrument of de-territorialisation and directs us
towards the borders, in expecting a "better country" or "promised land;" it is not a
conversion to the other's identity nor becoming the other. Being in the diaspora
means to become wise and to actively participate in liberating praxis.
In the same way, the starting point of theology is not an abstract concept, but
a concrete praxis that establishes a space and a language for critique and self-critique
in radical openness; it is a constructive reflection upon strategies of emancipatory
114 Daniel Boyarin, A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1994), p. 256.
115 Daniel Boyarin, A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics ofIdentity, p. 257.
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action. Thus, theological education should start from the inter-cultural ethnography
in evaluating the present human condition, and the "strategies of cultural critique
need to become intrinsic to theological critique in theological education."116 And, if
theological education is to restore the human condition, its task is to commit to
creating a space where everyone participates without discrimination, violence, or
totalisation.
Having realised that the self is not a pre-given, but comes into being by and
through the act, Christian identity does not originate from the beginning as clearly
defined, but, rather it is a task within the world. Theology reflects on the
117
possibilities of coping with this task. From this perspective, theological
education should become a discourse through which students critically engage and
challenge diverse cultural discourses, and examine the historical, social, political and
economic factors that concern us in the present situation. Theological education
through cultural critique, signifies a shift away from Eurocentric master narratives,
and offers a transcultural approach of de-centering and of border-crossing. It
constructs an ethical space that offers the possibility of extending these ideas to the
wider public discourse of social relations. In other words, it is a call for intellectuals
to assume responsibility for social justice, economic equality and human rights in a
wider sphere, in an effort to produce social change.
There is no such thing as a neutral educational process.
Education either functions as an instrument which is used to
116 Mark K. Taylor, "Celebrating Difference, Resisting Domination," in Shifting Boundaries, p. 274.
117 Werner Jeanrond, "The Problem of the Starting-Point of Theological Thinking," in The
Possibilities ofTheology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), p. 86.
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facilitate the integration of the younger generation into the logic
of the present system and bring about conformation to it, or it
becomes "the practice of freedom," the means by which men and
women deal critically and creatively with reality and discover
how to participate in the transformation of their world.118
Theological education should challenge the students to go beyond any particular
cultural and theological understanding, and engage in acts of constant translation and
critical dialogue with others, in order to recognise theological inquiry as an
emancipatory praxis that transcends differences.
3. From self-development to human solidarity
The inter-cultural dialogue or dialogical relation makes 'us' re-define the
meaning of human relation, by locating 'us' at the edge or border of our own culture
and all other cultures. The significance of dialogical encounter, here, is not just to
understand and re-evaluate ourselves in the light of other cultures, or to understand
other cultures and recognise their values. Rather, the dialogical significance of
critical self-reflection of all the parties or cultures involved, is located in ethical
responsibility for each other. If this dialogical significance does not go beyond the
cultural boundary, but remains within the pursuit of one's own development and
discovery, then there is a danger of re-building the boundary again, or re-crossing
back to one's 'own' territory. Consequently, this relation must be based on the
118 Richard Shaull, "Foreword" to Pedagogy of the Oppressed, by Paulo Freire, trans, by Myra
Bergman Ramos (New York: Continuum, 1984), p. 15.
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ethical responsibility of 'togetherness,' indicating an ultimate future, otherwise, we
will repeat the same mistakes all over again.
As the inter-cultural encounters and studies indicate, what we are looking for
is not just an authenticity of identity, but a kind of identity that follows and
contributes to human togetherness and ethical responsibility for all. This is not just
emphasising one's cultural uniqueness and difference over against the others in
setting of public policies or educational developments. It should be done in
conjunction with a recovery of the way in which human togetherness can be
achieved. The implication of inter-cultural discourse is focused on ethical space, a
third space of 'in-between,' as each culture comes out from its own territory to the
border and gains the meaning of 'the third' through the effects of dialogue. The
implication of inter-cultural discourse in the third space is not an expression of a
theoretical understanding, but is rather a way of living actual life. With this
intention, the purpose of dialogical relation of being human means human solidarity.
In the light of the history of mankind viewed through a post-colonial
discourse that re-iterates the ethical responsibility for the Other, the act of God in
Jesus is the supreme act of ethical manifestation for all. The Incarnation is the
greatest outpouring of God's own self to this world - kenosis, that is the act of God
in relation to the world and the embodiment of God in Jesus, with the world. In his
act, the Incarnate Word living 'among us' creates a different space, where everyone
can engage. The act of God in Jesus, is an ethical one of self-emptying, not a
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theoretical one for Christians exclusively, and therefore, Jesus is the dialogue itself
in God's relation to the world.119
Ethical responsibility in dialogue, as shown in this act of God - the
Incarnation, restores the possibility of hope, peace and justice in human solidarity for
all, since the act of God in Jesus, is the willingness and its manifestation to be with
the world. It is participating in the event of Jesus, as David Kerr describes the act of
God in Jesus: "His lived message was world-denying only in the conditional sense of
opposition to the tragic human temptation to espouse the lower values of transient
creation." Hence, in this ethical priority, dialogue restores humanity from "a moral
disqualification of humanity,"120 and from an institutionalised Western Christianity
that "deprives man of his freedom, of his responsibility, of his self-respect."121
What is restored through the dialogue based on ethical responsibility is hope in the
humanity God creates, and deepening that hope in faith. Dialogue is an act for the
future. The more we Christians participate in the event of Jesus, the more we
understand how God has willed to communicate with all human beings through
Jesus, and the more we will understand each other. Having a dialogue means going
toward the border that constitutes a mystery and assumes the ethical responsibility
for all. This is not a search for a new territory in which to stay or double/multiple
belonging to the territory, but rather acknowledging a limitation, from which a new
border-crossing or exodus begins toward hope in God and humanity, in its becoming.
119 David Kerr "Christology in Christian-Muslim Dialogue," in Christology in Dialogue, ed by Robert
F. Berkey and Sarah A. Edwards (Cleveland, OH: The Pilgrim Press, 1993), p. 206.
120 David Kerr, "Christology in Christian-Muslim Dialogue," in Christology in Dialogue, p. 206.
121 Ismail al-Faruqi, On Brabism: Urubah and Religion (Amsterdam: Djambatan, 1992), p.99, Cited
from David Kerr, "Christology in Christian-Muslim Dialogue," p. 207.
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It is only through dialogue that Christianity can discard its Western clothing,
clothing which has provided the idea that Western Christianity is non-historical one
122and ethically innocent, free from cultural limitations and ideologies. At the same
time, one's particular cultural militantism (or militancy), as well as in non-Western
culture, can be overcome and freed in the acknowledgement of limitedness and the
hope that comes from it. In this critical sense, dialogue enables us to achieve a self-
distantiation from the inherited tradition or belief and opens us to a vision of hope in
the good, and justice for all. This is not to close oneself up in subjectivity on the
basis of one's freedom, but means being responsible for the Other and standing in an
ethical space. Moreover, as seen in Levinas, it is a breaking of 'my' narcissistic
world of self-development, a conversion to a radical reversal or reorientation of the
self, in favour ofjustice for all.
Dialogue or the dialogical process rehabilitates the structure of academic
study that has been supporting the status quo on behalf of the dominant tradition and
professionalised intellectuals, and uncovers the hidden layers of ideology and power-
relations. As the meaning of dialogue is "talking through" the barrier,123 its function
is to 'break-through' (or break-down) familiar and comforting categories.124 Thus,
pedagogical sites must have a vision that is not content with the status quo but is
dedicated to transforming the very conditions that promote such conditions. In one
122 Johann Baptist Metz, "The 'One World': A Challenge to Western Christianity," in Radical
Pluralism and Truth: David Tracy and the Hermeneutics ofReligion, ed by Werner G. Jeanrond and
Jenniffer L. Rike (New York: Crossroad, 1991), p.205.
123 David Kerr, "Christology in Christian-Muslim Dialogue," p. 207
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sense, dialogue has a diagnostic function in examining the historical, socio-political
and economic factors of the present discourse, to give the intellectual or educational
system the most serious ethical obligation and responsibility for the oppressed or
victim. Since religion is a response/protest and "fundamentally a defiant gesture"
against the problem of suffering, from an affirmation of life,125 dialogue is religious
and theological in the way in which it protests the power-relation that causes
suffering, and demands an ethical action for it. Theology and its task are profoundly
based in the human historical situation. Religious hope means that all are required to
"do justice, love kindness, and walk humbly with our God" (Micah 6:8).
Being engaged in dialogue means resisting the power of oppression and
manipulation and the dangerous illusion ofpure reason and rationality, in the hope of
peace and justice for all in human solidarity, in the future. Dialogue is a theological
act of faith following the kenosis of God in Jesus. In the dialogical event, the
temporal moment becomes the realisation of the ultimate meaning that comes from
the future. In this vision, we reject the recovery of the self in terms of its self-
identity, but rather promote a 'togetherness' that is conditioned from the 'oughtness'
animating one's ethical action in relation to the Other. The 'oughtness' of ethics
orients the discourse that links the socio-political setting and subject-religious
experience, and puts them into faithful action for justice and peace, in human
solidarity. Theology as a form of dialogical discourse functions as cultural criticism
124 John D. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutical Project
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987), p. 269.
125 John D. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, p. 280.
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in questioning the ethical question and criticising self-development, and offers a new
affirmative vision of the future.
Christianity is a religion of ethical responsibility. Our relationship with God
is ethical, proclaimed by the prophet Jeremiah "to stand up for the poor and the
needy is what I call knowing Me - says Yahweh" (Jer. 22:16). The ethical demand
of the Other is required in Christianity; doing justice to the Other brings 'us' closer to
God. This is taking responsibility for the Other, not just representing or scapegoating
the Other for 'me.' Taking responsibility breaks the mechanism of 'sacred violence'
as shown in the event of Jesus, and means recognising the silence of the victim,
listening to the voice of the victim, and defending the victim:
A voice was heard in Ramah,
wailing and loud lamentation,
Rachel weeping for her children;
she refused to be consoled,
because they are no more.
(Matt 2:18 and Jer 31:15)
5. Beyond Interpretation
The starting point of theological thinking is to be found not in the classical
epistemological and ontological representation, but in concrete responsibility for the
Other, as God acts in solidarity with the world in the event of Jesus, the incarnate
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word engaging in a dialogical relation. The dialogical relation does not happen
simply in relation to one another, but in relation to a third one, the divine initiative in
overcoming the infinite gulf between God and man. In this respect, what is being
proposed is our participation in the event of Jesus, not a particular quality of his
personhood, especially in relation to other cultures and religions. The event of Jesus
reveals, as in Girard, the victim based concept of the sacred in religion and the
community as falsehood. The event of kenosis as God's incarnation, secularises the
sacred structure and mentality that creates a separation from the Other. The kenosis
as God's self-revelation, questions the human idea of truth and its related ideology.
This kenotic act of God in Jesus brings a new meaning of God and man into the
discourse, and liberates from the myth that held human thoughts for a long time. It
has a significance for today: it leads to an effort to integrate one's subject position
(traditionally of the West) into a continual change of its existence that can only be
sustained by the global historical development of the humanity. This means
positioning oneself within the network of different others, and orienting oneself in
this relation and developing a new sense of attitude and of responsibility to respond
to the Other, in committing oneself in the relation.
Theology as a reflection on kenosis opens new possibilities in theological
discourse, in understanding God, self and world, and in developing and promoting
self-critical thought for a new form of discourse. It reclaims the mystery of God who
has been domesticated by theological dogmatisms and a rational-functionalism that
"opens the door to idolatry, and the dominant idols are, in the end, those of the
powerful." Hence, "if we let human beings design God, then the socially dominant
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result will not be a deity fitted to the needs of the oppressed of the world." This
kenotie theology based on the incarnation suggests an alternative, it re-defines the
meaning of Christianity within our own culture;
The only way to communicate Christian faith with passion in a
culture like ours without asserting cultural dominance in a way
that is offensive to our neighbors and at odds with the central
themes of the Christian stories is to keep rejecting the advantages
that Christianity's residual cultural status could provide. We as
Christian have to keep making ourselves into outsiders who can
speak with a prophetic voice.127
Participating in the event of Jesus means identifying with the oppressed, because
solidarity with the victim and the oppressed is solidarity with God. Christian life
consists in following the kenotic life of Jesus, the mystery of God, as Christians
reflect the ethical responsibility taken by God in Jesus, for humanity. In this ethical
responsibility that exists in a physical setting, theology should be able to provide
insight into the contemporary human living situation and public discourse, and see
the trace of God in others, in ordinary discourse. It raises a question and initiates a
discourse that breaks the totalising system and monologic discourse of the world:
silence is not possible.
In theology and Christian living as the border-crossing, we do not claim any
territory as home; we break tribal identity and the solitude of the subject into a
relation with others in a proximity that preserves the Other's mystery from
126 William C. Placher, The Domestication of Transcendence: How Modern Thinking about God Went
Wrong (Louiville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), p. 16.
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totalisation. The goal of Christian hermeneutics is to reveal the mechanisms of
oppression and violence, and expose them in the light of ethics as the first
philosophy, and then rehabilitate them for the sake of freedom and justice in human
solidarity before God. This is to uncover the structure of our desire and violence,
and see the truth of the victim as articulated in Isa. 52:13-53:12., witnessing the event
of Jesus, the Man-God. The starting point of theology should be based on the
vision and hope for the future from the victim's perspective - a participation in God's
initiatives toward the world in history: with the prophetic suspicion that conceives of
history as injust and broken. This is to take responsibility for the oppressed and the
victim and through the vision of the future that renders hope, we have faith in God.
What is important is not a theoretical understanding, but our commitment and
attitude, the sense of faith that relates ourselves to the Other in an ethical relation of
dialogue, in its becoming. In kenotic praxis, there is an exodus toward the Other
away from 'home,' into the border. This means dialogising and responding to the
question of the Other; it is to live and grow as we learn and hear the voices of others
and to engage in discourse with them for the joint-inquiry towards hope for the future
- peace, justice, and human solidarity - that comes from faith in God. Therefore,
dialogue re-claims our human togetherness and solidarity in action before God, in
"the desire for a better country" (Heb. 11:16), the great time of carnival in which
everyone participates and shares in new life.
127 William C. Placher, Narratives of a Vulnerable God: Christ, Theology, and Scripture (Louiville:




This study is about the ethical relation to the other, and as the I have studied
the other, the I have been interpreted and interrogated by the other. This study has
endeavoured to expose the inner mechanism of human societies in its tendency to
essentialise I and to totalise and fix others in the system of representation, as shown
in the dominant Eurocentric discourse that divided the world into 'the West and the
rest' and even in contemporary multiculturalism in the West. Since the same
mechanism has operated within Western theological discourses, its relationship with
other religions and traditions has also existed within a self justifiable totalising
system, marginalising and demonising different others. Moreover, religious
institutions have played a role to justify such 'violences' as the energy of social
system, since they maintain the status quo. Thus, this study shows how deeply
rooted this mechanism is, within our cultural formations, socio-political systems and
even theological discussions.
In this contemporary theological discourse, therefore, we need to question the
fundamental assumptions and unexamined traditions of religious orthodoxy and its
cultural system, in order to break the totalising system and then, place them in
relation to others. This critical discourse has not only relativised the dominant
Western discourse, but also exposed essentialising and totalising tendencies in non-
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Western discourses which articulates only their own difference and uniqueness
against all that is called 'Western' (i.e. militant particularisms and tribalisms). This
means that theologians need to transform themselves from traditional intellectuals or
theologians who are instruments of particular traditions, to become critical
theologians who are aware of the ideological underpinnings of the particular opinions
they express, and who are willing to listen to the others, and moreover engage in
dialogical relationships.
Thus, theology should be a dialogically engaging discourse that places us into
a relation with others, reverses the mechanism of totalising power, and awakens a
sense of responsibility that comes from justice for all. This dialogical engagement
reflecting the Incarnation of Christ, God's engagement to us, should be a theological
consciousness and attitude that commits people to dialogical interaction with others.
Theological discourse should be self-critical and creative at the same time, since
there is no room for monologic truth that pretends to be the ultimate word. This
dialogically engaging theology should be an open and evolving discourse, since
theology is not a set of doctrines, but that which shows what it is to be human and
what a human being ought to be in a real living relationship with others. It should
be rooted in the future and in the process of realisation of a goal that is always yet-to-
be-achieved. Everything must be viewed in the light of the question of the future, so
that a particular culture or tradition cannot be closed within itself as something
already made or completely finished, but rather something that is open and
unfinished, and to exist in the future. We need a theological discourse that faces the
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future, the future redemption of the entire creation, the consummate fulfilment of all
things.
Theology that exists in the hope of future can save religion from the self-
isolation, and become a critical public discourse that questions and challenges the
socio-political ideology and its mechanisms which marginalise and oppress people.
Theology thus becomes a critical way of resisting hegemony and identifying with
those who are its victim, in an attempt to achieve the vision of future - peace, justice,
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